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Abstract
For over three decades, U.S. proscribed the transfer of advanced nuclear technologies to 
India -  being a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT). In 1998, in an 
unparalleled challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, India traversed the nuclear 
threshold and declared itself a nuclear weapon state, inviting repulsiveness of Washington in the 
form of sanctions. India's pursuit for advanced technology posed a persistent challenge to the NPT- 
centric nuclear non- proliferation regime. Despite the technological embargoes imposed by U.S, 
India's nuclear breakout in 1998 was inevitable and U.S. couldn't deal with it effectively.
Article IX of the NPT, which details its membership, states very clearly the criteria of membership of 
the treaty but bypasses completely the issue of the non-members who are nuclear states. This is 
consequential, of course, from the premise that states that tested after 1967 are not NPT -  
recognized nuclear weapon states, as detailed in the same article. By 2005, there is a complete 
transformation in U.S nuclear policy and so the Bush administration resumes full civilian nuclear 
cooperation with India. As India fits that description, a contract between India and a member of NPT 
becomes problematic and controversial. The 2005 U.S. -India nuclear cooperation agreement 
provoked sharp reactions and opened up a new Pandora's box. The indo-nuclear deal suggests trade 
in nuclear energy for peaceful purposes between the United States which is the signatory of the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT), and India, which is not.
This research examines the evolution of the change in the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy 
towards India. It looks at the triad relationship between U.S. Nuclear non-proliferation policy, India's 
nuclear non-proliferation policy and the Nuclear non-proliferation Regime. The research through 
this triad relationship investigates whether this Nuclear deal between India and U.S. marks a major 
change or just a tweak in the nuclear non -proliferation regime to accommodate a de facto nuclear 
state that is India within the regime. This study utilises regime theory to investigate whether the
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Indo-US nuclear accord fits in the existing fabric of the nuclear regime, which offers no broader 
framework for countries that have not signed the NPT and yet are in effect nuclear weapon states. 
The trajectory of the U.S.-lndia relationship was checked by huge antagonism with respect to the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. This thesis displays an intriguing, presumably remarkable, 
detailed analysis of how unique points of view with respect to a specific regime can create friction 
between two states—particularly, if one state is an advocate and a participant and the other is 
a non-participant. This research further highlights how a non-member state, that declined to accede 
to an establishing agreement of a regime, was accommodated within the setting of the principles 
and norms of the regime. This thesis could be valuable to other remarkable cases, particularly 
where the enthusiasm of the international group lies in the general acceptance of a regime.
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Chapter I
Introduction
The US directed the establishment of a global non-proliferation regime -  a web of treaties, IAEA 
(International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards and export control arrangements with a purpose 
of monitoring and restricting the spread of nuclear technology. The Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty 
(NPT) is the core of the nuclear Non-proliferation regime (China, France UK, Russia and US). It is a 
universal treaty with 187 member states, including five recognized nuclear weapon states. The three 
de facto nuclear states India, Israel and Pakistan have not signed the NPT. Engaging these 
states in the global non- proliferation regime remains above all a long term objective because they 
have tested their nuclear weapons and can join NPT only as non-nuclear weapon states.^ The NPT 
centric nuclear regime is under considerable stress because of the threat of proliferation of nuclear 
weapons post 9/11 assuming a complex dimension, as it continues to confront the issues of 
compliance . For instance for long Iran, a signatory of the treaty is thought to be fabricating uranium 
enrichment plants, possibly for weoponization. Earlier Libya and North Korea both the member 
states of Nuclear non-proliferation treaty diversified their civilian nuclear technology towards 
developing nuclear weapons.
Paradoxically, with the threat of conventional natural resources of energy such as oil, coal 
diminishing and concerns that the use of fossil fuels is precipitating climate change, nuclear power is 
being gradually flogged as a clean, green and affordable elucidation for the energy crisis. As of 
August 2011, there are a total of 440 nuclear reactors operating in 29 countries generating 366GW 
of energy.^ The very current Fukushima Daiichi nuclear crisis uncovered the potential hazards of 
nuclear reactors; yet, except for the solidification of safety codes, it seems likely that this incident
 ^ The five  Nuclear powers recognized by the treaty-hove la id down in article IX o f the NPT that only those count as nuclear weapon states 
which exploded a nuclear device before January 1st, 1967.
International Atomic Energy Agency, Num ber o f Reactors In operation Worldwide. The US has a maximum num ber of 104 reactors which 
is in operation, France at 58 and japan 50. Currently India has 20 reactors in operation. Available at h ttp ://w w w .iaea .org/cgi- 
bin/db.page.pl/pris.oprconst (accessed January23,2012).
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will spoil the ardent global quest for nuclear power. With the spread of nuclear technology for 
civilian purposes the probability of acquiring nuclear weapons is higher as well, and so this quest for 
nuclear materials requires international cooperation for even handed sharing of the nuclear 
technology in an environment which is safeguarded. Or else it might have an effect on the fault line 
of the NPT -centric regime which rests on a fine balance of unequal compulsions and approach to 
nuclear technology between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states.
In this setting India speaks to an extremely intriguing detailed analysis. Since the 1950s, India sought 
after a civilian nuclear project to consummate its development aims and goals, uninhibited by the 
US led nuclear non-proliferation regime. In 1968, India intensely contradicted and declined to 
sign the NPT, testing that the bargain is oppressive. In 1974 India conducted (Pokhran Nuclear test) 
the peaceful nuclear explosion "Smiling Bhudda." The U.S. reaction to India's nuclear explosion 
iposed a system of technological cartels essentially steered at forbidding India's access to nuclear 
technology and materials unless it adhere to NPT. India proceeded to defiantly decline to sign the 
NPT calling it unsuitable; in this manner it dismisses CTBT on comparative grounds. Emulating the 
decision of the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 and the decision by major powers to  propel 
India to sign CTBT, it was clear that the arrangement of nuclear vagueness was no more suitable, 
With the Pokhran II tests in May 1998, India at last relinquished its equivocalness and declared itself 
to be nuclear weapon power. As strobe Talbot said "  India had put the world on notice that it was 
now- unambiguously, unapologetically and irrevocably- a nuclear armed power.
The first genuine leap forward for India came in the last two years of Clinton's presidency. The 
Jaswant Singh- Strobe Talbot dialog, which started in June 1998, was the most compelling and the 
most genuine set of exchanges between the two nations. After the thorough benchmarks forced by 
the Clinton administration, the new approach of George W Bush came like a spout of fresh air. 
Forgetting about these benchmarks. Bush declared his enthusiasm toward moulding a "strategic
 ^strobe Talbot, Engaging lndia,Diplomacy,Democracy and the Bomb, Viking/penguin books: New De!hi,2004, p.5.
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partnership" with India. It appeared that the Bush administration was helpfully side-lining non­
proliferation concerns to engage a partner in South Asia. The change in the U.S. policy approach 
after 11 September, 2001 has likewise acted as a solid impetus in the conclusion of nuclear deal 
with India. India's nuclear weapons project is a by-result of its civilian nuclear programme: 
consequently, any nuclear accord with India includes a probability of nuclear proliferation. 
Nonetheless, the Bush administration recognized India as a "responsible" nuclear power and the U.S. 
India Nuclear cooperation agreement was marked into law in Dec 2008.
Tellis outlined the administration's argument just prior to the 18 '^’ July 2005 jo int statement by U.S 
and India:
Washington....has clearly placed its biggest bets on New Delhi, 
expecting that transformed bilateral relations would aid India in a 
manner that would ultimately advance America's own global 
interest with respect to defeating terrorism, arresting further 
proliferation, and preserving a stable balance of power in Asia 
over the long term...The administration has concluded, however- 
and correctly- that a strong and independent India represents a 
strategic asset, even when it remains a partner and not a formal 
ally. This judgment is rooted in the belief that there are intrinsic 
conflicts of interest between India and the United States.
Consequently, transformed ties that enhance the prospect for 
consistent 'strategic coordination' between Washington and New 
Delhi serve US interests just as well as any recognized alliance."*
This accord has caused polemical problems to the NPT regime and to the possibilities for nuclear 
disarmament: Conundrums created by one of the NPT's original sponsors setting out in partnership 
with one of its non-adherents in a manner quite unexpected under existing NPT regime. Proponents 
of the deal argued that the founding logic of the NPT is to prevent proliferation and as
 ^As Endowment for International Peace .Ashley J. Tellis, 'South Aslan Seesaw; A new US policy on the Sub-continent', Carnegie 
Endowment, July, 200S.
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India remains outside that framework, a parallel process outside the NPT must be initiated so 
that India might be brought under the banner of counter proliferation measure. Even though the 
deal is for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, opponents of the deal argued that the supplementing 
India's limited Uranium reserves free up the Indian indigenous reserves for use in the development 
of the Nuclear weapons, Daryl Kimball of the arms control association argues that by opening up 
the spigot for foreign nuclear fuel supplies to India, this deal would free up India's limited domestic 
reserve of uranium for both energy and weapons to be singularly devoted to arms production in the 
future.^
The Joint Statement between President Bush and Prime Minister Singh issued on 18 July, 2005 set 
out different angles of USA nuclear strategic cooperation with India in future. Splitting far from the 
long haul US non-proliferation accord. President Bush perceived India as "a resposible state with 
cutting edge nuclear technology." He submitted himself to attempting to accomplish "full 
Civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as it understands its objectives of promoting nuclear 
energy and attaining energy security." The key objectives are:-
a) Seek agreement from the US Congress to adjust domestic laws and policies.
b) Work with friends and allies to adjust restrictive international regimes so that India can benefit 
from "full nuclear energy cooperation and trade."
On his part Prime Minister Manmohan Singh committed India to:
a) "Separate its civilian and military nuclear facilities and programmes in a phased manner",
b) "Place voluntarily its civilian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
safeguards",
c) "Sign and adhere to IAEA's Additional Protocol with respect to civilian nuclear facilities",
d) "Continue unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing",
e) "Work with the US for the conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty" (FMCT),
 ^ Daryl G.Kimball, 'US-lndia Nuclear deal fails Non-Proliferation test'.Arms Control Association website, March2006,accessible at 
http://www.arm scontrol.Org/pressroom/2006/20060302_inclia_Deal.asp
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f) "Put in place comprehensive export controls on sensitive goods and technologies" and
g) 'Harmonise and adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Supplier 
Group (NSG) guidelines.
Since July 2005, both India and the USA have undertaken various activities as needed under the Joint 
Statement. India, for example, has submitted a Nuclear Separation Plan to the US in March 2006; the 
US Congress then passed the Henry J. Hyde United States-lndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation 
Act in December 2006 and both India and the USA have discharged the 123 Agreement in August 
2007 that tries to make an interpretation of the law into a mutually accepted bilateral framework.
The Henry Hyde Act gave the Bush Administration power to waive certain prerequisites of the US 
law in order to allow civilian nuclear cooperation between the US and India. The enactment obliged 
that any ensuing understanding could just be executed with congressional support. In this manner it 
is considered as an empowering Act. There are a few inconsistencies between the Hyde Act and the 
123 Agreement. There are things that are spelled out in the Hyde Act however not in the 123 
accord, (for example, the testing issue). Once more, the Hyde Act provided waivers for 
specific procurements of the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and not for others. Case in point, it provided a 
waiver to stop exports to India after the 1998 nuclear test, however it doesn't make clear that U.S. 
nuclear export help will be suspended in the event that India tests once more.
The Salient Features of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal are contained in the jo in t statement of July 18, 
2005 issued by India and the United States, which also envisaged bilateral cooperation in other 
areas, but the emphasis on the civilian nuclear technology cooperation was clear, and its terms 
constituted some one half of the jo int statement.® The United States recognised India therein to be 
'a responsible' state with advanced nuclear technology, obfuscating the reality that it cannot be 
recognized as a de jure nuclear weapon state. U.S. also pledged that 'India should acquire same
® P.R.Chari, "Introduction: The Indo -U S  nuclear deal. Seeking Synergy in Bilateralism", Routledge (2009),5
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benefits and advantages as other such states, for which the president will seek ' agreement from the 
congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and 'will work with friends and allies to adjust 
international Regimes' to enable civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.^
In the global arena, nonetheless, the Indo-US nuclear accord has made argumentative issues. The 
disagreement between India's status as a de facto nuclear weapon state and its de jure status as a 
'non-nuclear weapon state' under the terms of the NPT has not been raised in essence in any of the 
authority US archives. Since the conflict itself can't be redressed so long as India sticks to its de facto 
status, its accomplice, the US needed to work to guarantee that others concerned may get to be 
submissive some way or another to the Indo-US nuclear partnership. Both President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh and their administration authorities have been well mindful of this conflict. Singh 
commented that his jo int proclamation with Bush in July 2005 'did not allude to India as a nuclear 
weapons state' on the grounds that it had 'a specific undertone in the NPT', yet that the 
announcement 'unequivocally recognized the presence of India's military nuclear facilities.
One basis created by the Bush administration is 'bringing India closer to the [nuclear] non­
proliferation regime'. Envoy Gregory L. Schulte, US Permanent Representative to the IAEA said that 
'bringing India into the nuclear non-proliferation regime' is 'a key reward' of executing the US-lndia 
Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative and permitting civil nuclear export between India and interested 
nations in Europe.
The US House-Senate conference on the Hyde Act of 2006 expressed that India's obligations to 
secure its nuclear materials and nuclear and missile technology through exhaustive export control 
enactment and through harmonization and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime 
(MTCR) and NSG guidelines are 'basic to bringing India closer to the non-proliferation regime, one of 
the gains credited to U.S. nuclear cooperation with India by the Administration'. Yet, the Hyde Act 
states: 'Nothing in this title  [Hyde Act] constitutes power for any activity infringing upon a
 ^ Ibid, 5
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commitment of the United States under the NPT'. (Sec. 105. United States Compliance with its 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Obligations).
This asserted justification of the combative status of India and the new US position makes issues 
more entangled. US president Carter suggests that the Indo-US nuclear deal 'undermines the NPT.
In the event that India's special demands are satisfactory, why restrain other technologically 
developed NPT signatories, for example, Brazil, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Japan?
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty legitimized the disparity of status between the nuclear weapon 
states and the non-nuclear weapon states. In any case, the NPT likewise encompasses that each of 
the members "undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to 
cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on 
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control" (Article VI.) This 
has been a steady leitmotif going through positions taken by non-nuclear weapon states, since the 
time that they acknowledged the NPT as a deal with the nuclear weapon states.
After the first review conference of the NPT in 1975, it has been clear that the nuclear weapon states 
consider the NPT 'as an end in itself, while all, or practically all, non-nuclear weapon states members 
to the NPT have regarded the arrangement 'as a transitional stage in a procedure of nuclear 
disarmament'. The disappointment of the nuclear weapon states to work as per the Article VI 
procurement has permitted the US and India to conclude the 123 accord.
In this thesis I try to evaluate and examine the Triad relationship between U.S Nuclear Non­
proliferation Policy, India's Nuclear Non-proliferation policy and the Nuclear non-Proliferation 
Regime.
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Research Question:
My research study investigates the following question:
Does the India-U.S. nuclear accord commemorate a complete change of, or an amendment within, 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
1. How did the U.S. attempt to adjust India within the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
This dissertation rather than examining the U.S.-lndia nuclear cooperation agreement in a bilateral 
context, it examines the triadic relationship between the U.S., India, and the nuclear non­
proliferation regime to determine whether the U.S. civil nuclear cooperation with India undermines 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime or represents an accommodation to bring India within the 
global nuclear governance. It highlights how contending perspectives of a leading nuclear non­
proliferation regime promoter (the U.S.) and a regime nonparticipant (India) impinge on the bilateral 
relations of the two countries. This research fleshes out the change in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation 
policy, during the Bush administration that culminated in a U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement in July 
2005. It also explores the role of the Clinton administration in changing Washington's nuclear non­
proliferation stance toward New Delhi. The 2005 U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement is a recent 
development, therefore, there are has been less comprehensive literature on this subject to analyse 
the circumstances and factors that catalysed this nuclear pact; this study tries to overcome this 
knowledge deficit. The literature review exposed the lack of any theoretical analysis to provide an 
impartial understanding of the U.S.-lndia nuclear pact. Thus, this dissertation employs the regime 
theory to objectively analyse the significance of the U.S.-lndia nuclear pact.
The thesis has examined the ongoing inquiry of a developing nation's mission for cutting edge 
nuclear technology with the end goal of sustainable nuclear energy and economic development.
With the expanding stress on energy sources, more developing countries will be enticed to saddle
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nuclear energy for development purposes. This looming nuclear renaissance could challenge the 
delicate, yet lopsided, offset of commitments of nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon 
states hallowed in the NPT. This research underscores the requirement for new strategies that 
empower fair use of nuclear energy by NNWS and NWS, yet diminish the danger of nuclear 
proliferation. It further highlights that the nuclear dilemma between the advancement of nuclear 
technology and the threat of nuclear proliferation—has been managed to some extent, all things 
considered, however it has not as yet been fully resolved. The extension of restraints on the transfer 
of nuclear technology prompts a demand for impartial treatment and there is an expanding weight 
on the NWS to satisfy their commitments to disarmament as honoured in Article VI of the NWT. 
W ithout any concrete commitment by NWS, there is risk that the nuclear deal may turn out to be 
the fault line of the nuclear regime.
It is key to test and assess the criticalness of 2005 U.S. nuclear agreement with India which has 
switched the decades old Washington's approach of limiting India's entrée to get nuclear 
technology, with dire consequences for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. To begin with the 
strategy movement is straightforwardly identified with the proliferation of nuclear technology and 
weapons, which is a critical issue for global security. Succeeding U.S. administrations have indicated 
stanchness to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and sombrely clung to the technological 
embargoes dispatched because of India's 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion. Second, the Nuclear 
agreement with India indicates a confusion in the U.S non-proliferation strategy and encroaches on 
the "legitimacy and fairness"® of the nuclear regime. The 2005 civil nuclear accord, provided dual -  
use of nuclear technology to India, which never signed the NPT, thus making it "Not eligible for such 
cooperation under NPT auspices."®
This is ideal time for a detailed observation of this issue, as this is a very recent change in the U.S. 
non-proliferation approach and there is dearth of exhaustive research on the ramifications of this
T.V Paul "the US-lndia Nuclear Accord: implications for the Proliferation Regime." International Journal (Autumn 2007):419. 
® Micheal Ruhle/'Enlightenment in the Second Nuclear Age", international Affairs 83, no.3 (M ay 2007).
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nuclear accord on the non-proliferation regime. This exploration is noteworthy in numerous regards. 
There was shortage of apparatuses to equitably assess the effect of the adjustment in the U.S 
nuclear approach on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This study steadily inspects the triadic 
relationship among U.S., India, and the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It concentrates on how 
vying viewpoints of a heading nuclear non-proliferation regime advocate (the U.S.) and regime non­
member (India) influence the reciprocal relations between the two nations.
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CHAPTER II
Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
Theoretical Framework
In the arguments and discussions that followed the signing of the U.S. India nuclear cooperation 
agreement, the nucleus of the debate was on the implications of the nuclear agreement, on the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Quite a number of scholars fe lt that engaging India in nuclear 
trade was detrimental to the regime, but there is scarcity of objective tools to comprehend this 
change vis-a vis the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The security debate regime has suffered from 
the mistaken assumption that such regimes must cover the entire area of security. This research 
engages regime analysis to apprehend whether India-U.S. nuclear accord commemorates a complete 
change of, or an amendment within, the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
Over the last many years. International Regimes appeared as a major focus of empirical research and 
scrutiny and theoretical debates within the international relations. Yet the field remained closely 
tied to the study of formal organizations, missing a range of state behaviour that nonetheless 
appeared regulated or organized in a broader sense. The idea of International Regimes was 
proposed by John Ruggie in the mid 1970's. He defined International regimes as "a set of mutual 
expectations, rules, and regulations, plans and organisational energies, and financial commitments 
which have been accepted by a group of states."^® A wider and the most used definition was 
presented in 1983 by Stephen D. Krasner, where he defined international regimes as; "sets of 
implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision making procedures around which actors
John Gerard Ruggie, "international Responses to  Technology: Concepts and Trends," International Organisation 34(Sum m er 1975):570
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expectations converge in a given area of international relations. Principles are beliefs of facts, 
causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and 
obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision making procedures 
are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice"^^.Stephen Krasner's 
influential definition seeks a middle ground between "order" and explicit commitments; it stresses 
the normative dimension of international politics.
The mainstream concept of international regimes has two important theoretical roots, namely 
structural realism and the issue-area approach. Mainstream regime theory draws heavily on 
structural realism. It borrows the concept of actors in the international system as unitary and 
rational behaving units that act to promote their interests in a given situation. The decision to adopt 
this structural approach entails a severe limitation of the focus of regime analysis.^^ It ignores the 
factors leading to the emergence, change or disappearance of international regimes initiating from 
the unit level. Keohane and Nye juxtaposed the realist analytical model of world totally dominated 
by the overall power structure with an opposing ideal type, namely complex interdependence, which 
altered three fundamental assumptions of political realism in the light of empirical observations. 
Regime analysis attempted to fill the lacuna by defining a focus that was neither as broad as 
international structure, nor as narrow as the study of formal organizations. Regime analysis assumed 
that patterns of state action are influenced by norms, but that such norm-generated behaviour was 
wholly consistent with the pursuit of national interest. Hence, the regimes literature can be vied as 
an experiment in reconciling the idealist and realist traditions.^®
Another School of thought that scholars argue plays a very important role in Regime analysis is 
Cognitivism (weak and strong). Cognitivists have been sharply critical of the neo liberal approach to
Stephen D. Krasner 1983. p 2 
http ://w w w .un i-
bam berR.de/fileadm in/uni/fakultaeten/sowi professuren/poiitikwissenschaft insb In t/D ateien/M ltarbelter/Publikationen Texterkennun  
g/dynamic inti regimes/DynamicRegimesl text.pdf (Accessed 1 2 /04 /2012 ).
Stephan Haggard; Beth A. Simmons, Theories o f international Regimes, International Organizations,(M \J  Press), Vo! 41,No.3 (Summer, 
1987),492
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international regimes that it limits as a theory of international regimes, and can be traced back 
directly to the various realist "heritages" still operative in the neoliberal theories. Thus, they criticize 
realists and neoliberals alike for treating actors' preferences and perceived options as exogenous 
'givens', i.e. as facts which are either assumed or observed, but not theorized about. It is useful to 
distinguish two strands within the cognitivist school of thought in regime analysis: 'weak' and 
'strong' cognitivism.^"* Weak or Minimalist cognitivists focus on the role of casual beliefs in regime 
formation and change.^®According to weak cognitivists, neoliberals and realists underrate both the 
degree of uncertainty which decision makers face in many issue areas today and their capacity for 
complex learning, which extends to both means and ends.^® Strong Cognitivists who are also given 
the names 'Relativists' and 'Constructivists' put emphasis on the social character of international 
relations. They reject the conception of states as rational actors, who are atomistic in the sense that 
their identities, power, and fundamental interest are prior to international society and its 
institutions. States are as much shaped by international institutions as they shape them.^^
Since then, the idea of International regimes has occupied the mainstream in international relations 
and is used in the subfields of international political economy and environmental politics with 
"Political Vigour." There is a core agreement amongst scholars that regimes are complex institutions 
i.e., human artefacts, thus, the process of change in inevitable in regimes. The mushrooming 
literature shows the momentous interest of the scholarly community in researching the monetary, 
trade, oceans and environmental regimes.^® Paradoxically, there has been very little scholarly 
analysis in the field of security regimes. In this milieu, Robert Jervis suggests that "this dearth of 
scholarly study is not the result of neglect, but rather Inherent in the nature of the subject. There is
"^* See Hasenclever,Mayer, and Rittberger, Theories, pp. 136 -9 ,154-7
See Judith Goldstein and Robert keohane, 'ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework', in Goldstein and Keohane(eds), Ideas 
and Foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and Political change (ithaca,NY:Corneil University Press,1993),pp. 3 -30  
®^ Joseph S.Nye,Jr., 'Nuclear Learning and Us-Soviet Security Regimes', In ternational Organization, 41  (1987), pp. 371-402  
^^See Alexander W endt, 'Collective Identity form ation and the International S ta te ', American Political Science Review, 88(1994), pp. 3 84 - 
96
®^ Helmut Breitmeier, Oran R.Young and Micheal Zurn, Analysing International Environmental Regimes: From Case -S tudy to Database, 
(M IT  Press, September 2006), I; Also see, Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the Non-Proliferation regime: Anomalies Contemporary International 
Relations Theory, "International Organization 41, no 2 (Spring 1987):253.
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little security regime analysis because there are currently no security regimes; regimes are more 
difficult to establish in the security arena than in the economic realm because of the inherently 
competitive cast of security concerns, the unforgiving nature of the problems, and the difficulty in 
determining how much security the state has or needs"/®
Even so, there is a decipherable regime that standardises the behaviours of states regarding 
horizontal nuclear non-proliferation of nuclear technology and materials, and research on the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime thrives, yet, there is lack of regime analysis in this particular arena. 
The security regime debate has suffered from the mistaken assumption that such regimes must 
cover the entire area of security. Security regimes are systems of principles, norms, rules, and 
procedures regulating certain aspects of security relationship between states. A regime exists when 
ail four elements can be identified and when the regime controls enough variables in a given issue 
area to affect (if obeyed) parties 'behaviour by channelling or terminating unilateral self-help with 
regard to the regulated variables.®®
Researchers regularly pose the question how we know a regime when we see one. A few responses 
have been offered to this issue. The expression "regime" is at times utilized within an absoiutely 
descriptive approach to group a range of state behaviours in a particuiar issue are, yet since the 
potential for tautology is high, this methodology has generally been discarded. Different Scholars 
have differentiated between accords and regimes. While agreements are established on the 
promotion of short term interests, regimes encompass "not only norms and expectations that 
facilitate cooperation, but also a form of cooperation that is more than a following of short-run self- 
interest."®^ Puchala and Hopkins point out " Regime exists in every substantive issue area in 
international relations where there is discernibly pattered behaviour, whenever there is regularity in
*'® Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes, "International Organisation 36, no.2 (Spring 1982):357
®® Muller, Haraid, "The internationalization of Principles, Norms, and Rules by Governments, The case o f Security Regimes", Regime
theory and International Relations, Clandon Press, Oxford, 1995. P.361
®^  Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes." international Organisation 36, no.2 (Spring 1982):357.
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behaviour, some kinds of principles, norms and rules must exist to account for it."^^ "An 
International regime is an authoritative arrangement among international actors (states) that 
facilitates the accomplishments of specific goals through a process involving coordination or 
expectations and modification of certain behaviour patterns."^^
There is a huge overlap in the in the academic debates and certain basic components of regime 
categorized, for example, such as multilateral agreements, patterned and regularized behaviours, 
issue area, and injunctions. Stephen Krasner's idea of Regime is regarded as a set of explanation. 
Nonetheless, even his definition has not gotten away with much criticism. Critics contend that the 
parts of regime-principles, norms, rules and decision making overlap theoretically and are hard to 
identify in this present reality. Keohane, in an effort to fuse it all, hypothesizes that "Regimes are 
institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments that pertain to particular sets of issues 
in international relations."^^
Despite the fact that, rules are the most perspicuous segment in Krasner's definition- being sure and 
powerful in assessing adjustment to the regime by members by singularly focusing on the rules and 
eliminating other components, the conceptualization of regime by Keohane is delicate. There may 
be numerous rules and decision making techniques that are predictable with the same principles 
and norms. Fascinatingly, Krasner recommends that principles and norms are the essential defining 
characteristic of the regime and in this way determine the rules and decision making procedures. 
Accordingly this evaluation of regime components, as researchers examine, confers a unique 
lavishness as to existing definitions, as it empowers the evaluation of regime viability and 
additionally regime change Krasners' regime explanation helps in categorizing three kinds of 
regime change. First, "Changes in rules and decision making procedures are changes within
Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from  the Inductive analysis,"/nternot/ono/ Organisation 36, 
no.2 (Spring 1982):247
Trevor McM orris Tate, "Regime-building in the Non-Proliferation System, "Journal o f Peace Research 27, no.4 (1990):402  
Robert Keohane, international institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations, (Boulder,Colorado:Westview  
Press,1984),4
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter M ayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories o f in ternational Regimes, (Cambridge University Press: New York, 
2002). 12-13; Levy et al. 273-4
21 I P a g e
regimes", provided that principles and norms are unchanged.^® Second, conversely, when principles 
and norms -  the primary defining elements of a regime- undergo modification, this marks "changes 
of the regime itself." This type of variation is revolutionary and suggests a replacement of one set of 
principles and norms by another set of principles.
The modifications in rules and procedures consistent with the principles and norms might be 
considered as adjustment within the regime. This could happen because of a few endogenous and 
exogenous factors. Third, Krasner states " If the principles, norms rules and decision making 
procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly inconsistent with 
principles, norms, rules and procedures, then a regime has weakened",^^ therefore this definition 
can help in judging the viability of the regime.
Prof Oran R, Young describes regimes as being "social structures and not to be confused with 
functions, though the operation of regimes frequently contributes to the fulfilment of certain 
functions".^^ He further notes that "international regimes, like other social institutions, are 
commonly products of the behaviour of large number of individuals or groups". He bemoans over 
the fact that there have been less consistent endeavours to clarify regime change or to defend the 
nuances of regimes in the period after their introductory development. Different researchers have 
attempted to study what is implied by regime conversion. Regimes may change about whether to 
shift crosswise over cases in no less than four ways: strength, organizational form, scope and 
allocation mode. Distinctive hypothetical methodologies address these variables, however are less 
helpful in clarifying others.^®
Despite there being huge literature on nuclear non-proliferation regimes, there has been a checked 
crevice in research that tests the progressions in the nuclear non-proliferation regime and take a
Krasner, "Intervening variables," 188 
lbid.,188
Oran R. Young Regime Dynamics: The rise and fall of international regimes. International Organization, vol.36. No. 2, International 
Regimes (Spring, 1982), 277  
Ibid ,280
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gander at it through the viewpoint of regime analysis. I have attempted to fill that crevice by 
drawing on Krasner's work and attempted to explore whether the U.S -  India civil nuclear accord 
brought on a complete modification (change in principles and norms), or a more minor tweak 
(Change in rules and procedures) within, the nuclear non-proliferation regime .
Methodology and Approach
The approach taken in this research is Rationalist. "The state is assumed to be rational—it makes 
purposive decisions that take reasonable account of its interests, and the international constraints 
and opportunities that it faces. The rational theory analyses the strategies a state should choose— 
which is essentially the same as assuming that the state is a rational actor. It focuses on cases in 
which the opposing state is also rational (and in which the state accurately believes this is the case). 
The theory understands institutions as primarily endogenous, reflecting states' motives and their 
international environment, and providing states with a means for achieving their goals"^^. "The 
rational theory would be crucial in telling us how well a state can do—for example, how much 
security it can achieve—in the face of the opportunities and constraints imposed by the 
international system. In other words, understanding the impact of the international system on 
states' behaviour requires a rational theory, even if states do not always act in line with its 
constraints.^^ They are first and foremost policy choices to be evaluated. As a result, the rationalist 
approach finds deep sources of international security cooperation in the states' international 
environment and their motives, not in the international security institutions that they create^^. The 
issue is that states ought not, when in doubt, use worst case assumptions-doing so implies 
continually waiving the potential profits of collaborating with a security seeker, including when the 
state accepts the opposing state is liable to be one. In actuality, accepting the most exceedingly
^^Glaser, L. Charles ' Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and C ooperation ', Princeton University Press 
2010,2-3
ibid
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worse requires the state to disregard a key part of the security problem the cost and risks of arming
while giving undue weight to the event of rivalry^*.
This raises the question of how to evaluate the rationalist approach? To perform this evaluation, "it 
explores the theory's key components, including its explicit assumptions about how to characterize 
states and the international environment; its implicit assumptions about states' abilities to 
understand their international environment, utilize their resources, and analyse their options; and its 
deductions. If the theory's assumptions are sufficiently accurate, its variables sufficiently complete, 
and its deductions logically sound, then the theory will effectively identify the trade-offs facing 
rational states and the strategies they should choose. This evaluation provides substantial 
confidence in the quality of the theory. Key assumptions, including that the state faces an anarchic 
inter-national environment and acts rationally, do not raise serious problems. Anarchy is an accurate 
description of the international environment. Rationality is central to the theory because it is 
designed to analyse the choices states make, the theory needs to assume the state acts rationally"^^.
This research assimilates document analysis followed with semi-structured interviews. This is 
qualitative study with emphasis, "on understanding and description, not on prediction." Document 
analysis is a form of qualitative research in which documents are interpreted by the researcher to 
give voice and meaning around the assessed topic or research question. I have few motives for 
choosing these two methods. First, this research aims to acquire an in depth understanding of the 
change in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy to involve India in nuclear commerce, after three 
decades of nuclear technological seclusion. Second, the issue under research is relatively unmapped 
therefore, massive amounts of information requires exploration and needs to be unearthed from 
primary documents. The same way it is expected that the interviews with nuclear policy experts will 
bring out a clear picture of this nuclear deal.
Ibid 19-20
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The field research for the study was conducted at several policy research centres, including 
government institutions in the United States and Qatar and Sharjah. I conducted field research in 
three stages. In January 2012,1 travelled to Washington DC, New York, and Philadelphia in the 
United States. I visited the Carnegie Endowment for Research, the Brookings Institution, Asia 
Society, The South Asia Centre, and Van Pelt Library, Philadelphia, Centre for Advanced Study of 
India, Philadelphia and Council of Foreign Relations (Appendix A). The same year in February, I 
travelled to Sharjah, UAE, where semi structured interviews were setup with two nuclear policy 
analysts from New Delhi, India. Two more interviews were set up at the Institute of Defence and 
Strategic studies, Islamabad Pakistan, in the same month. In the following year, in May-June 2013,1 
visited Doha, Qatar for further data collection and Interviews. In Doha, I conducted research at 
several policy-research institutions and libraries, including the RUSI Qatar (Appendix A). During the 
research visits to institutions and libraries, I collected data from primary documents such as policy 
papers, congressional testimonies, conference papers and reports, and policy proposals. In addition,
I collected secondary data from published materials such as newspaper articles, journal articles, and 
books.
For the purposes of data collection, purposeful and theory based sampling has been employed. 
Theory based sampling follows a more theory testing approach, that links finding individuals or cases 
that embody theoretical constructs, it involves on-going sampling process. Theoretical sampling 
could be considered a particular type of criterion; it is also capable of illustrating the overlaps that 
can exist between these categories. The strategy I used in purposeful sampling is snowball or 
network sampling.^^ This kind of sampling the researcher starts by identifying some individuals who 
are relevant to the study and then asking them to locate other useful informants. Patton remarks 
that this strategy involves identifying participants or "cases of interest from people who know... 
what cases are information rich, that is, good examples for study, good interview subjects."^^ Lincoln
M erriam  B., " Case Study Application",64
M.Q. Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, California: Sage Pubiishers,1990.p.l82
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and Guba emphasise tha t data collection should continue until the researcher gets to  a point o f 
saturation or redundancy in sampling^^. In a significant suggestion, Merriam states tha t during 
data collection or analysis, the researcher "m ight also look fo r exceptions (negative case 
selection) or variants (discrepant-case selection)^^." For Data analysis, I documented the patterns 
from the structure of the data and analysed them within the suggested theoretical and conceptual 
framework. Thus, I used these principles in my research; I continued collection till redundancy was 
observed, and resumed data collection as and when the need for further information arose.
I conducted semi-structured interviews with American, Indian and Pakistani scholars and policy 
experts (on nuclear non-proliferation, energy and related issues. South Asia and India) at various 
policy research and academic institutions. Based on my initial research, I prepared a list (Appendix B) 
of participants I intended to interview. Semi-structured interviews are utilized regularly within policy 
research. In semi-structured interviews, a guide is used, with questions and themes that must be 
covered. The questioner has some prudence about the order in which inquiries are asked, however 
the inquiries are standardized, and tests may be provided to guarantee that the analyst covers the 
right material. This sort of meeting interviews gathers detailed data in a style that is to a degree 
conversational. Semi-structured interviews are frequently used when the specialist needs to delve 
deeply into a theme and to understand altogether the responses provided. "This form of 
interviewing allows the researcher and participant to engage in a dialogue whereby initial questions 
are modified in the light of the participant's responses and the investigator is able to probe 
interesting and important areas which arise.''^°
Later, I employed a strategy related to purposeful sampling, that is, snowball or network sampling^^. 
Since the change in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation approach hoisted a storm of contention, one
Y.S. Lincoln and E.G. Guba, Naturalistic Enquiry (California: Sage Publishers. 1985). Also, see description of the term , "theoretical 
saturation," in Glaser and Strauss, "Strategies for Qualitative Research," 61.
M erriam  B., "Case Study Applications," 64.
Jonathon A. Smith and Mike Osborn, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, in Qualitative Psychology: A Practical Guide to Research 
Methods, ed., Jonathon A. Smith (London: Sage Publishers, 2003), 55.
M .Q . Patton, Qualitative Evaluation Methods, California: Sage Publishers, 1 99 0 .p .l82 .
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motivation behind the examination was to arrive at a target investigation of the conception of this 
change. In this study I precisely assigned pools of interviewees with expert knowledge of nuclear 
security and energy, South Asia, and India, and aptitude for non-proliferation and foreign policy; 
people with nongovernmental and administrative experience were included. The incorporation of 
interviewees from an assortment of foundations enriched the thesis and added significantly to my 
knowledge and examination of alternate points of view. Preceding the interviews, I arranged a 
survey of regular inquiries, alongside specific inquiries identified with the particular knowledge and 
expertise of the interviewee. These inquiries were supplemented with inquiries that developed amid 
the course of the meeting.
Six individuals (catalogued in Appendix B) who had considerable expertise on the Nuclear Energy, 
non-proliferation and U.S.-India, U.S.-South Asia issues were accessible for interviews. Broadly, the 
inquiries were connected to: factors that directed to key alteration in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation 
policy; the genesis of this transition; the motivations of the Bush administration to propose India's 
admission to nuclear technology; and implications of the U.S.-lndia nuclear rapprochement.
I wanted to comprehend the perspectives of key White House bureaucrats who were involved in 
crafting U.S. nuclear strategy in the direction of India during the Clinton and Bush administrations. 
One of the major problems faced was the lack of cooperation from the senior and high level officials 
in India and U.S. who had direct links to the Defence Ministry as well some who were a part of the 
Indo-US nuclear deal. I was able to interact with Ambassador Thomas Pickering through a journalist 
in US. He was my first point of contact to Thomas Pickering. Thomas Pickering, known as the best 
diplomat of his times, had served as ambassador to India in 1992-93 when India was reforming its 
economy and advancing in the direction of liberalisation. He afterward assisted as undersecretary 
for Governmental Matters in the Clinton Administration and played a vital role in setting up a crucial 
Strategic dialogue alongside India. After about two months' time a fully answered questionnaire was 
sent back to me directly from Ambassador Thomas Pickering's Office. I also interviewed South Asian
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Prominent Nuclear Analyst General Talat Masood who is a former Secretary for Defence production 
in the Ministry of Defence Pakistan.
J. P. Rothe recommends two phases of data analysis. First, the researcher looks "for patterns that 
appear in the data, then correlate them and link them to a context.^^" Second, the theoretical 
context selected by the researcher aids "as the vehicle for data analysis," which he labels, "deep- 
structure analysis."'^^ Similarly, Polkinghorne suggests that data analysis continues "with a 
movement between the proposed structural description and the examples until an account can be 
given which clarifies the data in the fullest manner."^^ Thus, I allowed the findings to appear from 
the structure of the data and analysed them within the proposed theoretical and conceptual 
framework.
Limitations of this Research
This research study has certain boundaries, so that the aims of the study do not get confused with 
factors and issues of little significance. The research topic is relatively topical, there is shortage of 
wide-ranging research studies, such as books, and thus the study heavily relied on journal articles 
and interviews for information, policy papers, and government documents and on newspaper 
articles to validate facts. It was very difficult to arrange interviews with Nuclear Policy experts; 
especially it was next to impossible to arrange any interview with the Indian Nuclear Policy expert, 
owing to the nature of the subject. On several occasions questionnaires were sent back completely 
blank or changed, which was quite unhelpful for the research. This research thus employs document 
analysis and a few semi-structured interviews, thus the snag inherent in these methods may be 
visible in the study. The July 18, 2005 jo in t statement conveyed by President Bush and Prime 
Minister Manmohan Singh, built the skeleton for the US.-India nuclear accord, the March 2006 Pact 
and eventually the August 2007( 123 Agreement) which was signed into law by President Bush in
Rothe, "Qualitative Research,"127. 
ibid.
Polkinghorne, "Systems of Inquiry," 272.
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December 2008 are viewed as commendable pointers of progression in U.S nuclear loom. The 
technicalities and legalities of this deal are beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Chapter III
Literature Review
The 2005 U.S. nuclear rapprochement with india denoted a noteworthy policy movement beginning 
formerly precluded civilian nuclear technology trade with India, a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non­
proliferation Treaty (NPT) and a de facto nuclear weapon state. The nuclear accord between U.S.- 
lndia brought about overflowing controversies as the Bush administration switched its domestic 
legislation and additionally international guidelines for nuclear trade. To create a rationale for this 
exploration, I seek to examine the standard explanations offered in the literature and show their 
inadequacies in clarifying the case nearby. The writing reflects a predominating affinity to investigate 
the ramifications of the U.s -india nuclear pact on the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
In this context, scholars can be pigeon-holed in three categories: "optimists" who accept that this 
agreement fortifies the nuclear non-proliferation regime; "pessimists" who have trepidations that 
the nuclear arrangement has a negative effect; moreover "cautious optimists" who view it as a 
constructive headway, however wish to assemble criteria to reassure that there is no domino effect. 
With the end goal of examination, the debates related to the U.S.-lndia rapprochement have been 
categorized as—"Responsible" nuclear conduct; proliferation creates domino effect; Trading w ith de 
facto nuclear states; disgruntled state and the Power Transition thesis. Unscrambling the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime and Conceptualization of regime analysis.
'Reliable/Responsible' Nuclear Conduct
The persistent U.S.-lndia nuclear estrangement not just encroached on bilateral relations; it likewise 
kept India outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime. On this record, a few experts (Ashok
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Kapur'^^ Vinod Kumar"^ ®, T.V. Paul"^ ,^ and Mahesh ShankaO are hopeful that the nuclear 
rapprochement between the U.S. and India is a positive improvement. Paul calls it a "radical 
activity," overall, the nuclear irritation in the middle of India and the West hinted at no signs of 
completion'^^. The nuclear agreement consigned India to submit its civilian facilities to International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and to sign the Fissile Material Control Treaty, along these 
lines bringing India into the non-proliferation system. Kapur contends, while NPT was "a bargain 
between two superpowers that was projected as the basis of international security," this agreement 
is a "bargain between an asymmetrical pair of powers that choose to come together in a challenging 
international [nuclear] environment." He likewise remarks that this agreement has "levelled the 
playing field in the sphere of nuclear negotiations between "nuclear haves" and "nuclear have- 
nots."^® Kumar, expanding the contention further, explains that a while ago India was not just 
missing in the non-proliferation regime, it was a focus of the globai nuclear export controls, and 
accordingly, India remained a latent pariah. Yet the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement with non­
proliferation as a vital component has modified the equation. It has made indispensable space and in 
addition a potential part for India to be proactive in "global anti proliferation efforts."^^
The focal premise of the NPT regime is non-proliferation of nuclear technology and weapons. It has 
been contended that India, regardless of being a NPT outlier, has singularly emulated the norm of 
non-proliferation. Along these lines, optimists accept that India merits recognition for its responsible 
conduct and needs to be remunerated with nuclear aid (Paul and Shankar^^ Anupam Srivastava and 
Seema Gahlaut” , Lisa Curtis and Baker Spring^^). In the nuclear non-proliferation circle.
Ashok Kapur, "Canada-lndia Nuclear Negotiations: Context and Process," in Canadian Poiicy on Nuciear Cooperation with india: 
Confronting New Dilemmas, ed., Karthika Sasikumar and Wade L. Huntley (Vancouver, B.C.: Simons Centre for Disarmament and Nuclear 
Proliferation Research, 2007).
Vinod A. Kumar, "Counterproliferation: India's New Imperatives and Options," Strategic Analysis (January-February, 2007).
T. V. Paul, "The US-lndia Nuclear Accord: Implications for the  Non-Proliferation Regime," international Journal (Autumn 2007).
T.V . Paul and Mahesh Shankar, "Why the US-lndia Nuclear Accord is Good Deal," Survival 49, no.4 (2007).
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"responsible" conduct has been characterized as "strict controls on the diffusion of nuclear 
technology outside national boundaries/^" Paul and Shankar contend that since the 1974 peaceful 
nuclear test, India was rebuffed for its "nuclear transgressions" and denied access to nuclear and 
related propelled technologies. Presently, India has been compensated because of "the 
praiseworthy intentional restriction" it has shown by working out "strict controls over its nuclear 
knowhow and technology."^® Thus, India speaks to an exemplary illustration of the carrot and stick 
approach inherent in the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy. This sets a point o f reference for 
different nations that keep up high non-proliferation standards to be remunerated correspondingly. 
Curtis and Spring concur that India has been a "responsible steward of its nuclear assets."®^ Actually, 
they contend that contrasting India and other threshold nations like Iran or North Korea is "not just 
deceitful, it is awful foreign policy." India's responsible conduct, they contend, presents a destination 
criterion for civil nuclear cooperation with the accepted nuclear weapon states.
WMD export regulations experts Srivastava and Gahlaut, look at India and China's nuclear non­
proliferation conduct. They contend that, dissimilar to China, India has kept up a "strong record of 
substantive compliance" with the nuclear regimes' norm of non-proliferation. There has been no 
approved or coincidental export of nuclear technology by the government or by private entities. 
Contra rily, China has been a dynamic pro I iterator, has supplied nuclear as well as missile items to a 
few nations, and has been "repeatedly sanctioned" by the United States ®®.Thus, this arrangement 
underlines another criterion of stringent agreeability with the norms of the NPT regime, and not 
basically the convention of joining the NPT that means the non-proliferation credentials of a state.®®
Lisa Curtis and Baker Spring, U.S. Nuclear Agreem ent with india: An Acceptable Deal fo r  M ajor Strategic Gain, W eb M em o n o .l587  
(Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, August 1 4 ,2007 ), 2.
®® Karthika Sasikumar, "India's Emergence as a 'Responsible' Nuclear Power," in ternationalJournai (Summer, 2007), 831.
®® Paul and Shankar, "Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal," 119.
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Srivastava and Gahlaut, "India and the NPT," 286.
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The literature highlights India's adherence to non-proliferation and lauds its stringent export 
controls as commendable, responsible conduct. Researchers are optimistic that, through the nuclear 
settlement, heading India into the non-proliferation regime will be good. Nonetheless, in the context 
of the US-lndia nuclear reconciliation a few questions stay unanswered. To begin with, these 
researchers neglect to level headed discussion why India has taken after the norm of non­
proliferation when signatories of the NPT, in the same way as China and North Korea, occupied with 
illegal proliferation exercises. Second, for more than four decades India was stereotyped as a nuclear 
hermit and now it is continuously given a role as a responsible nuclear state. It is mere rhetoric to 
create support for the agreement or is it a construction of a certain identity by India? Third, it is not 
exactly clear whether recognition of "responsible" conduct of India implies that all the U.S.-lndia 
disagreements in the past in regards to the non-proliferation regime have been determined. Fourth, 
the optimists perceive India's great record of reducing horizontal proliferation however seem to 
ignore its vertical proliferation, that is, its weapons improvement. This corresponds to the limited 
methodology of the NPT-centric regime which attaches significance to controlling horizontal 
proliferation and considers vertical proliferation to be secondary.
Proliferation creates Domino Effect
Pessimists (Robert Einhorn®®, Joseph Cirincione®\George Perkovich®/ Gary Milhollin®®, William 
Potter®/Jayantha Dhanapala®®, Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf, and Lawrence Scheinman®®) 
highlight that the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement has negative implications for the global nuclear 
order. They expect that this nuclear settlement would be considered as a prize for nuclear crossover.
®® Robert Einhorn, "Should the US Sell the  Technology to  India? Part I," Yale Global (8 November, 2005). Available at 
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article7ids6474 (accessed February 15, 2011).
®^  Joseph Cirincione, "The US's Nuclear Cave-1 n," Asia Times Online (March 2006). Available at
http://w ww.atim es.eom /atim es/South_Asia/HC04Df03.htm l (accessed February 15 ,2011 ); Cirincione, "Strategic Collapse," 2008. 
®^  George Perkovich, "Global Implications of the U.S.-lndia Deal," Daedalus (W inter 2010).
®® Gary Milhollin, "The U.S.-lndia Nuclear Pact: Bad for Security," Current History (Novem ber, 2006).
®"* Potter, "US Non-proliferation Policy."
®® W illiam  Potter and Jayantha Dhanapala, "The Perils of Non-proliferation Amnesia," The Hindu, September 1 ,2 0 0 7 .
®® Fred McGoldrick, Harold Bengelsdorf and Lawrence Scheinman, "The US-lndia Nuclear Deal: Taking Stock," Arms Control Today 
(October, 2005). Available at www.arm scontrol.org/act/2005_10/GCT-Cover (accessed December 12, 2011).
33 I P a g e
consequently, may irritate proliferation among nuclear threshold and problem states, making a 
"domino impact." In the consequence of U.S.-lndia nuclear cooperation it may be troublesome "to 
dissuade some suppliers [nuclear powers] from providing nuclear assistance to countries of 
proliferation concern."®^
Rather, with the nuclear arrangement the U.S. has set an awful point of reference by "giving non­
proliferation objectives a back seat" and conferring necessity to its commercial and foreign policy 
interests. Therefore debating further that the U.S. being the norm leader made nuclear technological 
cooperation conditional on recipients. This heaves pointers to other nuclear supplier states, 
including parts of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), to look for commercial interest at the expense 
of the universal interest in nuclear non-proliferation.®® Consequently, subsiding the export controls 
for India would empower other problem states, including Iran and Pakistan, and in addition terrorist 
groups to exploit the debilitated regulations. This would be a stressing advancement and in the long 
run cause "non-proliferation amnesia," i.e., complete disentangling of the export controls regime.
It has additionally been contended by a few scholars (George Perkovich®® Leonard Weiss^®, Robert 
Einhorn^^) that the U.S. has given huge concessions to India and has made only minor additions. 
Acknowledgement of the restricted IAEA safeguards and the decision to discrete India's civilian and 
military facilities are seen as only "symbolic" gains for the NPT regime. Perkovich contends that the 
"looseness" of the nuclear agreement undermines non-proliferation objectives due to absence of 
strategic gains from India, including "containment of China." That is, the U.S. has neither 
extracted significant non-proliferation nor key strategic concessions from India. Leonard Weiss a 
nuclear researcher accepts that attempting to get India to  abandon or rollback its nuclear weapons
®^  Ibid
®® Einhorn, "Technology to  India"; Potter, "US Non-proliferation Policy"; Potter and Dhanapala, "Non-proliferation Amnesia."
®® Perkovich, "Faulty Promises."
^® Leonard Weiss, "US-india Nuclear Cooperation: Better Later than Sooner," Non-proliferation Review  14, no.3 (Novem ber, 2007). 
Einhorn, "Technology to  India."
Perkovich, "Faulty Promises"; Einhorn, "Technology to  India."
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"w ithout any development by the nuclear weapon states to disarmament was politically eccentric." 
Yet, this U.S.-lndia settlement is comparable to giving India, an outlier, recognition as a "weapons 
state" w ithout demanding the obligations expected of such states under the NPT; this undermines 
the essential standards of the treaty.^®
The pessimists have raised germane issues, including the point that the already established non­
proliferation norms can't be turned around and if exceptions are made for a specific state, then, 
different states will likewise demand concessions yet on distinctive grounds. Hence, in the opinion of 
pessimistic researchers and scholars this nuclear accord sets an awful point of reference and 
encroaches on the believability of the NPT regime. This is particularly unfavourable during an era 
when the U.S. is overseeing proliferation threats from Iran, North Korea, and post 9-11 terrorist 
groups.
Despite the fact that the optimists and the pessimists contrast in their perception of the 
consequences of the U.S.-lndia nuclear settlement, there is still an intriguing likeness in their 
methodology. Both investigate the nuclear agreement from the inclination "will it?" or "w ill it not?" 
help the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The principle concern of the researchers identify with the 
implications that this nuclear agreement could have on the horizontal proliferation of the nuclear 
weapons. This methodology which concentrates on the domino impact of the nuclear agreement, 
whether advantageous or Inconvenient, is implanted in Cold War rational. It reflects the alarm 
connected with the division of the world into coalitions; that is, if one state falls into the Soviet 
camp, different states in the region will follow after accordingly. This additionally reflects unbending 
nature to acknowledge the sui generis nature of nuclear proliferation challenges and adoption of 
imaginative measures for managing them. There is a nonattendance of basic thinking in the non­
proliferation talk which demonstrates considerable absence of inclusion of the point of view of the
Weiss, "Better Late Than Sooner," 451.
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other/^ India was constructed as a "nuclear untouchable" and there was restricted understanding of 
its exceptional non-proliferation conduct. Different questions emerge like why in any case did India 
decline to acknowledge the NPT? And why, being outside the nuclear regime, did India take after the 
norms of non-proliferation? Underlining these focuses further, Paul, author of Power versus 
Prudence: Why Nations Forego Nuclear Weapons reminds us that states have "particular reasons"— 
focused around indigenous domestic and regional political security circumstances—for obtaining 
weapons and denying them. That is, they don't fundamentally take after different states in decisions 
that require huge technological and economic investment.
Trading with De facto Nuclear States
Certain scholars (for instance Dinshaw Mistry and Sumit Ganguly^®, Dana R. Dillon and Baker 
Spring^®) show cautious optimism as they endeavour to bridge the dissimilar perspectives of 
optimisits and pessimist schools of thoughts. They contend that as opposed to stipulating this 
change in nuclear policy as an India-specific change, the U.S. should devise a criteria based policy 
that blueprints a guide for captivating de-facto nuclear states in civil nuclear cooperation. Dissipating 
the concerns of the pessimists, Mistry and Ganguly determine a multi-pronged criterion. It 
incorporates the conditions that states be subjected to nuclear ban for 20-30 years; hold fast to the 
non-proliferation regime; demonstrate a commendable export control record; and promise to 
disavow nuclear testing. Additionally, Dillon and Spring's criteria for civilian nuclear trade with 
potential de-facto nuclear weapons states, incorporates: a stable democracy with a rule of law; a 
record of non-proliferation and demonstrated admiration for international nuclear non-proliferation 
regimes' obligations to nuclear weapon states; not being a sponsor of terrorism; firm separation 
between civilian and military nuclear projects; nonaggressive security approaches; and readiness as
^® Dinshaw Mistry and Sumit Ganguly, "The U.S.-lndia Pact: A Good Deal," Current History (Novem ber 2006).
^® Dana R. Dillon and Baker Spring, "Nuclear India and the Non-Proliferation Treaty," Backgrounder n o .l9 3 5  (Washington D.C.: The 
Heritage Foundation, May 18,2006 ). Available at w w w .heritage.org/research/abm /m issiledefense/bgl935.cfm  (accessed February 12, 
2011).
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far as possible on the amount of nuclear weapons. It is noted that cautious optimists underscore the 
need to secure tenets for nuclear trade with de-facto nuclear nations, however the criteria these 
researchers determine are questionable. Nonetheless, they have pin pointed an escape clause in the 
NPT regime, that is, the absence of post proliferation administration of nuclear states. The NPT 
accordingly is only centred on keeping the spread of nuclear weapons; there is no provision for 
managing states that cross the nuclear threshold. Researchers like Avner Cohen and Thomas 
Graham, Jr. highlighted the imperativeness of incorporating the nuclear states (India, Israel, and 
Pakistan) through a "different convention" to the NPT. Such a convention would oblige these states 
to embrace international export controls, deny nuclear testing, and dispose of fissile material 
production^^.
Non-proliferation Bargained
Different scholars have contended that the U.S., a heading promoter of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime, had conceded the regime in quest for realist objectives. Consequently, 
different states excessively would enter into nuclear cooperation with defaulter states to accomplish 
realist gains and non-proliferation objectives would be side-lined in a developing pattern. There was 
across the board consensus among researchers that the realpolitik investment of the U.S. energized 
its nuclear rapprochement with India—a developing economy with enormous key potential in Asia. A 
dominant part of researchers (Dinshaw Mistry^®, Mario E. Carranza^®, Ashley Tellis®®, Sumit 
Ganguly®/ George Perkovich®/ Lisa Curtis®/ Harsh Pant®/ T.V. Paul and Mahesh Shankar®®)
Avner Cohen and Thomas Graham, Jr., "An NPT for Non-M em bers," Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, (M ay/June, 2004), 40.
^® Dinshaw/ Mistry, "Diplomacy, Domestic Politics, and the U.S.-lndia Nuclear Agreement," Asian Survey A6, no.S (Septem ber/October, 
2006).
^® M ario E. Carranza, "From Non-proliferation to  Post-Proliferation: Explaining the U.S.-lndia Nuclear Deal," Contemporary Security Poiicy 
28, no.3 (December, 2007).
®° Ashley J. Tellis, "W hat Should W e Expect From India as a Strategic Partner," in Gauging U.S.-indian Strategic Cooperation, ed., Henry  
Sokolski (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).
®^  M istry and Ganguly, "A Good Deal."
®^  Perkovich, "Global Implications," 2010.
®® Lisa Curtis, "The Costs of a Failed U.S.-lndia Civil Nuclear Deal," W eb M em o no.1688, (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 
November 2 ,2 0 07 ).
®^  Pant, "Triumph of Politics over Institutions," 2-3.
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acknowledged the Bush administration's neorealist target of producing a key association with India 
as the essential determinant of the U.S.-lndia nuclear rapprochement. Nonetheless, the clear 
absence of definition of the expression "strategic partnership" made space for contradicting 
interpretations. Entrenched in cold war mind set, a few researchers recommend that the US-lndia 
partnership is expected basically to keep up the balance of power in Asia, and particularly to contain 
China. Perkovich declares, that Washington understood that to "dissuade or prevent China from 
competing harm fully... [the U.S.] must mobilize states on China's periphery to balance Chinese 
power." Therefore, the Bush administration received the method to, "cultivate a partnership with 
India and enhance India's international power. A more powerful and collegial India will balance 
China's power in Asia.®®" Similarly, Ashley Tellis comments that the association is aimed at 
preventing "Asia from being dominated by any single pow er... which may use aggressive assertion of 
national self-interest to threaten American presence, American alliances, and American ties with 
regional states."®^ Tellis additionally certainly makes a reference to China, as no other nation in Asia 
has the possibility to command the region and debilitate American involvement. T.V. Paul notes,
"The U.S. is driven by both strategic and economic considerations in its pursuit to eliminate nuclear 
friction with India. Strategically, Washington perceives India as a potential counterweight to China, 
and by regularising the nuclear relationship; it sees prospects for improved political relations 
between the two states [U.S. and India]."®®
Yet, a few scholars (such as Curtis®®,Tellis®°, Michael A. Levy and Charles D. Ferguson®/ likewise 
reflect upon the strategic partnership as an issue-based relationship involving a convergence of post- 
Cold war interests, both global and regional in nature, for example, fighting terrorism and religious
®® Paul and Shankar, "Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal," 112.
®® George Perkovich, "Faulty Promises," 2.
®^  Ashley Tellis, The U.S.-lndia: Global Partnership: How Significant fo r  American interests? Testimony before the House Com m ittee on 
International Relations, 16 November, 2005, 3.
®® Paul, "The US-lndia Nuclear Accord," 848.
®® Curtis, "US-lndia Civil Nuclear Deal."
Tellis, "Global Partnership."
®^  Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, US-india Nuciear Cooperation: A Strategy fo r  Moving Forward, Council Special Report, no. 16
(Washington D.C.: Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006).
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fanaticism, controlling proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, spreading democracy, 
diffusing economic improvement, securing global commons, for example, ocean paths of 
communication, energy security®/ and even HIV/AIDS®®. Curtis sees the nuclear arrangement as the 
"centrepiece of the paradigm shift" in Washington's relationship with India. She comments, "If 
enacted, this [nuclear] agreement will mark a new era for U.S.-lndia ties. It will enable our two 
democracies to create a/reer, more stable, and more secure world (emphasis added)®/"
The strategic relationship rationale additionally reflects the "containment of China" as the essential 
goal. This again reflects a false perception of the Indian foreign policy goals. India has notable 
bilateral issues with China, yet, the previous has confidence in the standards of peaceful 
conjunction. It is highly farfetched that India will do anything that would irritate the balance of 
power with China. In this way, this assumption that India would be eager to go about as a balancer is 
a paradox. As it were, a U.S.-lndia strategic partnership may be grounded on integral interests yet 
India won't be gathering to a partnership controlled against any specific nation, particularly China. As 
Pant comments, "If Americans are hoping to cultivate another Britain, or even another Australia, 
India, for sure, is not the right candidate to expend energies on".®®
Unquestionably, Washington's relations with India have seen a remarkable upward swing in the 
post-Cold War period and this lead the Bush administration to look for a key relationship with India. 
In any case to contend that the nuclear agreement is an unimportant extension of the positive swing 
in the relationship with India is challenging. It suggests that the U.S. in order to further its realist 
targets made a quantum jump over the unsettled issues of nuclear antagonism with India. That is, 
the U.S. bargained the non-proliferation objectives at the altar of foreign policy. The plan that the
®^  Tellis, "India as a Strategic Partner."; Also see, Robert D. Blackwlll, "The India Imperative," The N ational interest, 80 (Summer 2005); Levi 
and Ferguson, "US-lndia Nuclear Cooperation." Alex Perry, "Why is Bush Counting on India?" Time, February 28, 2006. Also, Levi and 
Ferguson, 8.
®® Lisa Curtis, "New U.S. Alliance with India Forges Key Strategic Relationship," Commentary, (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 
December 9 ,2009 ).
®"* Lisa Curtis, "Nuclear Crunch for U.S.-lndia," The Washington Times, September 23, 2008.
®® Harsh.V, Pant "A Fine Balance: India walks a Tightrope between Iran and the United States." Orbis (Summer 2007). 508. Also, see, Am it 
Gupta, The U.S.-inclia Relationship: Strategic Partnership or Complementary interests? (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February
2005)
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reason for the nuclear pact is to development the U.S.-lndia strategic partnership appears 
oversimplified and direct. It denies an in-depth understanding of the unprecedented change in U.S. 
nuclear non-proliferation policy following 30 years of antagonism with India. Hence, this exploration 
as opposed to burrowing at the foreign policy context, investigates the nuclear rapprochement in 
the scenery of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It endeavours to bridge this gap in the writing 
and to give an explanation to the U.S.-lndia agreement within the context of the U.S. approach to 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Disgruntled State and Power Transition Thesis
Scholars like Paul and Shankar suggest that India—a state with nuclear weapons—be suited in the 
international nuclear order as it could turn into a disgruntled state. They contend that the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) "has no room for the orderly exit of a declining power or entry of a 
rising power."®® The treaty is not changing enough to oblige variations in the power distribution of 
the global nuclear order. Consequently, the nuclear rapprochement with India speaks to a logical 
move by the Bush administration. Paul and Shankar esteem it as like the accommodation of China, a 
"earlier dissatisfied power," which was coordinated into the international order amid the Nixon- 
Kissinger period®^. The power transition thesis which was produced by Organski, in contrast to 
realism, sets that international order is hierarchical. There is constant competition among states for 
scarce resources and their goal is not basically, aggrandizement of power, rather maximization of net 
gains.®® The dominant power creates the international order with rules and regulations that "direct 
political, economic, diplomatic, and military interactions."®® Paul and Shankar opine that the Indian 
nuclear tests, Pokhran I (1974) and II (1998), reflect India's longing for recognition as a nuclear 
weapons state and also a global power. In this way, they contend, if India is not perceived as a
®® T.V. Paul, "The US-lndia Nuclear Accord," 856.
®^  Paul and Shankar, "Nuclear Accord is Good Deal," 116.
®® Jacek Kugler and A.F.K. Organski, "The Power Transition: A Retrospective and Prospective Evaluation," in Handbook o f W ar Studies, ed., 
Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
®® Douglas Lemke, "The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the  End of Cold W ar," Journal o f Peace Research 34, n o .l 
(February, 1997), 24.
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weapons state and concurred its expected place in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the 
consequences could be damaging. Disgruntled states that see a disparity between their self-image 
and their position in the international order "are susceptible to ultranationalist and revisionist 
tendencies, growing increasingly defiant of a global order which refuses to recognize their claims."^®® 
Thus, the U.S.-lndia nuclear deal, as they would like to think, "maintains and fortifies" the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime and "suggest[s] to other rising powers that the framework is adaptable 
enough to take into account inexorable changes in the global distribution of power." There are a few 
inconsistencies in the explanation offered by Paul and Shankar. In the first place, the construction of 
India as a "dissatisfied/disgruntled state" is not convincing enough. A disappointed state is likened to 
a revisionist state, yet India, notwithstanding its demeanour at the nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
does not have the underpinnings of a revisionist state. India's methodology to a few international 
institutions, including its constant backing of the United Nations framework and quest for 
democratic norms, renders it a reformist state as opposed to a disgruntled state. Amit Gupta 
characterizes a reformist state as ,"one that by and large accepts the structure and order of the 
international system but wishes to make incremental changes to it in order to improve its own 
power potential and status within the international system."^®^
India declined to sign the NPT on the premise of inherent imbalances, yet, India was the first nation 
to call for a comprehensive test ban, and India was occupied with the Committee on Disarmament 
amid NPT and CTBT deliberations. India is a signatory of the Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Convention. In the light of this, Paul and Shankar additionally perceive that, aside from the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, India has been constructively occupied with different circles of 
international order. Along these lines, different questions emerge: Is a disgruntled state 
fundamentally contradicted to the whole international set up? That is, if India restricts the nuclear
®^® Paul and Shankar, "Nuclear Accord is a Good Deal," 113-4. 
Gupta, "The US-lndia Relationship," 11-12.
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non-proliferation order, however is constructively occupied with different parts of global order; 
would regardless it be considered a challenger?
Second, Douglas Lemke, a proponent of the power transition hypothesis, has contended that conflict 
might be foreseen when the disgruntled challenger obtains equality with the predominant power. 
That is, conflict between the challenger and the dominant power is reliant upon convergence of two 
conditions: accomplishment of equality and dissatisfaction. As Lemke puts it, "parity and the 
challenger's dissatisfaction are jointly necessary for a war, o weak dissatisfied challenger Is not to be 
feared"^^^ (emphasis added). The United States through nuclear technology transfers proposes to 
accelerate India's improvement and in this way help India change into an incredible power. Be that 
as it may, as indicated by Paul and Shankar India is a disgruntled state, consequently its rise as an 
extraordinary power would meet the conditions for conflict, as pointed out by Lemke. That is, 
contrary to Paul and Shankar's contention, the U.S. should not offer help in nuclear technologies to 
India; on the grounds that if India turns into a dominant power it could challenge the American 
strength. Third, Paul and Shankar's contention to consolidate India inside the NPT regime would 
make an awful point of reference to assuage the states that contradict the global nuclear order and 
this could demonstrate hindering the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Democratic Peace Theory and Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime:
The Democratic peace theory contends that democratic states seldom go to war with one 
another^®®. The democratic peace evokes a lot of interest, particularly, in the post-Cold War period, 
as it is accepted that a world composed of democracies would boost global security. President 
Clinton viewed democratization as the third mainstay of his foreign policy. In the State of the Union 
address, he expressed, "Ultimately, the best strategy to insure our security and to build a durable
®^® Lemke, "Continuation of History," 24.
®^® Kant's idea of peace between the liberal states was rediscovered and popularized by Michael Doyle. See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal 
Legacies, and Foreign Affairs (I and II)," Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, no.3 and 4  (Summer and Autumn 1983); also see Francis 
Fukuyama, "Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon," Political Science and Politics 24, no.4, (1991).
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peace is to support the advance of democracy elsewhere ... they [democracies] also make better 
trading partners and partners in diplomacy."^®^ Jack Levy even goes to the degree to declare that the 
equitable peace proposal is the "closest thing we have to an empirical law in the study of 
international relations."^®®
The democratic peace theory has been utilized by a few researchers, in changing degrees, to clarify 
America's nuclear rapprochement with India (Jarrod Hayes^ ®®, Perkovich^®/ Levi and Ferguson^®®, 
Dana R. Dillon and Baker Spring^ ®®). For the U.S. in its promotion of democracy, "the claim of a 
deeper relationship with the world's biggest democracy [india] was verifiable." This appears to be 
the most possible explanation for the positive engagement between the U.S. and India ^^ ®. Hayes 
confirms that the democratic peace thesis effectively clarifies the mystery in the U.S. nuclear non­
proliferation policy. The Bush administration offered civil nuclear cooperation to India—which 
restricted the NPT as well as crossed the nuclear threshold. In the meantime, the quest for nuclear 
technology by Iran, a signatory of the NPT, is considered a risk. This is so on the grounds that, "as a 
fellow democracy, the United States need have no fear of India's nuclear capabilities."^^^ The Bush 
administration consistently stressed the shared democratic identity with India, making a "feeling of 
association and trust. That trust continues notwithstanding Indian actions, in the same way as the 
1998 test that betrayed U.S. wishes." This shared identity, Hayes contends, has empowered the de 
securitization of India's nuclear stockpile while nondemocratic Iran is constructed as the "other" and, 
inexorably, this prompts securitization of its nuclear project.^^®
^®^  President Bill Clinton, State o f the Union Address, 25 January, 1994. Available at http://w w w .w ashlngtonpost.com /w p- 
srv/polltlcs/speclal/states/docs/sou94.htm (accessed 8 June, 2012).
®^® Jack s. Levy, "Domestic Politics In W ar," In The Origin and Prevention o f M a jo r Wars, ed., Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (New  
York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 88.
^®®Jarrod Hayes, "Identity and Securitization In the Democratic Peace: The U.S. and the Divergence of Responses to India and Iran's 
Nuclear Program," International Studies Quarterly 53 (2009).
^®^  George Perkovich, Democratic Bomb, Policy Brief no. 49 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Novem ber
2006).
^®®Levl and Ferguson, "Strategy for Moving Forward."
^°® Dillon and Spring, "Nuclear India."
^^®Levl and Ferguson, "Strategy for Moving Forward," 9.
Hayes, "Identity and Securitisation," 988  
Ibid., 994.
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Perkovich contends that, as an extension of peace transition theory, Washington sees the world as 
separated into "democratic friends" and authoritarian "enemies." As an end product to the peace 
transition theory, Perkovich has proposed the "democratic bomb" proposal. He contends that prior 
the spread of nuclear weapons fundamentally was seen as the issue; now, it is nondemocratic states 
with nuclear weapons that are viewed as the issue .P erkov ich  brings up that, since the mid- 1960s, 
the U.S. has not pressurized or persuaded Israel to surrender its nuclear armoury. Correspondingly, 
seeking after the "democratic bombs are good" method, the U.S. in its nuclear agreement with India 
has abandoned its policy of forbidding nuclear trade with any state that did not employ 
comprehensive safeguards. In this context, Dillon and Spring affirm that it w ill be trying for 
Washington to strike a harmony between its acknowledged duty to nuclear non-proliferation 
objectives and the quest for nuclear cooperation with "friendly, democratic, de facto  nuclear powers 
such as India."^^'^
The democratic peace thesis albeit persuasive it doesn't give an agreeable explanation of 
Washington's nuclear rapprochement with India. In 1971, amid the India-Pakistan war, the U.S. 
conveyed a maritime team headed by the USS Enterprise, a nuclear fuelled plane carrying warship, 
in the Bay of Bengal to undermine India with urgent consequences. This scene opposes the rationale 
of the democratic peace theory, as India was democratic state and Washington had interceded for 
sake of Pakistan which was under military rule. Wesley Widmaier has examined this 1971 "close 
miss" between the U.S. and India from the constructivist point of view. He contended that it is a 
deception to "assume that all inferences regarding democracy must engender cooperation."^^®
Perkovich, "Democratic Bomb," 1.
Dillon and Spring, "Nuclear India," 1.
^^ ® Wesley W . Widm aier, "The Democratic Peace is W hat States Make of it: A Constructivist Analysis of the U.S.-lndian 'Near-M iss' in the  
1971 South Asian Crisis," European Journal o f International Relations 11, no.3 (2005): 435
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Also, India has been a democratic state for more than 63 years, and yet, throughout the previous 30 
years it was forced to bear the technological embargoes forced by the U.S. On the off chance that, 
surely if the U.S. considered democratic bomb as favourable, then why did Washington set up 
nuclear export controls in response to India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974? In 1998, when 
India clearly went nuclear, why did the Clinton administration force sanctions as opposed to 
tolerating the democratic nuclear stockpile? That is to say, why amid the Bush time did this "shared 
democratic identity" lead to  civilian nuclear cooperation, and why not earlier? Therefore, the 
democratic peace argument brings up a larger number of issues than it answers. At last, democratic 
peace argument relates the nuclear reconciliation to U.S. foreign policy objectives and neglects 
giving a compelling explanation.
Unscrambling Non-proliferation Regime
The literature consistently connects U.S. nuclear rapprochement with India to the Bush 
administration. A few scholars (Sharon Squassoni^^®, Carranza^^/ William Walker^^®,Gary Milhollin^^®, 
and Joseph Cirincione^^®) opine the Bush administration responsible for the change in the course of 
U.S. nuclear policy towards India. Some point to the transition in U.S. stance to the Bush 
administration's neorealist design to create strategic partnership with India. While numerous other 
nuclear scholars accept it to be a by-result of U.S. aloofness towards the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. In this context, researchers draw a comparison with Bush's predecessor. President Clinton is 
viewed as an arms control enthusiast and an eager supporter of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Case in point, it was amid the Clinton administration that the NPT was extended indefinitely 
at the 1995 Review Conference and its enrolment seen a considerable rise. Besides, because of
^^ ® Sharon Squassoni, "U.S.-lndian Deal and its Impact," Arms Control Today (July/August 2010). Available at 
http://wwv\/.arm scontrol.org/act/2010_07-08/squassoni (accessed March 1 2 ,2011 ).
M ario Carranza, "Can the NPT Survive? The Theory and Practice of U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation Policy after September 11,' 
Contemporary Security Poiicy 27, no. 3 (December, 2006).
William Walker, "Nuclear Enlightenment and Counter-enlightenm ent," international Affairs 83, no. 3 (2007).
Milhollin, "Bad for Security."
^^ ® Joseph Cirincione, "Strategic Collapse: The Failure of the Bush Nuclear Doctrine," Arms Control Today (November, 2008).
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Clinton's deliberations, on the CTBT were effectively concluded and considerable advancement was 
made around the Fissile Material Control Treaty.
Clinton launched a positive swing in US-lndia bilateral relations, yet, he didn't cross the non­
proliferation redline. That is, dissimilar to Bush, he didn't develop relations with India at the cost of 
nuclear non-proliferation objectives. Sharon Squassoni, a non-proliferation expert, is of the view that 
India "deisred for legitimization of its nuclear weapons" and demanded that the United States lift 
the ban on nuclear exports. Yet, "the U.S. policy, at any rate until the Bush administration, was that 
India needed to cap and roll back its nuclear weapons p rogram ,''S im ila rly , Carranza opines that 
"attaining a nuclear restraint regime in South Asia remained a vital goal of American foreign policy 
until the end of the Clinton administration in January 2001." On the contrary, the Bush 
Administration, in quest for neorealist objectives, denoted a unique movement in U.S. foreign policy 
from "non-proliferation to post proliferation towards South Asia." Carranza did not plainly outline 
the definition of "post proliferation," yet it could be derived that he implied the renunciation of the 
U.S. policy to push for a rollback of India's nuclear weapons and an implied acknowledgement of 
India's de-facto nuclear status. This U-turn of U.S. policy has been interfaced to the more extensive 
nuclear principle of the Bush administration that included detachment to multilateral nuclear non­
proliferation treaties, for example, the CTBT and the FMCT, unilateral withdrawal from the Anti- 
Ballistic Missile Treaty, cessation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and absence of 
enthusiasm towards seeking nuclear disarmament.^^^ Along these lines, the Bush administration, in a 
one-sided endeavour, bowed the guidelines of the non-proliferation regime and conceded India 
access to nuclear technology without demanding even-handed responsibilities. Such an action, as 
Cirincione brings up, "appears to remunerate India's nuclear proliferation." It concurs recognition to 
India as a nuclear weapon state "with all the rights and privileges held for those states [nuclear
Squassoni, "U.S.-lndian Deal." 
Carranza, "Can the NPT Survive," 465
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Weapon States] that have joined the NPT, yet, w ithout the same o b lig a t io n s .T e llis  highlights 
that the apprehensions of an approaching contention with China empowered "the realist and in 
addition neoconservative factions" inside the Bush administration to be more accommodative of 
"New Delhi's developing nuclear capabilities."
William Walker^^'^ has especially reprimanded the "counter-enlightenment" instincts of the Bush 
administration. He accepts that the NPT spoke to a "grand enlightenment project" and reflected "a 
ubiquitous rationality and commitment to r e a s o n . I t  was in 1960s-70s with the concerted 
deliberations of the United States that an international nuclear order was constructed focused 
around a "managed system of deterrence" and a "managed system of abstinence."^^® Walker 
recommends that the Bush administration sought unilateral measures, for example, abrogation of 
multilateral treaties, the Antiballistic missile (ABM) Treaty and the START, and along these lines 
denoted a different movement to counter-enlightenment which would in the end disentangle the 
NPT regime^^^. Contrary to the fundamental rule of the NPT that "nuclear weapons are intrinsically 
illegitimate," the Bush administration conferred "legitimacy on India's nuclear weapons program. 
That is. President Bush "abandoned blanket condemnation" of all nuclear proliferation and made a 
distinction between "bad" guys (Iraq and Iran) and "great" guys to seek after particular containment 
of nuclear weapons. Besides, as Cirincione reasons. Bush's procedure "looked for the elimination of 
regimes instead of weapons, accepting the United States could figure out which nations were 
responsible enough to have nuclear weapons and which nations were definitely not. U.S. power, not 
multilateral treaties [like NPT], would implement this judgment.^^^
Cirincione, "Strategic Collapse." 
W alker, "Nuclear Enlightenment.' 
ibid, 431.
Ibid, 435-6 .
Ibid.
Ibid., 448.
Cirincione, "Strategic Collapse."
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Large portions of the issues raised by these researchers are convincing, yet the counter- 
enlightenment does not give an acceptable explanation. In the first place. Walker's proposition that 
the NPT is an edification undertaking conceived by the United States merits some legitimacy; beyond 
that, his assumption that the NPT was made to attain nuclear disarmament appears exaggerated. 
Walker overstates the degree to which western nations were focused on a grand enlightenment 
project; rather, the NPT was the consequence of a bargain arrived at between a few states. Second, 
the Bush administration's nuclear policy has been evaluated adversely. The question emerges: If 
President Clinton was given to fortifying the nuclear non-proliferation regime, then, why did he 
neglect to keep the twin nuclear crossovers in South Asia—India and Pakistan? In response to 
Walker's counter-enlightenment proposition, Ruhle comments, "If the U.S. non-proliferation policy is 
different from that of 40 years ago, it is not because the U.S. has become more fundamentalist, but 
because the [nuclear proliferation] problems it confronts have fundamentally changed."^^° That is, 
transition in the U.S. nuclear methodology is not a consequence of the eccentricities of the occupant 
Presidents; rather, it is a response to the changing global nuclear order. Third, the U.S. nuclear 
rapprochement with India is a generally late advancement and there is almost no understanding of 
the conditions under which the Bush administration allowed India access to the nuclear technology.
Conceptualization of Regime Analysis
Stephen Krasner's conceptualisation of a regime is the most generally acknowledged definition of a 
regime. As indicated by Krasner, a regime is a set of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures; principle and norms rule preeminent and characterize the last co m p on e n ts .C ritics  
contend there is considerable conceptual cover and pragmatic trouble in recognizing to a great 
extent verifiable principles and norms. Toll, Young, and Zurn note that standards," while, "norms
Ruhle, "Enlightenment," 515.
Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," In ternational Organisation 36, 
no.2 (Spring 1982):185-188
48 I P a g e
describe general rights and obligations mainly at the level of issue areas."^^^ That is, principles might 
be viewed as the basic set of assumptions and targets underlying a regime in a specific issue zone 
and the norms characterize and manage the conduct of participant state actors. Rules are viewed as 
the most concrete and unequivocal components of a regime and are normally enshrined in 
multilateral or bilateral agreements.^^^
In view of Krasner's definition, T.V. Paul defines the nuclear non-proliferation regime as "a set of 
norms, principles, treaties and procedures through which countries pledge not to acquire nuclear 
weapons or help in their acquisition by other states."^^"^ . The nuclear non-proliferation regime 
confronts the possibly hazardous horizontal spread of nuclear technology. The spread of nuclear 
weapons could be deadly, however the spread of nuclear energy and its promotion for peaceful use 
is helpful for humanity. Subsequently, the managing standard of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime is: controlled access to nuclear technology and regulation o f the behaviour o f recipients and 
suppliersf^^ Hasenclever et al, explains that norms "serve to guide the behaviour of regime 
members in such a way as to produce collective outcomes which are in harmony with the goals and 
shared convictions that are specified in the regime principles."^^^ Thus, the non-acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by additional states (non-nuclear weapon states) and non-transfer of nuclear 
technology without verification by both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon 
states (NNWS) could be perceived as the principle norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.^^^ 
In view of these guiding principle and norms, a complex web of boundless regulations and decision­
making procedures hallowed in a few multilateral and bilateral agreements serve as prescriptions for
M arc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zurn, "The Study of International Regimes," European Journal o f International Relations 1, 
no.3 (1995):273.
Please refer to  discussion in the Theoretical Framework section. Introduction chapter 
^^ ‘’ t .V . Paul, "Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime," 
Cambridge Review o f international Affairs 16, n o .l (2003): 137 
McTate, 'Regime-Buiiding,"403
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter M ayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories o f In ternational Regimes (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2002): 10-11.
Kari M ottola, "W hither the Non-Proliferation Regime?" Current Research on Peace and Violence 4, no.4 (1981): 236; Also see, 
Hasenclever, et al, "Theories of International Regimes," 9 -10 .
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the conduct of member states. The NPT structures the core of the non-proliferation regime and 
characterizes the global nuclear order focused around a categorisation of states as nuclear weapon 
states and nonnuclear weapon states. Remembering these perspectives, this dissertation, with the 
assistance of regime analysis, contends that the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement characterizes a 
progressive change within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Stephen Krasner has given a 
distinction between change within a regime and change of a regime. He suggests that changes in 
principles and norms lead to a complete change of the regime, though changes in rules and 
procedures imprint changes within the regime.^^^ Puchala and Hopkins consider changes within the 
regime to be evolutionary changes of the regime.^^®
Conclusion
The literature review highlighted real trepidations among researchers and scholars in regards to 
implications of the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement for the global nuclear order and the abetment of 
horizontal proliferation. This reflects the predominant concerns of the non-proliferation talk in 
which any improvement in the nuclear arena is evaluated as a potential danger. Here, a parallel 
might be drawn with the Cold War period, when all international advancements were examined 
opposite the Soviet danger and the domino hypothesis invaded the Western mind set. In this 
context, Matthew Woods laments, "Forecasting the inevitable and dangerous spread of nuclear 
weapons is an enduring dimension of international relations."^^° He claims
"The international nuclear order results from the creation of inevitable and
dangerous proliferation as an intersubjective reality that assumes an
Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," International Organisation 36, 
no.2 (Spring 1982):185-188
Puchala and Hopkins, "Lessons from  Inductive Analysis," 249 .
M atthew  Woods, "Inventing Proliferation: The Creation and Preservation of the Inevitable Spread of Weapons," The Review o f  
internationai Affairs  (Spring 2004), 416.
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involuntary chain reaction and precludes the actual occurrence of such 
widespread, unstoppable proliferation."
Interestingly, there was considerable absence of consensus among researchers over the question of 
whether U.s -India nuclear cooperation is gainful or adverse to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
The optimists saw it as a constructive improvement for bringing India, a nuclear outlier, inside the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. In this context, a few unconvincing arguments were advanced, for 
example, (I) the consequences of leaving India, a disgruntled nuclear state, outside the nuclear 
regime could be impeding. The pessimists, on the other hand, raised their concerns in regards to 
nuclear cooperation with a non-signatory of the NPT. Pessimists contended that (i) the U.S.-lndia 
nuclear arrangement set a point of reference that weaponisation is remunerated and (ii) other 
nuclear weapons states may be urged to take part in nuclear cooperation with non-nuclear weapon 
states for strategic gains, in absolute dismissal for the global nuclear non-proliferation regime.
However, the examination of the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement, and the absence of any theoretical 
tools to unbiasedly break down this agreement, impedes an assessment of its effect on the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. Therefore, the review of literature proposes a huge empirical and 
theoretical deficit in our understanding of the transition in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy, 
which apparently side-lined the nuclear non-proliferation regime to captivate a challenger of the 
regime in nuclear cooperation. This demands an itemized investigation with respect to the terms of 
the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement and its implications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
Accordingly, the questions emerge: (i) Does the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement undermines the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime or brings India inside global nuclear influence? Additionally (ii) how 
has the U.S., a promoter of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, transform its three decade old 
policy—from technological isolation to nuclear cooperation—to India, a nonparticipant in the
Ibid, 417.
51 I P a g e
regime? To understand and answer these questions, this study analyses the U.S.-lndia nuclear 
reconciliation in the scenery of the nuclear non-proliferation regime as opposed to inside a U.S. 
foreign policy context. To conquer the theoretical deficit, this study will utilize regime analysis to 
provide an objective analysis of the issues. The regime analysis will help to understand the global 
nuclear non-proliferation regime; establish India's position as a challenger to the nuclear non­
proliferation regime, and resolve the ongoing issue of dealing with India; illuminate endeavours by 
Bush administration to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime and shed light on the U.S.- 
lndia nuclear agreement on the nuclear non-proliferation regime—i.e.,. Uncover whether it is 
consistent with the basic components of the regime or disentangles them. Accordingly, this study 
can dissect in detail whether the change in the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy towards India, 
climaxing in the nuclear agreement, speaks to a transformation of, or an accommodation within the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime.
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CHAPTER IV
India’s Nuclear Past
Nuclear power was on India's agenda even before independence. Her leading scientists had visions 
about using its potential for development and fashioning a world role. Post-independence, India, 
cognizant of its unfavourable circumstances, set out to confront economic vulnerabilities as well as 
the political and societal challenges of nation building. As a newly independent country in 1947, 
India's theatre of insecurities was wider than the prevalent Western notion of security. Therefore, 
during the Cold War era when the great powers were "defining national security in terms of military 
power based on Morgenthau's realism,"^^^ the Indian leadership envisioned achieving security 
through non-military measures. This was enthusiastically supported by the first Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru, and has remained an important objective for all subsequent Indian Governments, 
although the level of commitment has varied. Homi Bhabha, the great Pioneer and implementer of 
this policy for almost two decades, charted out a three-stage process to lead India to nuclear self- 
sufficiency. He was also clear that India should develop every facet of nuclear capability, including
Raj pa I Budania, India's National Security Diiemma: The Pakistan Factor and India's Policy Response, (New Delhi: Indus Publishing 
Company, 2001), 16.
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weapons. The nuclear establishment in the department of Atomic Energy (DAE) has preserved with 
this vision, although its conversion into military capacity at the disposal of Armed forces is limited. 
The Indian Political leadership like other recognized nuclear weapon states, found the glamour of 
possessing nuclear weapons and technology irresistible.
From 'peaceful' nuclear explosion to estrangement
It is important to gain an in-depth understanding of the nuclear disjuncture between the U.S. and 
India. Therefore, this chapter attempts to explore the following questions: Why did India oppose the 
nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT)? What caused the nuclear estrangement between the two 
countries? Why were the U.S. and India at extreme ends of the non-proliferation regime? During 
the immediate Post- World War II period, there was considerable enthusiasm around the world for 
developing nuclear power and other peaceful uses. Even the use of explosions for peaceful purposes 
was seriously considered. International collaboration and technology transfer were encouraged, and 
close relations developed between Indian and western atomic energy establishments. It was Nehru's 
powerful, spirited leadership along with Homi Bhabha's genius and technical expertise that steered 
India's nuclear policy toward the goals of achieving self-sufficiency and development through 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. As early as 1944, Bhabha wrote to the Tata Trust urging them to 
establish a first-ever training and research institution for fundamental research in nuclear physics. 
This was to guarantee that India would be prepared with both framework and infrastructure at the 
beginning of the nuclear era. Therefore, in June 1945 the Tata Fundamental Research Institute was 
founded . Hence, Scientific and industrial research centres were secured for the training of its 
scientists and to distinguish regions strategic to the advancement and improvement of the nation.
R. L. M . Patil, India-Nuclear Weapons and International Politics (Delhi: National Publishing House, 1969), 20. Also, see, Leonard Weiss, 
"India and the NPT," Strategic Analysis (March 2010): 256. Dr. Homi Bhabha received his PhD in nuclear physics from  University of 
Cambridge in 1934.
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Regardless, India's disposition around the arming of nuclear energy was clear. In 1946 at a public 
meeting, Nehru stated that the bomb was a "symbol of evil." He strongly advocated that India, 
while developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, must never build nuclear weapons.^'*'^ When 
the first indigenous Asian reactor APSARA went critical at Trombay, Canadian and US assistance was 
readily forthcoming for building larger CIRUS reactor at the same time.
Homi Bhaba had envisaged a three stage formula, to which the DAE and the government of India 
(Gol) have remained committed till now, that is moving from using natural Uranium, then the 
plutonium thus obtained in fast breeder reactors, to the final stage where Thorium would be 
utilized. In 1956, Canada signed a nuclear cooperation agreement with India and agreed to supply 
India with CAN DU reactors. Later, the U.S. decided to join the nuclear pact and approved to supply 
10 tonnes of heavy water for the CAN DU reactors. The so-called CIRUS (Canada India Research US) 
reactor turned out to be critical on July 10,1960, and fully functioning in 1963. On the other hand, 
the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) in 1974 ended up being the tipping point for suspension 
of the nuclear coordinated effort. It was claimed that India utilized the plutonium created from the 
CAN DU reactors to direct the "peaceful" explosion in contradiction of the CIRUS agreement. That is, 
India had redirected nuclear technologies that were imported from Western countries expected for 
peaceful nuclear purposes—to building nuclear warfare. Therefore, it was accounted for that India 
likewise used the CAN DU reactor as a "Design Prototype" to construct Dhruva reactors for the 
creation of plutonium. Under this umbrella of nuclear participation Agreement which was marked in 
1963, India consented to limitations and safeguards on the fuel and spent fuel. It was on a choice 
made to import boiling water low enriched Uranium reactors from the US for a civilian power plant 
at Tarapur. The fuel for this reactor was to be supplied by US for the reactors whole lifetime. Tarapur 
has remained sort of separated from the standard of India's nuclear progress and development. All
G.G. Mirchandani, India's Nuclear Diiemma  (New Delhi: Popular Book Service, 1968), 3.
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things considered it is recommended that it may have been exceptional in the event that it had 
never come into existence.
India's relations with US generally had a tendency to be unstable following India's independence. In 
1953, they were warm because of the 1962 India-China clash. However this was not to keep going 
long. They brought a crash with the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, harmonizing with Pakistan giving 
Nixon and Kissinger the communications channel for the essential US opening to China and the very 
nearly synchronous finish of the Indo -soviet friendship treaty. Dedicated backing to Pakistan in the 
United Nations and elsewhere, and the showcase offeree with the dispatch of the Seventh Fleet to 
the Bay of Bengal brought the relationship to the most minimal level ever.
In the meanwhile positive disposition towards peaceful uses of nuclear energy had likewise changed 
profoundly and were substituted by developing concerns over expansion of nuclear weapons and 
their testing, and also over reactor mishaps and their perils. Disarmament talks and negotiations had 
brought about the Partial Test Ban Treaty as the world struggled over its survival, confronted with a 
arms race between the nuclear powers, including the testing. The NPT, concluded in 1968, was 
expected to end proliferation. That aim and objective was without any doubt shared by India. 
However India's permanent exclusion from the nuclear weapon powers (P5) on the premise of a 
discretionary due date left her disenthralled over what she rightly saw as discrimination. The 
monopoly of the P5 was focused around the flawed theory that only they were equipped for their 
mindful conduct. A provision that they would additionally take solid measures to guarantee advance 
towards complete nuclear disarmament qualifies that. However this expectation, on the off chance 
that it ever existed, was never genuinely sought after, and it had been invalidated with the 
permanent augmentation of the treaty in 1995.
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In 1974, India directed peaceful "nuclear" explosion at Pokharan. Sullivan recognizes four reasons for 
this change: the 1962 border war with China, the demise of Prime Minister Nehru in May 1964, 
China's trying of its first nuclear explosion and the military conflict with Pakistan in 1965.1 contend 
that these were helping components however were not in themselves the principle purposes behind 
the change in India's mentality to arms control. Basically, it was India's frustration with the unfair 
regime and the absence of considerable steps to curtail vertical proliferation and end of nuclear 
weapons that brought on a shift in Indian stance towards arms control. The true avocation maybe 
lies in these circumstances, although scientific and development progress additionally gave some 
method of reasoning. However the timing appeared to have been dictated by domestic political 
issues. The risk to Indira Ghandi proceeding in office, which brought about the Emergency being 
proclaimed a year later, was gathering immense force. It is dicey whether all the outcomes of this 
radical step were completely predicted by a tiny group of Indian decision makers.
Globally, there was mixed response to India's peaceful nuclear explosion. Yet, it was not a surprising 
advancement and after a very long time India had been "viewed as one of the two countries well on 
the way to take after China into the ranks of nuclear power." Nonetheless, the Indian PNE made a 
"thinly veiled outrage" inside Canada. At first, the idea was that India had broken the terms of the 
CIRUS agreement. Robert Gillette states that, India "had climbed into the nuclear clubhouse on the 
shoulders of Canadian technology and Canadian aid." '^^^ India was viewed as a defaulter on a few 
checks: infringement of the CIRUS agreement, perfidy of Canadian government's trust, abuse of 
Canadian aid, and challenge of the NPT framework. In May 1974, Canada suspended the nuclear 
agreement, regardless, Mitchell Sharpe, then secretary of state for external affairs, cleared up that 
India did not break any legal agreement. '^^® The response and the feeling of betrayal fe lt in Canada, 
despite the fact that legitimately unwarranted, was not so much preposterous. The CIRUS
Robert Gillette, "India: Into the Nuclear Club on Canada's Shoulders," Science 184, no. 4141 (7 June 1974): 1053.
See, Kapur, "Some Hypotheses and Lessons," 313; In M ay 1974, Mitchell Sharpe, stated, "...the Indian government [had] not broken 
any agreem ent that it [had] entered into." As quoted in, George Bindon and Sitoo Mukherjee, "Canada-India Cooperation," Research 
Policy 7 (1978): 230; Also see, Gillette, 1055
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agreement was marked in 1956, more than 10 years preceding the signing of the NPT. Around then 
there was extensive equivocalness in regards to the meaning of peaceful nuclear explosions and 
safeguards. With the coming into force of the NPT in 1968 there was an expanded attention on 
safeguards and controls on technology sharing with the non-nuclear weapon states. Articles II and III 
of the NPT dispensed the criteria and difference between "peaceful" nuclear explosion and nuclear 
weapon test. Besides, the NPT prohibited the conduct of nuclear tests, be it for peaceful or military 
purposes by the non-nuclear weapon states, i.e. the states which had not tested a device by 1 
January 1967. Accordingly, in 1971, Canada, signatory to the NPT, demanded that India reflectively 
rethink the peaceful clauses in the 1956 agreement. The Canadian demand was turned down by the 
then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi.^'^^
Regardless, the Indian peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) of 1974 made Western countries aware of 
existing limitations and loopholes in the non-proliferation accord and intensified their impasses in 
regards to the potential use and abuse of nuclear technologies. Henry Kissinger remarked, "The 
Indian nuclear explosion ... raises anew the spectre of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which 
any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust."^'^^ Suddenly, post-1974 India turned into a 
"nuclear pariah."^'^^ In light of the Indian nuclear test, the U.S. Congress passed the Nuclear Non- 
Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). This Act banned nuclear fares including any "source material, 
special nuclear material, production or utilization facilities, and sensitive nuclear technologies" 
unless the beneficiaries- non-nuclear weapon states—acknowledged IAEA defends on all its nuclear 
facilities, including those deemed for peaceful purposes. It is vital to note that the new criteria for 
U.S. nuclear exchange did not oblige signing of the NPT, just acknowledgement of the full-extension 
safeguards. India's position on nuclear safeguards was clear; it would not acknowledge oppressive
Kapur, "Some Hypotheses and Lessons," 313; Bindon and Mukherjee, 231-2; Also, see, Ashok Kapur, "India and the Atom," The Bulletin 
o f Atomic Scientists 30, no.7 (September 1974), 29.
The US Departm ent of State, Bulletin n o .l8 7 5  (2 June 1975), 707.
Michael A. Levy and Charles Ferguson, "U.S.-lndia Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy for Moving Forward," Council Special Report, 
(Washington D.C.: Council for Foreign Reiations, February 2007), 3.
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and discriminatory safeguards/^°. Thus, the NNPA rendered India ineligible for nuclear trade with
the
It has been contended that the non-proliferation controls have to a great extent emerged in 
"defensive" reaction to India's nuclear and missile advancements. While India's 1974 nuclear 
explosion actuated the mystery creation of the London Club, later called the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG), Indian advancement of space engineering propelled the shaping of the Missile Technology 
Control Regime (MTCR).^^^ Brahma Chellaney talks about the nuclear friction between India and the 
U.S. and states that it is actually an "intense struggle between one country's determination to 
control the global diffusion of sensitive technologies and another country's resolve rooted in security 
considerations to build technological independence."^^^
India was seen as the beneficiary of nuclear technology and in this manner obliged to take after the 
conditions and tenets of technology exchange as settled by the supplier countries. Since, 1974 
India had defaulted in the Western discernment, and deserved reprimand and sanctions. Therefore, 
Canada cancelled the nuclear arrangement and the U.S., which was less vocal, presented the NNPA 
and rejected India from technology sharing arrangements. If viewed from the western perspective, 
the Indian PNE could introduce a domino impact, with other developing nations sticking to this same 
pattern and redirecting peaceful nuclear technologies to military purposes. Consistently, then, India 
must be confined and this clarifies the inconvenience of innovative embargoes against India. India 
came to be viewed as an untouchable yet, fundamentally, was not viewed as a rogue state.
See, P.R. Chari, "An Indian Reaction to  U.S. Non-proliferation Policy," International Security 3, no.2 (Autumn 1978): 58-59; Carranza, 
"From Non-Proliferation to  Post-Proliferation,"466; Leonard S. Spector, Status o f U.S. Sanctions Imposed on India and Pakistan 
(Monterrey: James M artin Center for Non-proliferation Studies, August 2001), 3.
Weiss, "India and the  NPT," 26. Weiss informs that, "The law contained a narrow 18-24 month window to  allow President Carter, 
unless blocked by a vote of Congress, to  grandfather tw o  shipments of nuclear fuel fo r the Tarapur reactors while attem pting to  persuade 
India to satisfy the new export criteria....The 18-24 month window in the NNPA closed w ithout India's acquiescence to  full scope 
safeguards, making India ineligible fo r nuclear trade with the United States." (26)
ManojJoshi, "Curbs on Missile Technology," The Hindu, November 1989; Brahma Chellaney, "Non-proliferation: An Indian Critique of 
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Concept of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime:
The international nuclear non-proliferation regime involves the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; 
the International Atomic Energy Agency shields framework; export control systems, for example, the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group; UN Security Council resolutions; multilateral and bilateral agreements, 
including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI); and bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements 
between the supplier and buyer states. It is backed by an expansive scope of alliances together with 
security assurances. The NPT is the cornerstone of the regime. It originated in the growing 
awareness amid the 1950s and 1960s that the proliferation of nuclear weapons was intrinsically 
hazardous and NPT served the security investment of nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear 
weapon states to keep their future spread. After a few years of negotiation, the NPT opened for 
signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970^ ^^ .^
The nuclear non-proliferation regime has assumed a critical part in abating the spread of nuclear 
weapons and hence in assisting global and U.S. security. Within twenty years of the United States 
'development of the nuclear bomb in 1945, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China 
had tested atomic weapons. The number appeared ready to develop extensively. In the early 1960s, 
President John F. Kennedy anticipated that a decade later, fifteen to twenty states would have 
atomic weapons. Yet today the aggregate number of states that have atomic weapon arsenal 
remains at nine: half the number Kennedy anticipated would exist by the early 1970s^^^.
From the dawn of the atomic bomb, U.S. authorities recognized enormous proliferation dangers 
inborn in the spread of enrichment and reprocessing. It was seen then, and stays genuine today, that 
the production of fissile material is the most excessive, entangled, and troublesome part of making a
Paul Lettow. "Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation regim e" In ternational Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 54, April 2 01 0 .6  
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nuclear weapon/^^ Enrichment and reprocessing are hard to catch, and subsequently are conducive 
to clandestine projects. In addition, a few states members of the treaty have contended that the 
expansive terms of Article IV permit, or at any rate don't forestall, marked enrichment and 
reprocessing.
The IAEA website states:
Efforts over the past several years or so to prevent more 
countries from acquiring nuclear weapons have been based on 
several independent, but mutually reinforcing elements. The 
most crucial element is the political disincentive for a State to 
acquire nuclear weapons or to assist other States in doing so.
The individual and collective effort to allay national security 
concerns which might encourage the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons is the most important means of preventing nuclear 
proliferation, because it seeks to eliminate the motivation to 
acquire these weapons. Similarly, States may be provided with 
incentives expressly to renounce the nuclear weapons option.
Such incentives may include guarantees by nuclear weapons 
States not to use nuclear force and positive offers of assistance 
in the event of the threat or the use of force against the State 
concerned. Historically, such incentives have played a major 
role in limiting the number of States acquiring nuclear 
weapons. Another important incentive has been the prospect 
that a State may obtain improved access to nuclear technology 
if it makes a commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. This 
has been important to countries which have wished to make
Unless a state or non-state actor can purchase, take, or generally obtain weapon-grade fissile m aterial, enrichment or reprocessing is 
the most troublesome and vital part of delivering a nuclear weapon.
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use of nuclear power, and to developing countries which have 
sought improved access to the medical, agricultural, industrial 
and environmental applications of nuclear technology^^^.
Central to the non-proliferation regime is the body of legally binding agreements 
(multilateral, regional and/or bilateral)-w ith the NPT being the pre-eminent multilateral 
agreement-in which non-proliferation commitments by States are enshrined. Coupled 
with such non-proliferation commitments is the verification carried out, on behalf of the 
international community, by independent inspectors from the IAEA. There are also 
regional and bilateral inspection arrangements such as those instituted by Euratom, the 
Brazilian/Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and 
various bilateral agreements concerning safeguards and co-operation between States. A 
further element is the system of controls which the majority of States apply to exports 
of materials and equipment which could be used not only in the civil nuclear industry 
but also in the production of nuclear weapons.
In this analysis I take the "non-proliferation regime" to mean the complex of formal and 
informal agreements among states to avert the spread of nuclear weapons to new 
actors. The regime encompasses both formal treaties and the principle shared 
perceptions in the international system about nuclear technology and the roles, and 
tasks of the member states. Some members have a very special role. In Finnemore 
and Sikkink's terminology the US has the identity of 'norm leader'^^^.
http://www.iaea.ore/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards/pia3802.htm l ( accessed 14 June 2013) 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Booklets/Safeguards/pia3802.htm l 
M a rth a ,Finnemore, and Sikkink, Kathryn 1998. international Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change. International Organization 52 (4):887-918
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The non-proliferation regime has both formal (treaties and international institutions) 
and informal components (intergovernmental cooperation and norm leader activities). 
The 1968 NPT is the most imperative of the treaties. Other multilateral treaties 
incorporate the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) which restricts nuclear testing in the 
atmosphere and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) which confines the yield of 
underground nuclear tests. Bilateral treaties are also a part of the regime, for example 
the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the US and Russia (1991). International 
institutions incorporate the UN which serves as the fundamental venue for negotiations, 
for the most part embraced at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. An alternate 
paramount international organization under the UN is the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) set up in 1957. See the table below
Table of Formal and Informal Components of nuclear non-proliferation regime
Formal
Components
M ultilateral
Treaties
NPT (Nuciear 
non­
proliferation  
Treaty)
Internationai
Organizations
IAEA
(International
Atomic
Energy
Agency)
Informal
Components
M ultilateral
coordination
NSG (Nuclear
Suppliers
Group)
Norm Leader 
Initiatives
PSI
(Proliferation
Security
initiative)
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Challenges to the NPT
Looking back at the political and diplomatic drama of Tarapur, some matters which continue to have 
contemporary and even permanent relevance are worth revisiting. The first is the operation of Non- 
Proliferation regime built around NPT and mechanisms set up to maintain it like the IAEA safeguards 
and the NSG. There can be no doubt that with their immense capacity for destruction, nuclear 
weapons and the related technology need to be tightly controlled and kept in safe hands. India has 
always been clear that nuclear disarmament is the only sure way to ensure this. India was equally 
right to also object to the arbitrary apartheid which created an oligarchy of weapon states and a 
punitive machinery to indefinitely preserve this inequality.
Even before the stronghold of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the U.S. and India had 
conflicting viewpoints on nuclear non-proliferation. India, a part of the nonaligned nations (NAM), 
favoured the negotiation of an arrangement that concentrated on all inclusive demobilization, that 
is, a settlement that included even handed vertical and horizontal non-proliferation. On the 
contrary, the U.S. favoured the post-war nuclear weapons status quo and was concerned simply with 
the addition of new nuclear weapon states. The U.S. headed the foundation of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime, monopolized nuclear technology, and denied impartial access to double utilize 
technologies to the non-nuclear weapon states. India—a promoter of nuclear demobilization and 
arms control—was, ironically, minimized in the foundation of the NPT-centric regime.
The nuclear estrangement between the U.S. and India is barely ascribed to the last's insolence of the 
NPT. This viewpoint experiences specific amnesia as it conveniently disregards that India was 
vigorously occupied with nuclear disarmament negotiations for a few decades. In the 1950s India 
had pioneered a call for a thorough boycott on nuclear testing and also a stop on nuclear fissile 
material. Therefore, in 1988 in the United Nations General Assembly, the Indian leader, Rajiv Gandhi 
laid out a striking activity for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2010. Francine Frankel, 
64 I Pa ge
an India specialist, remarks that, "The United States and India have long professed similar 
commitments to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet, the United States' approach to 
non-proliferation, which asserts that universal membership of the 1970 Non-proliferation Treaty, is 
the world's best hope for ultimate progress toward this goal, has been contested from the outset by 
lndia."^®° That is, there has been a concession to the objectives yet contrasts in the intend to 
accomplish them.^®^ Such an assertion is focused around a few erroneous assumptions, inter alia: to 
start with, the U.S. and India had comparative targets concerning non-proliferation; second, the NPT 
is an instrument with an extreme objective of disarmament, and at long last, India was restricted to 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. This reflects an intense absence of discriminating methodologies in 
the proliferation talk. The U.S.-lndia nuclear standoff was not a straightforward instance of issue- 
based antagonism emerging from India's refusal to sign the NPT.
The fundamental nuclear disjuncture between the U.S. and India brought them odds during 
international negotiations on nuclear disarmament and arms control. Since 1945, international 
relations have been "overwhelmingly dominated" by U.S. concerns and quandaries. This is reflected 
in the establishment of the non-proliferation regime. A Report on the International Control of 
Atomic Energy, otherwise called the Acheson-Lillenthal report, ready by the U.S. State Department, 
underscored the double nature of nuclear technologies and the concomitant danger of proliferation. 
It stated, "The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and the development of atomic 
energy for bombs are in much of their course interchangeable and interdependent."^®^ This justified 
international control of the nuclear materials and technologies which structures the premise of the 
Proliferation picture. In addition, the start of the Atomic Age corresponded with the bipolar Cold
Francine R. Frankel, ed., "Preface," in Bridging the Non-proliferation Divide: The United States and  India (Centre for the Advanced 
study of India, University of Pennsylvania, Lanham: University Press of America, 1995), xi 
ibid
Report on the International Control o f Atomic Energy, Prepared for the  Secretary of State's Com mittee on Atomic Energy, Publication 
2498, (Washington D.C.: Departm ent of State, March 1 6 ,1946 ), 4 . Available at h ttp ://w w w .fo ia .c ia .gov/cg i/1946/03% 20- 
% 20March%201946/Report_on_theJnternational_Control_of_Atom ic_Energy_16_Mar_1946.PD F (accessed March, 1 8 ,2 0 1 2 ). The report 
suggested establishment o f an International Atomic Development Authority. On the basis of this report, the U.S. submitted Baruch Plan to  
the United Nations.
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War time; accordingly, it became increasingly imperative for the U.S. to defeat the danger of nuclear 
weapons, along with the risk of communism. A compelling methodology to manage both dangers 
was "containment."^®^ The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the close call from nuclear war 
denoted a defining moment in superpower relations. In ENDC discussions, the U.S., the U.K., and the 
recent USSR arranged the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) which was formally marked on 5 August 
1963. The PTBT was huge in controlling nuclear aftermath in the environment, yet, by excluding 
underground explosions it neglected to understand the objective of a complete nuclear test boycott. 
Nonetheless, in the context of the strained Cold War period, India hailed the conclusion of the PTBT 
as a noteworthy venture to nuclear disarmament. Prime Minister Nehru, remarked, "It is highly 
important and significant because after years of discussions and arguments, this has happened and it 
breaks the ice as it were and gives an opportunity to go ahead with regard to disarmament and in 
putting an end, gradually, perhaps, to cold war attitudes of nations to each other."^®"^
Since the mid-1950s China had been forcefully seeking after its nuclear weapons program and 
conducted its first nuclear test in October 1964. In June 1967 within the period of 32 months China 
test fired a nuclear capable missile and conducted a few nuclear tests, including a thermonuclear 
explosion, i.e. a hydrogen bomb. Then, in India there was fierce debate from the opposition and 
some ruling Congress party members who demanded a change in the Indian position on nuclear 
weapons. On 10 May 1966, the day following the third Chinese nuclear test, the external affairs 
minister, in response to the level headed discussion in the Lok Sabha, expressed:
We had made a careful assessment o f the situation in consultation with our
service chiefs and atomic energy experts even when the firs t nuclear device
^®^  Containment was a strategy used by the U.S. was an aggregation of the political, m ilitary and financial methodologies to  stall the  
impact of the Soviet socialism. The containment strategy was form ulated by George Kennan. He stated: "the main elem ent o f any United  
States policy tow ard the Soviet Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm  and vigilant containment of Russian expansive 
tendencies." George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs  25, no. 4 (July 1947): 575.
^®^  Nehru, "India's Foreign Policy," 187.
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was exploded by China. The mere fac t that China has exploded Its third 
explosion does not vitiate the earlier conclusion, [not to conduct nuclear test] 
though at the same time, the policy is kept under constant review. In any 
serious review, account has to be made not only o f Chinese tests but o f 
relevant factors, especially progress made In the discussions relating to 
nuclear disarmament in which many countries are participating (emphasis 
added).^ ^^
Intervening in the discussion, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi said, "I do not think our policy is at all a 
negative one; I think it is a very positive policy. We are building our atomic power. Of course, we are 
using it for peaceful purposes; but in the meantime, we are increasing our know-how and other 
competence."^®® This demonstrates that India was not enthusiastic to promptly respond to the 
Chinese nuclear weapons program with its own particular nuclear test explosions. Consequently, it 
likewise invalidates the erroneous perception in the West that India's nuclear approach Is to a great 
extent a response to the security risk from China. India was not aggressive in building nuclear 
weapons, nor was it fervently contradicted to the option of weaponisation—as saw prior throughout 
the Nehru period (1947-64). Rather, India, which had submitted a jo in t memorandum in September 
1965 to the UNGA for formulation of a non-proliferation treaty, was perusing a wait and watch 
policy. It was enthusiastically seeking after a demand for nuclear disarmament and was 
endeavouring to secure certain security measures, for example, a boycott on nuclear testing and a 
stop on nuclear weapons, in the interregnum. The cali for disarmament was not just moralistic, it 
was additionally guided by India's security considerations, as any accomplishment in shortening of 
vertical proliferation, for example, a stop on nuclear form up, would have dealt with the nuclear 
weaponisation in India's quick neighbourhood, versus China, other than giving a global reduction in 
nuclear threat.
®^® Lok Sabha Debates, Parliament of India, M ay 10 ,1 96 6 , Column 15712. 
®^® Ibid
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There are suggestions that even in the mid-1960s India was technologically ready to conduct a 
peaceful nuclear explosion. Nonetheless, it was in the post-1968 situation that disillusionment with a 
superpower's impassions to worldwide security investment joined with neighbourhood geopolitical 
variables, probably impacted then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to give the green light for a peaceful 
nuclear explosion in 1974. One noteworthy element which presumably turned out to be an impetus 
in India's calculations for PNE was the plain hostile to India backing offered by the U.S. to Pakistan in 
the 1971 Indo-Pak war. In the early 1970s, Pakistan had become significant for Washington in the 
incipient U.S.-China rapprochement; in this manner, the U.S. sent its state of the craftsmanship 
nuclear equipped plane carrying warship Enterprise in the Bay of Bengal to debilitate India. This not 
just underlined the political utility of the nuclear weapons to the Indian foundation, additionally 
fortified the inborn discrimination in the worldwide nuclear request, that advantaged states having 
nuclear weapons could target unarmed states.
The Indian PNE tested the NPT regime in a few ways. First, the nuclear test announced as "peaceful" 
violated Articles II and III of the NPT that assumed that there is no difference between peaceful and 
military explosions. In fact, there is no distinction in peaceful and military explosions. Yet, by calling 
it a peaceful explosion India showed its plan to utilize nuclear energy for developmental purposes. 
Second, the Indian PNE tested the distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear 
weapon states. The NPT distinction between NWS and NNWS was focused around a date: 1 January 
1967. All states that had conducted nuclear explosions before this date were considered NWS and 
along these were qualified to conduct future nuclear tests for both peaceful and military purposes. 
States that had not conducted nuclear tests by 1 January 1967 were banished from conducting any 
tests, including peaceful explosions. Therefore, the PNE put India in a questionable class India - 
demonstrated its nuclear weapons capacity,however avoided building nuclear weapons arsenal. In 
this context, Subrahmanyam comments that the Indian arrangement of non-arrangement was
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outsider to the Western and Communist notions of outside approach and was thusiy viewed as a 
front. Similarly, "the sponsors of the NPT argue that a country can be only a nuclear weapon power 
or a non-nuclear power." They fail to recognize that there can be a third category. The Indian PNE 
and the subsequent declaration that India does not propose to manufacture nuclear weapons made 
India an ambiguous nuclear state.^®  ^ In response to a disintegrating security environment, the PNE 
demonstrated that India had the capacity to develop nuclear weapons. The PNE additionally 
reflected India's strategy to keep away from the development of nuclear weapons while holding the 
option to go nuclear if the security environment so demands.
^®^  K. Subrahmanyam, “Self-Reliance and National Resilience: The Indian Nuciear Policy,” (New Delhi: Abhinav Publishing, 1975), 128.
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CHAPTER V
POKHRANII: India’s nuclear goal posts
Different methodologies to non-proliferation in the post-1968 period initiated a nuclear stalemate 
between the U.S. and India. The U.S. at that time was fully occupied in a nuclear arms race with the 
Soviet Union and found it suitable to sporadically harp on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in talks with India. On the other hand, India was securely positioned in an abstruse position with 
regard to nuclear weapons. In the post-Cold War period, change in the global nuclear order and the 
dawn of the Clinton administration created ripple effects in the U.S.-lndia nuclear equation and both 
states were distressed from their slumberous deadlock. President Clinton, in an offer to reinforce 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, started a review of the NPT (1995) and was vital in the 
formulation of the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The first section briefly highlights 
the hostile relationship between the U.S. and India. The second section explores the Clinton 
administration's "cap, rollback, and eliminate" approach to nuclearisation in South Asia. The third 
section looks at the development of multilateral ties between the U.S. and India. The fourth section 
critically evaluates the indefinite extension of the NPT, the signing of the CTBT, and India's 
obstruction to these treaties. The fifth section examines the imposition of sanctions on India by 
Washington in the aftermath of India's Pokhran II nuclear tests. The final section analyses the flawed 
U.S. nuclear diplomacy toward India. In the mid-1990s, the Clinton administration was 
enthusiastically engaged with worldwide endeavours to reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime; it underpinned an inconclusive broadening of the NPT (1995) and the formulation of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban treaty(1996). India not just contradicted the inconclusive extension of the 
NPT but in the following year declined to sign the CTBT. Yet, nothing was as outrageous as India's
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five nuclear test explosions in Pokhran in 1998. This posed an unprecedented challenge to the NPT 
as India established itself as a de facto  nuclear weapon state. These tests forced a serious review of 
the hitherto policy of "denial and isolation" pursued by the U.S toward India. These tests 
disassembled the existing U. S.-lndia nuclear stalemate and catalysed the requirement to change 
U.S. non-proliferation policy towards India.
Inevitable Antagonists
The trajectory of U.S.-lndia relations post-1968, i.e. NPT-era, displays a fascinating case. Relations 
between the two nations were affronted because of the distinctive methodologies of the U.S. and 
India to an international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Regimes are complex social institutions 
bound to "reflect the prevailing structure of power in [international] society." Oran Young remarks, 
"Regimes are never neutral with respect to their impact on the interests of participating actors."^^^ 
After India's 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion, the U.S. too responsibility for the task of 
strengthening nuclear and missile export controls. This led to the establishment of export cartels like 
the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)^^^ the Zangger Committee^^°, and the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR)^^\ These cartels averted the dual use technology collaboration with India, a non­
signatory of the NPT. Interestingly, from there on, the U.S. did not feel the need or the urgency to 
deal with India on nuclear issues, yet sporadically demanded that India join the NPT as a non-nuclear 
weapon state. India was not at all ready to agree to the biased nuclear non-proliferation regime and 
kept on developing atomic and space programs, so, the stalemate continued. Donald Puchala and 
Raymond F. Hopkins contend that "the tenets of the international regime come to match with the 
values, objectives, and decision-making procedures of the pre-eminent participant or participants. A
Oran R. Young, "Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes," in Andrew Linklater, ed.. Critical Concepts in Political 
Science, Volume 2, (New York: Routledge, 2000), 744.
Nuclear Suppliers Group, form erly known as 'the  London Club,' held its first meeting in London, November 1975  
Zangger Com mittee, also called the NPT Exporters Com mittee, took shape during the 1971-1974 period.
Missile Technology Control Regime was form ed in 1987 by the  Western advanced nations to  prevent the proliferation of advanced 
technologies related to the unmanned delivery vehicles. Including nuclear capable.
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regime need not serve the common or separate interests of every participant very well or even at 
all.""""
U.S.-lndia relations, except for sporadic periods of warmth and cooperation, were largely estranged 
in the Cold War period. During the Reagan administration (1981-89) few attempts were made to kick 
off U.S.-lndia cooperation on defence and advanced technology.""^ As the Cold war faded the 
danger of advanced U.S.-origin military technology from India passing into Soviet hands had 
significantly decreased. Former Department of Defence official Joseph McMillan hints that the 
Reagan administration believed in endorsing "India's indigenous military and defence capability."""^ 
President Reagan acknowledged the rising power of India and wanted to deter India away from the 
Soviet camp. In the 1980s, India, too, was struggling to move beyond the Soviet influence. India 
wanted to play a proactive role in international affairs, and once again proclaim its identity in the 
global order. Specifically, it was intent in diversifying and broadening its defence trade and lessening 
its reliance on defence gear and extra parts supplies from the Soviets.""^
Throughout the first Gulf War (1991-92) American combat aircraft flew from bases in South East 
Asia to Gulf destinations. India allowed the American air ships to refuel in Bombay. This was an 
essential decision taken by India acknowledging the U.S. movement was against a fellow non-aligned 
state, Iraq.""^ Yet, in 1992, India was completely taken aback when the U.S. took a retaliatory 
measure to obstruct the progress of India's civilian space program. In accordance with the Missile
Donald J. Puchala and Raymond F. Hopkins, "International Regimes: Lessons from  Inductive Analysis," International Organisation 36, 
No.2 (Spring 1982):247.
""^ Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, Enhancing Indo-U.S. Strategic Cooperation, Adelphi Paper no. 313, (London: The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1997), 38-39. in 1982 President Reagan and Indira Gandhi signed the U.S.-lndia Science and Technology Initiative. In 
1984, A M em orandum  o f Understanding on Sensitive Technologies, Commodities, and Information  was also marked by these tw o  
countries.
An Interview w ith Joseph M cM illan by a south Asian nuclear, Senior Research Fellow, National Defence University, Washington D.C., 
February 2009. Earlier, M cM illan had served as the  Principal Director of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Departm ent of Defence. In 
his official capacity, during the Reagan administration, McM illan played an im portant role as he m et the  Indian delegation including. Dr. 
Santhanam and Dr. Arunachaiam, for bargaining the sale of Light Combat Aircrafts (LCA) to India.
See, jyotika Saksena and Suzzane Griilot, "The Emergence of indo-U.S. Defence Cooperation: From Specific to  Diffuse Reciprocity," in 
Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the World's Largest Democracy, ed. Gary Bertsch, Seema Gahiaut and Anupam Srivastava, 
(New York: Routledge, 1999).
A fter initial reluctance India supported UN Resolution 678 which certified use of force if Iraq failed to w ithdraw  from  Kuwait by the
stated date, January 1 5 ,1 99 1 .
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Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the U.S. levied sanctions on both the Indian Space Research 
Organization (ISRO) and the Russian space agency (Glavkosmos), and prohibited the sale of 
cryogenic engines to India.""" The U.S. described the Russian cryogenic engine as an "MTCR 
Category I" item and stated that the ISRO-Glavkosmos deal completely infringed MTCR guidelines. 
According to the U.S. Defence Authorisation Act, 1991, the President is coerced to impose sanctions 
against any company or country selling MTCR listed items to non-MTCR signatories.""®
The disintegration of the Soviet Union commemorated a substantial systemic change and 
"fundamentally altered" the interests of America and India. The Soviet Union was not only a source 
of "diplomatic and political support" for India; it was also its "long-time weapons supplier."""^ The 
"division of the Soviet Union," Ambassador Thomas Pickering emphasizes, represented the loss of a 
"Probable strategic option" for India. He remarked that India's geopolitical scenario had been 
radically changed as the Soviet Union "was no longer there and no longer a dependable 
alternative.""®” As far as the America was concerned, the collapse of the Soviet Union created an 
opportunity to develop closer relations with India. Especially, the Clinton administration Dr Zafar 
Jaspal says "recognised that India was a free agent and they might as well try to make sure it was 
part of the American consensus.""®"
In January 1991 India had signed an agreem ent with Glavkosmos, which was a Russian space agency, and purchased the  Cryogenic 
engines and technology for use in the geo-synchronous satellites. In 1990, besides Glavkosmos, India had received offers for similar 
engines from  the General Dynamics, USA and Arlanespace, France. W hile the American offer did not include the transfer of technology, 
the French Space Agency offer was not economically feasible; "U.S. Continues to  Embargo High Tech Defense Exports to  India," Defense 
and Foreign Affairs Weekly, August 1 3 -1 9 ,1 9 9 0 ,1 ;  The Hindu, 23 May, 1992; "Cryogenic Deal W ith Russia," Strategic Digest, November 
1993 ,1843
The sanctions imposed boycott on the commercial transactions of the tw o space organizations ISRO and Glavkosmos. It additionally  
influenced the  U.S. government contracts w ith the tw o organizations which secured things like super-workstations and telescopes. In any 
case, both Russia and India asserted that Washington's charges about infringement of the MTCR w ere inspired, to  demoralize rivals in 
commercial space business. Regardless, in July 1993 Russia succumbed to  the western weight and wiped out the offer o f cryogenic engines 
to India. Manoj Joshi, "Dousing the Fire: Indian Missile Program and the  United States Non-proliferation Policy," Strategic Analysis 17, no.
5 (August 1994); Brahma Chellaney, "Non-proliferation: An Indian Critique of U.S. Export Controls," Orbis (Summer 1994): 44.
Christine Fair, "Learning to  Think the Unthinkable: Lessons from  India's Nuclear Tests," India Review A, no. 1 (January 2005): 33.
Interview w ith Ambassador Thomas Pickering, March 2012.
Dr Zafar Jaspal, interview.
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Additionally, the end of the Cold War marked the decline of the Soviet-style economy. In India, signs 
were visible that the state-led economy was performing dismally. Nonetheless, the then Indian 
Prime Minister Rao and his finance minister, Manmohan Singh, acted swiftly to initiate a transition 
toward policies of economic liberalization. Ambassador Pickering, who was posted in India during 
1992-93, recollects, "Heroic people in India were quick to call attention" to the economic 
stagnation. Thus, "historically, we saw the beginnings of the change in India.""®" The liberalisation of 
the Indian economy can be termed as India's second encounter with destiny. Significantly, the 
revamping of the Indian economy—from state-led socialist economy to market-based—created 
space for a symbiotic connexion with the global economy."®® The American corporate sector was 
quick to view India's potential as a huge market for U.S. capital, technology, and goods. Robin 
Walker, an expert on South Asia, opines that the liberalization of the economy associatively 
unleashed an innovative upheaval and prompted "bewildering engineering exchange" In fact, he 
contends that the US-lndia trade was a typical case of a government following its corporate sector in 
opening up a relationship with another country"®^. Thus, with the end of the Cold War there were 
high hopes that the U.S. would find a natural ally in India. Dennis Kux, the author of Estranged 
Democracies, stated that the "most logical policy" for Washington would be "to treat India as a 
significant Asian power." He encouraged United States and was of the opinion that it "should seek 
friendly relations, including expanded security relations ... India is large enough and economically 
and militarily of sufficient importance that the Indo-U.S. relationship could have strategic 
importance in its own right." In view of the post-Gold War potential for growth of U.S.-lndia bilateral 
relations, Clinton adopted a dual-track policy with India. On the one hand, the Clinton administration 
made a sincere endeavour to enhance the apathetic relationship with India; on the other hand, 
vigorous deliberations were made to make India follow Washington's dictates and comply w ith the
Amb. Pickering, interview.
W ith the liberation of the economy, India's economic investment changed and prom pted a change in the trading accomplices. Post- 
1991, Russia lost Its position as India's real trading accomplice. Really, w ith the breakdown of the Soviet economy, its successor state, 
Russia could none, of these manage the  p re l9 9 0  built level of rupee-based exchange, nor, could be a hotspot fo r inflow of investments 
and capital in India.
Interview w ith Robin W alker by South Asian Nuclear Specialist, Robin W alker is a National security scholar, Truman Security Project, 
Washington D.C. He states, "As the American companies w ent in the late 1990s, in 2000 Clinton visited and made the first visit [of the  
American President] to India in several decades".
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non-proliferation regime. By the by, India declined to follow U.S. orders in the nuclear non­
proliferation circle and, therefore, the nuclear uniqueness endured."®®
Clinton's Approach: “Cap, Rollback, and Eliminate"
With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
developed as a critical threat. In the post-Cold War period there were pessimist concerns about the 
development of new nuclear states coupled with the "spread of nuclear weapons and knowledge" 
among dissident states and terrorist groups. Consequently, the Clinton administration was 
confronted with a highly challenging global nuclear order and so non-proliferation was high on 
Clinton's foreign policy agenda. In the South Asian region, the presence of two nuclear states, India 
and Pakistan, drew huge attention"®®. The U.S. had constantly stressed the signing of the NPT by 
India (and Pakistan); yet, India had declined to sign the treaty and Pakistan interfaced its signatures 
to India's. Additionally, since the 1980s, there were a few concerns with respect to India's 
progressions in the indigenous missile program, particularly the build upon-proliferation of nuclear 
capabale missiles. In February 1993, Congressional Research Service (CRS) report brought up that 
India had enough fissionable material to deliver 75 or more nuclear weapons while Pakistan could 
make 10-15 weapons. Both nations had missiles and aircrafts for carrying nuclear weapons with 
variable limitations in productivity and precision. The CRS report likewise tagged that while India's 
nuclear system was to a great extent independent, Pakistan had gotten the nuclear technology from 
abroad."®" Consequently, the Chief of Central Intelligence, James Woolsey, in his Congressional 
testimony expressed, "The weapons contest in the middle of India and Pakistan postures maybe the 
most plausible prospect for future utilization of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear
Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941-1991  (California: Sage Publications, 1994), 451.
Since 1980s there were a few  reports that Pakistan was forcefully seeking after atomic weapons and missile im provem ent w ith  outside 
backing, fundamentally China and North Korea. Yet, preceding 1998, not at all like India, it never led an atomic test
Richard P. Cronin and Barbara Leitch LePoer, South Asia: U.S. Interests and Policy Issues, CRS Report fo r Congress, no. 93-243  
(Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, February 12,1993 ), 4-5.
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weapons." He additionally cautioned that both nations were equipped forgathering nuclear
weapons on short notice. 188
The expanding nuclearisation in South Asia stoked alarm of the approaching danger o f nuclear war in 
the region. U.S. insights reports uncovered that in the year 1990 India and Pakistan had barely 
gotten away from a nuclear war."®” Intelligence satellites had recognized an "extraordinary expand in 
Pakistan radar action." There were strong indications that Pakistan was prepared for war. It was 
accounted for that Pakistan had prepositioned and armed its F-16 flying aircraft."®” Richard Kerr, the 
then deputy director of intelligence for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), regarded the India- 
Pakistan conflict as the "most perilous situation," even "more startling than the Cuban missile crisis." 
The Indian government debated the legitimacy of the sagacity asserts that in 1990 it was nearly on 
the verge of nuclear exchange with Pakistan."®" It was also suggested that the intelligence reports 
were a ploy of the U.S. to project "an exaggerated over-nuclearized scenario" in South Asia in order 
to allow the Americans to dictate non-proliferation measures to the region."®" Nonetheless, a 
noticeable researcher, Devin T. Hagerty, contends that the 1990 no-war was a probability that did 
not happen as a result of "existential prevention." That is the knowledge of each one side's nuclear 
capability and that any military hostility could escalate into nuclear war deterred both India and 
Pakistan."®® This phenomenon of the nonappearance of nuclear war because of the hazy nuclear 
situation between the sub continental twins was likewise depicted as "non-weaponised deterrence
Testimony o f the Director o f Central Intelligence Agency, James Woolsey, Senate Governmental Affairs Com mittee, 103rd Congress, 1st 
Session, Washington DC, February 2 4 ,1 9 9 3 ,1 2 .
Seymour Hersh, "On the Nuclear Edge," N ew Yorker (March 29,1993 ): 56-57; In early 1990 India exasperated with the proceeded 
undercover Pakistan's backing to  the radicals in Indian Kashmir, began arrangements to  complete strikes at the terrorist preparing camps 
situated in Pakistan. In light of the  knowledge reports, the Pakistani stronghold offered requests to  arm  F-16s w ith atomic weapons to  
defeat the accepted substandard quality versus India. These improvements were picked up by the American intelligence. Prior, too in 1987  
there had been a Brasstacks Crisis, in which india's military was completing noteworthy peacetime practices which was misread by 
Pakistani side as India's arrangements for w ar .For details on these tw o crises see, Sumit Ganguly, "Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issues and the  
Stability/Instability Paradox," Studies In Conflict and Terrorism  18, (1995): 325-334; Also see, Stephen P. Cohen, "1990: South Asia's Useful 
Crisis," (paper presented to  the Annual M eeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Chicago, February 6-7  
1992); Devin T. Hagerty, "The Power of Suggestion: Opaque Proliferation, Existential Deterrence, and the South Asian Nuclear Arms 
Competition," Security Studies 2, no.3-4 (Spring-Summer 1993).
Hersh, "Nuclear Edge."
^®^"Singh Denies Reports on Indo-Pak Nuclear W ar," The Hindustan Times (N ew  Delhi), March 2 5 ,1 99 3 .
Vi nay Kumar Malhotra, ed., "U.S. Latest Initiatives on Non-proiiferation in South Asia and Indo-U.S. Relations," in lndo-U.S. Relations In 
the Nineties (Delhi: Anmol Pubiications Pvt. Ltd, 1995), 32.
Devin T. Hagerty, "Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: The 1990 Indo-Pakistani Crisis," International Security 20, no. 3 (W inter 1995 /96 ):
80.
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"®'""and "recessed deterrence.""®® Even though a "direct, interstate conflict" was avoided due to 
incipient nuclearisation, it was suggested that the next war could result from "domestic turmoil and 
spill over.""®® This realization centred attention on the Kashmir question in the middle of India and 
Pakistan, and its capability to change into an undesirable nuclear situation in the subcontinent. 
Subsequently, on a few occasions the Clinton administration raised the Kashmir issue which 
incensed the Indian establishment. On October 28,1993, Assistant Secretary of State Robin Raphael 
asserted Kashmir to be a debated region and in this way questioned India's authenticity of rule."®" 
Earlier, President Clinton, in his September address to the United Nations General Assembly, had 
additionally commented that India had damaged human rights in Kashmir. India considered this 
against India stance on Kashmir to be an endeavour to weight it to surrender its nuclear option."®®
The risk of nuclearisation and related dangers in South Asia urged the Clinton administration to seek 
after its non-proliferation objectives energetically. In May 1993, the White House report to the 
Congress, Progress Toward Regional Non-proliferation in South Asia, stressed, "Non-proliferation is a 
high necessity" and announced the intention to "pursue a comprehensive, incrementai and iong term 
approach that seeks to cap, then reduce over time, andfinaiiy, eiiminate weapons o f mass 
destruction and their means o f deiivery from  the region (emphasis added).""®® From there on, 
Washington recharged its weight on India to sign the NPT and demanded different measures to 
check the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region, for example, stopping the production of fissile 
material and accepting international safeguards on nuclear facilities.
The Clinton administration at a few occasions recommended that non-proliferation plans in South 
Asia could be instituted through multilateral conferences. In a bilateral dialog with India, the Clinton
George Perkovich, "A Nuclear Third W ay in South Asia," Foreign Policy 91 (Summer 1993).
Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation," in Nuclear Deterrence: Problems and Perspectives In the 1990s, ed. 
Serge Sur, (New York: UNiDIR, 1993), 66.
Sumit Ganguly, "Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Issues and the Stability/Instability Paradox," Studies In Conflict and Terrorism  18 (1995):329. 
The Hindustan Times, 29 October, 1993.
M alhotra, "Initiatives on Non-proliferation," 20.
U.S. Departm ent of State, Report ta Congress on the Progress Toward Regional Nuclear Non-proliferation (Washington D.C.: U.S.
Departm ent o f State, M ay 5 ,1 9 93 ), 3.
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administration proposed a five nation conference (counting the U.S., Russia, China, Pakistan, and 
India) to achieve a denuclearisation course of action for the subcontinent. Thus, a nine-nation 
conference was likewise mooted. In April 1994, Strobe Talbott, the appointee secretary of state, 
went to India particularly to accentuate the "cap, rollback, and eliminate" targets of the 
administration. He likewise proposed a nine-nation multilateral conference focused around the 
recipe 5+2+2. That is, the five permanent members of the U.N Security Council (the U.S., Russia, 
China, France, the U.K), Japan and Germany, other than India and Pakistan."””
The Clinton administration at a few occasions recommended that India declined these regional 
activities as they were imperfect on a few numbers. Firstly, the gross disregard of the China factor in 
Indian strategic calculations, these suggestions put forward by the Clinton administration included 
China as a conspicuous member. It had long been perceived that, "India could not accept the status 
quo of China's legitimate and exclusive regional possession of nuclear weapons.""”" India respected 
any regional denuclearisation plan to be unsuitable without the abridgement of Chinese nuclear 
capabilities. China was likewise responsible for abetting Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs. In 
this way, these recommendations reflected Washington's absence of perception of the regional 
geopolitical elements and India's security concerns."”" Second, these recommendations implied 
expanded international reconnaissance and impedance in the South Asian region; a probability that 
India had intensely abstained from throughout the Cold War. Third, the inclusion of Japan and 
Germany was seen as a vital move as these were likewise India's significant trade partners. At long 
last. New Delhi was not in support of region-specific solutions including a regional/sub-regional 
nuclear weapon free zone; India considered these as only fractional and oppressive measures. The 
nuclear weapons and the delivery vehicles have global reach; along these lines, regardless of the 
possibility that the Indian subcontinent was denuclearised India could even now be a focus of a
Raj Chengappa, "Nuclear Dilemma," India Today, April 3 0 ,1 9 9 4 ,4 6 .
W illiam  Schneider, "Policy Issues and Implications o f Nuclear Testing by India and Pakistan,” Statem ent before the Subcommittee on 
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, on The Crisis in South Asia, Part II, Senate Foreign Relations Com mittee, U.S. Congress, June 3,1998. 
Available at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/s9806G3-schn.htm  (accessed April 2 9 ,2 00 9 ).
Marshall M . Bouton, "Heed South Asia's Concerns," Far Eastern Economic Review  161, no. 26 (June 25 ,1 99 8 ).
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nuclear assault Hence, logically talking, India was restricted to any regional-level capping measures 
until and unless these were joined to global disarmament."”® Indian Atomic Energy Commission 
Chairman R. Chidambaram denounced the U.S. non-proliferation initiatives in the region, stating, 
"India has observed the longest moratorium on nuclear bomb explosions. So we don't have to take 
lessons on morality from the U.S. or anyone else ... we are not in favour of any regional capping 
effort or having countries broker a deal between India and Pakistan on the nuclear question.""”^
The Clinton administration had little accomplishment in implementing the "Cap, rollback, and 
eliminate" objectives in the hitherto neglected South Asian region. In a frantic offer, the U.S. offered 
38 F-16 battle airplanes to Pakistan, conceding it a one-time exception in the Pressler Amendment"”® 
in lieu of international safeguards and inspections on its nuclear installations. Although Pakistan 
rebuffed this offer"”®, it created a lot of uproar in India. It reflected the Clinton administration's lack 
of understanding of the political dynamics in the region."”" Moreover, F -16 combat -planes are 
equipped for carrying nuclear weapons, and hence, this offer contradicted U.S. nuclear non­
proliferation policy. Washington was endeavouring to denuclearize the region, yet, on the other 
hand, was eager to offer nuclear competent airplanes to Pakistan—a nation which was under the 
U.S. scanner for illegal proliferation practice.
President Clinton embraced a coercive policy to make India follow U.S. dictates on nuclear non­
proliferation. The administration showed minimal enthusiasm toward seeking after dialog to bridge
Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain their Nuclear Capabilities, (Washington DC: W oodrow Wilson Centre Press, 
1995), 201; Thomas W . Lippman, "U.S. Effort to  Curb Nuclear Weapons in Peril as India Insists on Limits for China," Washington Post, July 
7 ,1 9 94 .
Dr. Rajagopalan Chidambaram, Chairman of India's Atomic Energy Commission, Interview by Raj Chengappa, "Say 'No' to  Regional 
Capping," India Today (April 3 0 ,1 99 4 ), 50.
“^ The Pressler Amendment was presented in 1985 by the U.S. Congress as another area 620e (e) in the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). It 
ordered yearly confirmations by the U.S. President to  the Congress that Pakistan was not fabricating a nuclear explosive device, and that 
the American help was not being abused towards subsidizing Pakistan's atomic project. Since 1985 till 1989, the U.S. kept on ensuring that 
Pakistan did not have a nuclear explosive device. It was in 1990 shockingly tha t the George W  Bush was not able to  issue the  obliged 
confirmation; this set off the Pressler Am endm ent sanctions. It matched w ith the end of the Cold W ar which significant decreased 
Pakistan's importance as a cutting edge state against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan area. Pakistan had officially made full instalm ent for 
the F-16s. Yet, as per Pressler Amendment, neither did the U.S. convey the F-16s nor did Washington return Pakistan's instalment; hence, 
this issue waited on.
Interestingly, Pakistan refused this proposal of the supply of 38 F-16s in lieu of IAEA safeguards— even though Pakistan had already  
made the full payment for these aircrafts.
John F. Burns, "India Rejects U.S. Bid for Nuclear Pact with Pakistan," N ew  York Times, March 2 6 ,1 99 4 .
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the nuclear divide, and made no endeavour to understand the security concerns behind India's 
aspiration to maintain its nuclear capabilities. India and the U.S. continued to be "stuck in the 
nuclear narrative.""”® Thus, George Perkovich remarks, "The United States continued to pursue 
proposals to cap India's nuclear and missile programs. The Indians neither accepted nor rejected 
these proposals, indicating a decorous stalemate (emphasis added).""”®
Talbott-Singh Dialogue
Promptly after the Pokhran II nuclear tests, India launched fiery diplomatic efforts to clear up its 
position that the tests were required by its weakening security environment, and to underline that 
there was no "revisionist agenda."""” As a component of that exertion, India asked for a dialog with 
Washington. Notwithstanding the indignation within the administration, the Indian invitation to talk 
was quickly acknowledged by the White House. The Indian nuclear tests drew the attention of the 
Clinton administration to the mulling non-proliferation issues with India. Strobe Talbott has seemly 
alluded to the Pokhran II explosions as "attention-grabber and action-enforcer."""" After the starting 
period of reactions and sanctions, Washington fe lt desperation to thoroughly audit its policy to 
nuclear India, hence, a "more reflective process began.""""
On June 12,1998, scarcely a month after the nuclear tests, a very High level United States-lndia 
dialog commenced.""® It consisted of 14 bilateral gatherings throughout the whole one year. The U.S. 
delegation was headed by the then appointee Secretary of state. Strobe Talbott. Since the start of 
the Clinton administration, Talbott had been included in nuclear non-proliferation issues in South
Satu P. Limaye, "U.S.-lndia Relations: Stuck in Nuclear Narrative," Comparative Connections 3, n o .l, April 2001.
George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Im pact on Global Proliferation, updated edition, (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 2001), 347.
C. Uday Bhaskar, "Systemic Compulsions in India-U.S. Relations," in Indla-U.S. Relations: Addressing the Challenges o f the 21st Century, 
ed., N.S Sisodia, Peter R. Lavoy, Cherian Samuel and Robin W alker (Delhi: Magnum Books, September 2008), 26; Brajesh Mishra, Principal 
Secretary to  the Prime M inister of India, held parallel dialogues with British and French counterparts; though these talks w e re  notas  
extensive and prolonged as w ith the U.S.
""" Strobe Talbott, in an email response to the questionnaire submitted by the author, April 2 0 ,2 0 0 9 .Also see Strobe Talbot. "Dealing with  
the Bomb in South Asia." Foreign Affairs 78, no. 2 (March-April 1999).
""" Kanti Bajpai, "India-U.S. Foreign Policy Concerns: Cooperation and Conflict," in Engaging India: U.S. Strategic Relations with the 
World's Largest Democracy, ed., Gary K. Bertsch, Seema Gahiaut and Anupam Srivastava (N ew  York: Routledge, 1999), 202.
Washington also assumed a parallel series of dialogue with Pakistan, but the  US-Pakistan dialogue is beyond the scope of this study.
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Asia. From the Indian side, Jaswant Singh, representative director of the Indian Planning 
Commission, joined the discussions as an exceptional emissary of the Prime Minister.""^ The Talbott- 
Singh talks ended up being a phenomenal dialogue between the two nations whose relationship up 
to this point was relevantly described by Selig S. Harrison as a "dialogue of the deaf."
The Talbott-Singh dialogue was held in an "opaque environment"""®, yet, soon there was a 
recognizable change in Washington's tone. After a couple of starting rounds, Karl Inderfurth 
expressed, "we are making progress in defining the principles that will underpin U.S. relations with 
India"""" (emphasis added). The purpose of these talks, he emphasized, was to explore for a 
"common ground." He stated that the attempt was, "to  build on areas of agreement and find some 
ways to manage differences where we do not agree." ""® In contrast to its prior reformatory 
approach, the U.S. was not uniquely centred around managing nuclear non-proliferation goals, 
rather, it was quick to energize a positive environment and encourage talks that would attain more 
extensive American objectives with India. In this way, the dialogue secured a wide range of United 
States-lndia relations, from political, security, economic, and technological relations, to regional and 
International developments.""®
Shifting Nuclear Goalposts
The Talbott-Singh talkathon was inconclusive. At first, sanctions were interfaced to advancement on 
the nuclear front, yet, taking into account distinctive political-economic considerations, a large
After his election to  the Indian Parliament, Jaswant Singh was inducted into the Cabinet as the Foreign Minister of India (Decem ber 
1 9 9 8 -July 2002).
""® Selig S. Harrison, "Dialogue of the Deaf: M utual Perceptions and Indo-American Relations," in Conflicting Images, ed., Sulochana 
Raghavan Glazerand Nathan Glazer, (Glen Dale, MD: Riverdale, 1990).
""® Bhabani Mishra, "India-U.S. Relations: A Paradigm Shift," Strategic Analysis 29, no. 1, (January-March 2005): 84; Also see, Sukumar 
Muralidharan, "On to  the Next Round," Frontline 16, no.3 (January 30-15 February, 1999). Available at 
w w w .h indu .eom /fline /fll603 /16030970.h tm  (accessed March 21, 2011).
Inderfurth, testimony, July 13 ,1998 .
As quoted in, Chidanand Rajghatta, "American Sanctions Will Go Soon, Says Inderfurth," The Indian Express (M um bai), August 3 1 ,1 9 9 8 . 
J.N. Dixit, "Indo-U.S. Relations: Delhi Dialogue and After," RedlffNews, February 1 1 ,1 99 9 . Available at 
w w w .red iff.co m /new s/1999feb /lld ix it.h tm  (accessed March 10, 2011). The U.S. delegation consisted of Kari Inderfurth; Vice-Chairman of 
the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee General Joseph Ralston; Assistant Secretary in Charge of Disarmament Robert Einhorn; a 
representative from  the National Security Council dealing w ith South Asia; and M atthew  P. Daley, who had served as deputy chi e f of 
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portion of the sanctions were quickly waived. The Clinton administration neglected to evoke any 
considerable responsibility from India on the determined nuclear destinations and, rather, wound up 
moving the nuclear goalposts as for India. First and foremost, even a quick perusing of the new 
nuclear benchmarks uncovers an unobtrusive yet considerable change in the American nuclear non­
proliferation policy to India; the U.S. methodology changed from "cap, rollback, and eliminate" to 
the maintenance of nuclear restraint. Samantha Ravich opines, "The benchmarks were created with 
the mindset that the rollback of India's weapons program was a possibility."""” I contend that in the 
post-Pokhran II time, the U.S. did not consider it related to demand rollback and elimination of 
nuclear weapons, rather, Washington essentially induced India to practice nuclear limitation in order 
to counteract coincidental nuclear aftermath in South Asia.
Second, and most huge, the oft-declared objective of the Clinton administration, that is, adherence 
of India to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapon state (NNWS), was conspicuously absent from the 
nuclear benchmarks. The Clinton administration apparently reconciled itself to the way that India 
had nuclear weapons and there was no probability of a rollback.
Third, the Clinton administration neglected to enrol India's dedication to the huge treaties of the 
non-proliferation regime. India could dodge signing the CTBT as it was rejected by the U.S. Senate 
and the U.S. had accordingly lost its haggling position. Likewise, the FMCT was all the while moping 
in the Conference on Disarmament. Accordingly, no agreement could be arrived at and India was not 
bound to acknowledge restrictions on the production of fissile material.
Fourth, despite the fact that, the Clinton administration declined to accord a de jure recognition of 
India's status as a "nuclear weapon state" as characterized by the NPT, these benchmarks reflected 
an inferred acknowledgement of India's nuclearisation. The benchmarks likewise uncovered an
Samantha F. Ravich, "Nuclear Non-proliferation and the Cases of Russia, China and India," in The Challenge o f Proliferation: A Report o f  
the Aspen Strategy Group, ed., Kurt Campbell (Washington D.C.: The Aspen Institute, February 2005), 107.
82 I P a g e
acknowledgement of India's security necessities for a "minimum deterrent." The post-1998 test 
situation reflected a change in the U.S. stance in that it now perceived "India's right to build a 
credible minimum deterrent."""" In January 2000, Strobe Talbott, in an interview with a prominent 
Indian news daily The Hindu, stressed that the United States "fully" recognizes that it is "the 
sovereign right [o find ia ] to make decisions on what sort o f weapons and force posture are necessary 
fo r  the defence ofindia and Indian /nterests" """(emphasis added). Be that as it may, the condition 
was that the deterrence posture ought to be transparent and in addition satisfactory to the U.S. to 
keep any miscalculation or inadvertent nuclear war on the subcontinent. This acknowledgement of 
India's requirement for a nuclear impediment reflected a different modification in U.S. nuclear non­
proliferation policy this has gone generally unrecognized. Subsequently, the Clinton administration, 
in spite of changing the goals and stance of its nuclear non-proliferation policy, neglected to viably 
manage the post-proliferation challenge of nuclear India, the oddity.
Beyond the Bilateral Ties
The Clinton administration, cognisant of the emerging market potential of India, sought an 
"enlargement of the template of the Indo-U.S. relationship."""® Interestingly, there was unmistakable 
fascination on both sides to fashion new multidimensional connections. In April 1994, in a historic 
six-day memorable visit to Washington of then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao, mutual 
interests in trade and development were explored. Contentious issues, for example, Kashmir, human 
rights, missiles, and nuclear proliferation were consigned to the foundation and examined secretly 
among the leaders.""^
""" Mohan, "Early Solutions."
Ibid.
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Soon after the summit meeting, there was a build in the pace and extent of high level exchanges that 
attempted to captivate India in a few circles. U.S. Energy Secretary Hazel O' Leary went by India in 
mid-1994 and again in February 1995. In January 1995, William Perry turned into the first American 
Secretary of Defense to visit India after a gap of seven years. Throughout his trip, he signed marked 
the Agreed Minute on Defense Relations, with his Indian partner. Minister of Defense Mallikarjun. 
This understanding called for building another key relationship and a "Defence Policy Group" (DPG) 
was made. The DPG mandate was to: survey systems in the post-Cold War period, push exchange of 
senior officials and military officers, and launch training and jo in t exercises among the military.""® 
This was considered a significant breakthrough in U.S.-lndia relations.
Following Perry's visit, U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown led "the largest American business 
group ever to visit India."""® He signed an agreement with his Indian counterpart to inaugurate a 
"Commerce Forum," a jo int project between government authorities and business executives to 
advertise bilateral economic relations. The delegation returned home with $4 billion dollars' value of 
trade and investment, and this was "just the beginning for American companies ready to exploit 
India's free market economic changes."""" Secretary Brown's visit marked a "'capstone' toward 
forging a new relationship between India and the U.S."""®
Accordingly, the economic significance of India was acknowledged by the business community and 
in addition the Clinton administration. As indicated by Warren Christopher, the U.S. Secretary of 
State, India's economic reform arrangement made good conditions for "unprecedented trade and 
investment." Christopher averred, "Our investment in India has increased more in the last year
The Hindustan Times, January 1 3 ,1 99 5 .
John F. Burns, "U.S. Ends A $4 Billion Visit to india," The New York Times, January 1 8 ,1 99 5 .
ibid. The deals included areas likely to  make quickest advances in the emerging economy of India.
Ibid.
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[1993] than it had in the preceding four decades of Indian independence."""® By the end of 1995, the 
U.S. had emerged as India's "biggest trading partner and a source of 40% of foreign investment in 
the country.""®”
Strengthening of NPT-centric Regime
Disregarding the expansion of bilateral ties clear in the high-level visits and imperative economic and 
defence Agreements, nuclear dissimilarities continued between the U.S. Since India was considered 
a proliferation peril, domestic legislation and international fare controls restricted the degree of 
defense and security cooperation with India. Robin Raphael, in an announcement before the 
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, underscored that "non-proliferation is a high 
necessity" for the Clinton administration. She eased the concerns that the change of economic 
relations with India would cripple the U.S. non-proliferation objectives. She remarked, "Some 
commentators have incorrectly argued that expanding U.S. economic objectives in South Asia should 
or will undercut our efforts to advance other key interests, such as non-proliferation or human 
rights.""®" Raphael highlighted the fact that the evolution of bilateral relations was restricted to 
finding "common ground on this vital issue of non-proliferation.""®"
Throughout the years 1993-96, the U.S. attempted vigorous endeavours to reinforce the non­
proliferation regime with the indefinite extension of the NPT and the signing of the CTBT. This 
accentuated the nuclear divergence between the U.S. and India. The NPT review conference was 
planned for April 1995."®® The U.S. put pressure on India to sign the treaty India repeated that it 
would not sign any oppressive non-proliferation treaty that is not connected to a staged elimination
W arren Christopher, "Strengthening U.S. Relations with South Asia," Speech by the U.S. Secretary of State to the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation, New York City, September, 2 9 ,1 9 9 4 , Bureau o f Public Affairs, U.S. D epartm ent o f  State Dispatch 5, 
no.40 (3 Oct, 1994):656.
Ranbir Vohra, The M aking o f India: A Historical Survey, 2nd edition, (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), 288.
Robin Raphel, Non-proiiferation Policy in South Asia, Statem ent before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 9 March 1995, U.S. Departm ent o f State Dispatch 6, no. 12 (Washington D.C., March 2 0 ,1 9 9 5 ).
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of nuclear weapons. At first, India's Foreign Secretary, K. Srinivasan, had guaranteed that India may 
go to the NPT review conference as an onlooker, yet this prompted broad domestic feedback. In the 
expressions of K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian security analyst, "Let us not spoil our unique record of 
unrelenting opposition to nuclear weapons by even giving an iota of our recognition to the NPT by 
sending an official observer.""®^ Accordingly, India refrained from the NPT extension conference. On 
May 11,1995, after prolonged negotiations, the arrangement was stretched out for an inconclusive 
period focused around the proposal set forward by Canada."®® The NPT, irrefutably, has assumed a 
part in easing o ff nuclear proliferation. Accordingly, it is desirable over the political agitation that 
could have resulted in its absence."®® Yet, in the post-Cold War period, the 1995 NPT Review 
Conference gave a chance to evacuate the imbalances and disparities in obligations between nuclear 
weapon states (NWS) and nuclear non weapon states (NNWS) honoured in the Treaty. The 
disarmament condition. Article IV, of the NPT could have been reinforced and interfaced to a staged 
project of elimination of nuclear weapons. As Michael J. Mazarr remarks, the Clinton administration 
had "a historic chance to reverse the nuclear arms race of the last 40 years.""®" On the other hand, 
Clinton indicated enormous absence of imaginative intuition and key vision. The NPT, which 
propagated imbalance and centred parsimoniously on horizontal proliferation alone, was given 
another lease of existence without any noteworthy changes.
The Clinton administration also actively engaged in negotiations for framing the CTBT in the 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva."®® This reflected a critical change in the U.S. position on 
comprehensive test ban. India had called for a nuclear test boycott in 1954 when the U.S. had
K. Subrahmanyam, "India's 'No' to  Observer at the NPT Extension Conference," Times o find ia, January 2 5 ,1995 ; For th e  debate in India 
on the NPT extension, see, Savita Pande, "Future of NPT and India-Any Options?" Strategic Anaiysis (July 1994): 452; "India and NPT 
Extension: a Case for Totai Disarmament," The Times o find ia, February 1 5 ,1 99 5
Stephen W . Young and Daniel T. Plesch, A Permanent Non-proliferation Treaty, Newsletter on International Security Policy, 4 5 ,1  June 
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conducted only about 50 nuclear tests."®® All through the Cold War, the U.S. did not consider nuclear 
test boycott to be in its national investment and contradicted it. Around then, the U.S. raised 
concerns about the insufficiency of the verification measures to assess nuclear tests conducted by 
the Soviet Union. To beat this issue of verification, in 1984, India, along with different nations, 
secured a gathering called the Six Nation Initiative to give seismic monitoring services."'^” 
Subsequently, India made a vain endeavour to conquer any hindrance between the superpowers for 
the resumption of dialog on a nuclear test ban.
Really, the rationale behind the U.S. opposition to comprehensive nuclear test ban was principally to 
keep up nuclear prevalence vis-à-vis Soviets. This superiority required periodical nuclear tests to 
guarantee the unwavering quality and safety of the current nuclear stockpile and in addition for 
scaling down and upgrading the weapons. Seaborg and Loeb emphasise that the main reason was 
"the determination to 'modernise' the U.S. stockpile by adding new weapons considered more 
suitable to future needs.""^" As indicated by facts, during the period from 1945-1992 the U.S. 
conducted 1,030 nuclear tests. Exclusively, the number ascents to 1,054 if the 24 tests held together 
with the U.K are incorporated"^" Since 1961 the U.S. conducted nuclear tests consistently with a 
record high of 56 nuclear tests in a single year, 1962. Ironically, throughout the period from 1965-68 
when negotiations for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty were being held, the U.S. tested 184 
nuclear explosions. By 1970, when the NPT came into power, this number had expanded to 269."^®
At the end of 1992, after the six nuclear tests. President George W. Bush declared a unilateral 
moratorium. The U.S. changed its position because of the disintegration of America's most 
outstanding adversary, the Soviet Union, and incompletely to the approaching NPT extension
U.S. Departm ent of Energy, United States Nuclear Tests: July 1945-Septem ber 1992, DOE/NV-209-REV15 (Las Vegas, Nevada: Nevada 
Operations Office, December 2000), xi.
K.Subrahmanyam, "India 'First' Country to Accede to Partial N-Test Ban Treaty," The Times o find ia , February 1 3 ,1 99 5 . The countries in 
the six-nation initiative, included Mexico, Sweden, Argentina, Greece and Tanzania.
Glenn T. Seaborg and Benjamin S. Loeb, "M ake the Partial Test Ban Comprehensive," Bulletin o f the Atomic Scientists 4, no. 7 (M ay  
1987): 3.
U.S. Deptt. of Energy, "United States Nuciear Tests," xi; Also see, Stephen I. Schwartz, ed.. Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences o f  
U.S. Nuciear Weapons since 1948, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
U.S. Deptt. of Energy, "UnitedStates Nuclear Tests," xi; Also see, Robert Standish Norris and Thomas B. Cochran, U.S. Nuciear Tests Juiy 
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expected in 1995. An effective extension of the NPT was contingent upon U.S. advance to a 
comprehensive test ban. Besides, by the 1990s the U.S. had consummated simulation testing and 
had collected enough information to utilize computer aided nuclear testing.
In spite of the fact that the nuclear test explosions by a nuclear weapon state are legitimately not in 
contravention of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty; nonetheless, contradict the soul of nuclear 
non-proliferation fundamentally. At first, in the 1950s-60s when India supported a comprehensive 
test ban the quick destination was to reduce nuclear aftermath and its implications for world 
population health; in the long term, the CTBT was seen as a venture to genuine global disarmament. 
It was proposed that with the cessation of nuclear tests, no new nuclear states would rise and 
existing nuclear weapon states would be not able to keep up or overhaul their nuclear weapons 
stockpile. That is, the CTBT was aimed at preventing "qualitative and quantitative development of 
weapons."""^ "^
Nonetheless, in 1996 the CTBT, in the same way as the NPT, was not connected to a generally 
characterized disarmament program nor did it confine nuclear weapon powers from improving their 
nuclear weapons arsenal. The CTBT was detailed during a period when the nuclear weapon states, 
including the U.S., had conducted many tests and had accumulated enough information to conduct 
simulation tests. Once more, the U.S. appeared unconcerned with disarmament or with joining 
measures to control vertical proliferation. Additionally, the arrangement banned only nuclear test 
explosions, not virtual nuclear tests. Along these lines, the CTBT, in the same way as the NPT, turned 
into an instrument to just check horizontal proliferation."'"® As John D. Holum asserted, the United 
States had conducted in excess of 1,000 nuclear tests, the highest number of nuclear tests by any 
nation. Easing concerns with respect to the implications of the CTBT for the U.S. security interests.
Arundhati Ghose, "Negotiating the CTBT: India's Security Concerns and Nuclear Disarmament," Journal o f In ternational Affairs 51, no. 1 
(Summer 1957): 245.
M utim er, "Testing Times," 17.
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Holum expressed, "It is possible under current circumstances to maintain our stockpile safely and 
reliably without explosive testing... the test ban is not an agreement that we will, through attrition 
and lack of confidence, get rid of our nuclear arsenal. On the contrary, the plan includes stockpile 
stewardship.""^® He further remarked, instead, “ \Ne gain security to the extent we lock all nations in 
piace on the nuciear weapons learning curve (emphasis added).""'"" Similar feelings are indorsed in 
the Shalikashvilli report, which strongly affirms, the CTBT "is compatible with keeping a safe, reliable 
US nuclear deterrent and is an important part of global [read, horizontal] non-proliferation 
efforts."""®
Hence talked about above, India had little confidence in the believability of the CTBT negotiations in 
the Conference of Disarmament (CD), January 1994-August 1996. Arundhati Ghose, the Indian 
minister to the CD, vociferously contradicted the draft of the treaty. She relevantly affirmed that the 
magnitude of the treaty was slender, saying, it "does not fu lfil the requirement o f a comprehensive 
ban [but rather it  is] a nuclear weapon test explosion ban treaty." This was not the CTBT that India 
had envisaged in 1954 as a step toward nuclear disarmament.""® It was simply "a (horizontal) non­
proliferation treaty."
An alternate debate between the U.S. and India emerged over the entry into force (EIF) provision of 
the CTBT. On the suggestion of the British delegation, headed by Sir Michael Weston, the EIF 
condition was linked to the mandatory signatures of the 44 nations that had consented to have the 
seismic stations as a component of the international monitoring system. This was seen by New Delhi 
as an endeavour to constrain India to sign and ratify the treaty. Accordingly, India offered to
John D. Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Remarks at a Press Conference, U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency. Washington D.C., 10 December 1996.
John D. Holum, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, USACDA, Statem ent before the Subcommittee on 
International Operations and Human Rights of the Com mittee on International Relations, U.S. House o f Representatives, March 5 ,1 9 9 7 .
Clinton Urges U.S. Congress to  Ratify CTBT," Times o find ia , January 7, 2001; The Shalikashvilli report is available at 
http://w ww.carnegieendowm ent.org/2001/01/04/findings-and-recom m endations-concerning-ctbt-shalikashvili-report/d4j (accessed June 
1 0,2013).
Arundhati Ghose, Statem ent a t the Plenary M eeting o f  the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, June 2 0 ,1 9 9 6 . Available at 
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withdraw its starting proposal to have a seismic station. The Indian delegation kept up that 
persuasively putting India's name on the 44-nation contravened the Vienna Convention on treaties 
that denies forcing a sovereign state to sign a treaty not in its national."®” India's objections were 
that it was not interfaced to a global disarmament schema and permitted selective proliferation. It 
was not comprehensive in the genuine feeling of the term as it banned only nuclear weapons 
explosions however permitted subcritical tests and computer simulations by advanced states."®" In 
this context, the Indian prime minister remarked, "As the PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty) drove 
testing underground, we do not wish the CTBT to drive testing into laboratories by those who have 
the resources to do so. We must ensure that the CTBT leaves no loophole for activity either 
explosive based or non-explosive based, aimed at the continued development and refinement of 
nuclear weapons.""®" At long last, the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Salman Haider, pointed out 
India's position that it would not sign the CTBT however would continue to press for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons in a time-bound framework."®®
In this manner, on both occasions—the NPT Review Conference and the CTBT negotiations—the 
divergence in the middle of India and the U.S. appeared unbridgeable a dialog of the deaf with total 
absence of understanding on both the sides. The CTBT was signed and in a rehash of history India's 
demands, for nuclear disarmament and global non-proliferation, were ignored. Rather, Arundhati 
Roy has recommended that throughout the negotiations of the 1996 CTBT, the destination of the 
U.S. was to captivate Russia and China in some control and verification measures, especially on-site 
inspections and satellite observations and surveillance.
Arundhati Ghose, "Maintaining the Moratorium : A Defacto CTBT," Disarm ament Forum 2, United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research, UNIDIR, Geneva (2006):24.
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While the U.S.-lndia stalemate on nuclear issues held on, the Clinton administration embraced an 
alternate activity to enhance relations with New Delhi and launched the "Strategic Dialogue" in 
October 1997. It involved an arrangement of high level visits to India with a focus on building specific 
areas of cooperation. President Clinton wanted to visit India in the fall of 1998 as a feature of this 
new activity, yet the arrangement was racked after India conducted Pokhran II nuclear test 
explosions."®" Regardless of a few attempts by the Clinton administration to make India not to reject 
the CTBT's EIF statement and to sign the treaty, India dismissed the proposed draft of the CTBT at 
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva."®®
Pokhran II: The Start of Sanctions
Within two years of the conclusion of the CTBT, India used its nuclear option. On May 11 and 13, 
1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests code named "Shakti," signifying "Power." These tests 
were conducted at Pokhran, in the Indian state of Rajasthan, where India had conducted its sole 
peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974."®® The Pokhran II nuclear tests conducted by India made a strong 
global ripple effect and inspired prompt worldwide condemnation. For the Clinton administration 
the Indian nuclear tests were an inconsiderate stun, as the non-proliferation goal was high on its 
foreign policy agenda. Other than a few strategic endeavours at the regional level, to "cap, rollback, 
and eliminate" Indian nuclear abilities, the administration was locked in at the global level in
Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations o f Strategy, (New Delhi: Macmillan, 2002), 391; Narula et 
al, "In Isolation Ward"
Karnad, "Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security," 392; Perkovich, "India's Nuciear Bomb," 383.
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fortifying the non-proliferation regime—as obvious in the NPT review and the conclusion of the 
CTBT."®" In this manner, the Pokhran II nuclear tests candidly tested U.S. efforts to control 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and its attempts to expand relations with India. President Clinton 
condemned the nuclear tests in the strongest words and alluded to South Asia as the "most 
dangerous place on the earth." On May 12,1998, President Clinton completely expressed his 
intention to take harsh steps if India conducted further nuclear tests. He said:
"I want to make it very, very clear that I am deeply disturbed by 
the nuclear tests which India has conducted, and I do not believe 
it contributes to building a safer 21st century. The United States 
strongly opposes any new nuclear testing. This action by India 
not only threatens the stability of the region, it directly 
challenges the firm international consensus to stop the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction ... As most of you 
know, our laws have very stringent provisions, signed into law by 
me in 1994, in response to nuclear tests by nonnuclear weapon 
states. And I intend to implement them fully.""®®
Therefore, the U.S. diplomat to India, Richard Celeste, was called to Washington for consultation. 
White House Press Secretary Mike Mccurry commented that India's decision to conduct nuclear 
tests "runs counter to the effort the international community is making to promulgate a 
comprehensive ban on such testing.""®® National Security Advisor Samuel Berger states that the U.S. 
was "deeply disappointed" by the Indian decision to "test nuclear weapons." Speaking about the
Dennis Kux, "U.S.-Pakistan Relations as the Twentieth Century Ends," in Pakistan 2000, ed., Charles H. Kennedy and Craig Baxter 
(American Institute of Pakistan Studies, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000), 68-69.
Bill Clinton, Statem ent of the President on India's nuclear tests. Office of the  Press Secretary, W hite House, 12 M ay 1998; Stephen Lee 
Myers, "Nuclear Anxiety: The Policy; Clinton To Impose Penalties on india Over Nuclear Tests," New York Times, 13 M ay, 1998; James 
Ben net, "Nuclear Anxiety: The President; Clinton Calls Tests a 'Terrible' Mistake and Announces Sanctions against India," N ew York Times, 
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Nuclear tests conducted by India he expressed his opinion at a conference as it "blew the lid off 
South Asia's long simmering rivalry" and "threaten to trigger a full-fledged nuclear and missile race 
in the region.""®”
It has been recommended that instantly after the first day's tests; President Clinton guaranteed the 
Indian government that sanctions could be removed if India would end future tests and deployment 
of nuclear weapons."®" However after a lapse of one day India conducted further nuclear tests. On 
May 13,1998, in response to India's second adjust of nuclear test explosions and in accordance with 
the legal obligations, U.S. President Clinton forced sanctions"®" on India under the Arms Control 
Export Act, otherwise called the Glenn Amendment."®®
The main objective of the Clinton administration was to prevent a snowball impact in the 
subcontinent, particularly the nuclear hybrid by India's opponent neighbour i.e. Pakistan."®" 
President Clinton made an appeal to the Government of Pakistan to forgo conducting nuclear tests. 
He stated, "I also urge India's neighbours not to follow suit—not to follow down the path of a 
dangerous arms race.""®®
Later, a high level group headed by the Deputy State Secretary was dispatched to Islamabad to 
deflect Pakistan from crossing the nuclear threshold. Pakistan was to be suitably remunerated with 
motivating forces extending from the conveyance of F-16 aircraft to a recovery of economic and
Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to  the President for National Security Affairs, Remarks at the Carnegie international Non-Proliferation  
Conference, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Security, Washington D.C., January 1 2 ,1 99 9 .
Richard Cronin, Barbara Leitch LePoer, Jonathan Medalia and Dianne Rennack, India- Pakistan Nuclear Tests and U.S. Response, CRS 
Report for Congress (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated November 2 4 ,1 99 8 ), CRS-28.
As per the section 102 (b)4 Arms Export Control Act, President has thirty  days tim e-fram e to decide about im plem enting the sanctions. 
Yet, in case of both India and Pakistan, President Clinton applied sanctions within a couple o f days of conduct of the  nuclear tests.
Glenn Amendment, adopted 1977, Sec 102(b) o f the Arms Export Control Act, form erly Sec.670 o f the Foreign Assistance Act o f 1961  as 
amended. This amendment prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to  any non-nuclear weapons state (as defined by the  nuclear non­
proliferation treaty) that carries out a nuclear test explosion; For extensive discussion of the sanctions imposed on India a nd Pakistan, see, 
Jeanne Grim m ett, Nuclear Sanctions: Section 102(b) o f the Arms Control Export Act and Its Applicatian to India and Pakistan, CRS Report 
no. 98-486 (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated September 1 9 ,2001 ). For details on the Glenn A m endm ent, see 
Randy J. Rydell, "Giving Non-proliferation Norms Teeth: Sanctions and the NNPA," The Non-proliferation Review  6, no.2 (W inter 1999).
Although, this study focuses on the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy tow ard India, yet, due to  several factors (beyond the  scope of 
this study), the reference to  Pakistan in the discussion becomes inevitable. Firstly, the issue of India's nuclearisation evoking U.S. response 
was linked to  the fears o f nuciear arms race in South Asia. Secondly, Pakistan justifies its nuciear programme by projecting the  threat from  
India, due to  latters' conventional military superiority
Myers, "Nuclear Anxiety: The Policy."
93 I P a g e
military funding."®® Regardless of U.S. deliberations; Pakistan conducted nuclear tests, and on May 
30,1998 went under the Glenn Amendment sanctions net. Since 1990, Pakistan had been 
confronting sanctions under the Pressler Amendment and the Symington Amendment."®"
Sanctions under the Glenn Amendment forced on India and Pakistan, included: (i) termination of 
U.S. foreign support with the exception of humanitarian or food and agricultural assistance; (ii) 
termination of U.S. government offers of defence articles, designs, and services, and in addition 
revocation of licenses available to be purchased of things on the U.S. Munitions List; (iii) termination 
of all foreign military financing; (iv) dissent of government supported creditor money related help; 
(v) prohibition of budgetary or even specialized aid from any international monetary institution; (vi) 
prohibition of advances or credits from U.S. banks, with the exception of procurement of sustenance 
or horticultural wares; (vii) prohibition of licensing exports by the commerce department; and (viii) 
denial of credit or other export-import bank support for exports."®® By law, the sanctions were to 
stay set up until Congress passed legislation to uproot them."®® The Clinton administration 
additionally ordered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to stop on-running nuclear safety dialogue 
with India.""” Hence, U.S. professionals working in territories of touchy technologies were confined 
from going by India and the other way around. For example, permission was not conceded for eight 
senior U.S. physicists from the Fermi National Accelerator Lab and the Argon National Lab to partake 
in an international symposium on particle Physics at the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research 
(TIFR) in Mumbai—as the TIFR was incorporated in the sanctioned entities list issued in November
Kux, "U.S.-Pakistan Relations," 69. It is reported that before Pakistan conducted the nuclear tests. President Clinton in an attem pt to  
prevent a nuclear breakout spoke four times with the Pakistani government.
The Symington Am endm ent, adopted in 1976, Sec 101 o f the Arms Export Control Act, form erly Sec. 669 o f the Foreign Assistance Act o f  
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1998""". Dr Zafar Jaspal, a non-proliferation expert, recalls that Indian nuclear energy scientists were
also denied visas to visit the U.S."""
U.S. authorities' emphasized that the sanctions had a "rehabilitative purpose"""® to urge India and 
Pakistan to appreciate international non-proliferation norms. Karl Inderfurth, the Assistant Secretary 
for south Asian affairs, in his testimony on July 13,1998, expressed, "It is not the intention of the 
United States or any of our international partners to isolate India or Pakistan. We are not trying to 
engage in punishment for its own sake."""" Clinton administration highlighted that the sanctions 
were not focused against the populace of these nations; rather, they were planned to "influence the 
affected governments."""®
Pokhran II and the Nuclear Regime
A few explanations have been offered for the Pokhran II nuclear weapons explosions and crossover 
of the nuclear threshold by India. These include: domestic governmental issues; ideological 
elements; national security dangers from China and Pakistan; status and power motivations; 
technological headway; and the scientific -technological complex.""® There has been little discussion 
of the role of the non-proliferation regime, and the resultant unjust nuclear order, in instigating 
India's nuclear weaponisation. I contend that the Pokhran II nuclear tests reflected India's resistance 
of the fortifying of the nuclear regime in the 1995-1996 periods. In the post-1970 period, India, 
having been barred from the non-proliferation regime, conducted a peaceful nuclear explosion and
Pallava Bagla, "Washington Blocks 8 U.S. Scientists from  TIFR Physics Seminar," Indian Express (M um bai), 15 January 1999. Nonetheiess, 
twenty-five U.S. scientists from  non-government institutions attended the symposium.
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subsequently cut a third path for itself in the global order of nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots. As 
a nuclear competent non-nuclear weapon state, India held a position of strategic ambiguity. It 
turned out to pragmatic policy, empowering India to achieve diverse o b je c tive sP ick in g  not to 
weaponise, India could soundly accentuate global disarmament, yet, held the option to advance 
technologically and create nuclear weapons.
Anyhow in 1995-96, the NPT was reached out w ithout huge revisions to defeat its intrinsic errors, 
and the signing of the CTBT fortified particular and unfair non-proliferation approach. The NPT 
extension prompted the perpetuation of the inalienable imbalance in the middle of NWS and NNWS, 
without any considerable advancement to nuclear disarmament.^^^ The CTBT, framed as an 
instrument of horizontal non-proliferation, embraced the imbalance and constrained the learning 
curve of only the have -n o ts .In d ia  had opposed these measures as contradictory to its goals and 
declined to sign both of the treaties. The absence of accommodation of Indian concerns expanded 
its "sense of isolation and vulnerability."^®^ There was no extension for India to join the global non­
proliferation regime aside from by bargaining its nuclear policy goals.
Besides, India understood that after the CTBT came into power in 1999, it would be difficult to 
practice its option to conduct nuclear tests. Christine Fair comments, for India "the open door 
expenses of not testing were abruptly expanding." Especially after the conclusion of the CTBT, India 
saw "the noose to be tightening."^®^ Subsequently, India fe lt urged to practice its nuclear option and 
accordingly broke the nuclear impasse with the Pokhran explosions. Actually, even China and France, 
the dejure nuclear weapon states, before signing the CTBT likewise finished arrangement of tests to
Deepa M . Ollapally, "Mixed Motives in India's Search for Nuclear Status," Asian Survey, 41, no.60, (N ovem ber/Decem ber 2001). 
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gather enough information for future overhauling through computer simulations/®^ As Jyotika 
Saksena remarks, contrary to the expressed reason to abridge nuclear test explosions, the 1996 
CTBT's defective design "provided reasons for states to conduct tests before the treaty foreclosed 
such an option altogether."^®®
Flawed U.S Nuclear Diplomacy
The Pokhran II tests turned out to be a significant test for the Clinton administration. 
Notwithstanding its deliberations to anticipate nuclearisation in South Asia it was confronted with 
the development in fast succession of not one yet two accepted nuclear states. The Pokhran II tests 
produced a "nationwide churning process" within the U.S.^ ®^  This prompted a serious evaluation of 
the defective nuclear non-proliferation policy to India, and of the more extensive policy at the South 
Asian region. An autonomous team, convened by two Washington based prestigious research 
organizations the Brookings Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations—contended that it was 
"a critical juncture fo r re-examining U.S. [non-proliferation] policy toward South Asia."^®®
First Initially, U.S. insights offices neglected to distinguish preparations for the 1998 nuclear test.^®® 
U.S. discernment had monitored the Pokhran test site for a few years and yet neglected to catch the
Ghose, "Maintaining the Moratorium ," 25; Jyotika Saksena, "Regime Design M atters: The CTBT and India's Nuclear Dilemma," 
Comparative Strategy  25 (2006): 209.
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up and coming test/®^ Richard Shelby,Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called it "a 
monster disappointment of our sagacity gathering."^®® Raj Chengappa, in his book Weapons of 
Peace, considers India's achievement in sidestepping the CIA a triumph in itself/®® Nonetheless, it 
was hard to choose whether it was "a colossal failure of our intelligence-gathering."^®® The U.S. State 
Department was considered responsible for its powerlessness to judge India's motivations and 
additionally its determination to go unmistakably nuclear. Stephen Cohen, a prominent South Asian 
researcher, mourned that the detonation of nuclear gadgets in May 1998 denoted "one of the great 
failures of the recent American policy—all the more so because it was foreseeable and 
preventable."^®^
Second, after India's peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, the U.S. was mindful of the approaching 
probability of nuclear tests and clear weaponisation in India.^®  ^Along these lines, for 24 mediating 
years, the principle point of the U.S. non-proliferation policy, including the innovative isolation, was 
to impede India's nuclear crossover. Hence, the 1998 tests turned out to be a failure of the hitherto 
nuclear punitive approach—"based on sticks and stones"^®®—towards India. Stephen Cohen, in his 
testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented, "Our diplomacy constrained by 
restrictive and highly specific legislation, had nothing to offer but threats, and these failed to work." 
Instead, he contended, this prompted the reinforcing of "the anti-American groups in both countries 
[India and Pakistan] as well as those who sought to build and deploy nuclear weapons."^®^
David Albright, "The Shots Heard 'Round the W orld," The Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists S4, no.4 (July-August 1998):21. Albright provides 
a good discussion of several debates on the  Pokhran II nuclear tests—the yield estimate, therm onuclear explosion, and the  detection 
failure.
"Don't Blame the CIA," The Economist, 23 M ay 1998
Raj Chengappa, Weapons o f Peace: Secret Story o f India's Quest to be a Nuclear Power (New Delhi: Harper Collins, 2000), 17. 
Chengappa examines India's quest since 1974 laden with political calculations, manipulations, missed opportunities and hurdles for the  
right opportunity to  conduct the nuclear tests 
^®°The Economist, "Don't Blame the CIA."
Stephen, P. Cohen, Testimony on Political and M ilitary Developments in India, Near East and South Asia Subcommittee, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Near East and South Asia Subcommittee, M ay 2S, 1999. Available at 
www.brookings.edu/testlm ony/1999/0S2Sindia-cohen.aspx?p=l (accessed March 2 4 ,2 01 1 ).
Perkovich, "India's Nuclear Bomb," 18S.
Cohen, testimony. M ay 2S, 1999.
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In a comparable tone, Marshall Bouton contended that the Indian nuclear tests were the 
consequence of the U.S. policy of "denial and isolation" sought after since 1974 and that this policy 
could have further harming effects.^®® In the post-1998 situation it was accepted that sanctions 
would make India more rebellious, rather, the U.S. should captivate India in nuclear haggling and 
offer certain motivators, for example, exchange of civilian nuclear technology.^®®Hence, the 
requirement for an inventive methodology was progressively accentuated, for the U.S. to function 
emphatically as an "honest broker and not as a punitive voice."^®^
Interestingly, Selig Harrison laid out an intricate impetus based approach and recommended looking 
for Congressional approbation to continue technology exchanges to India up to this point disallowed 
by the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978. This, he contended, would make a positive 
environment in which the U.S. could evoke a few concessions from India—to start with, application 
of international safeguards on all its reactors, other than the Tarapur reactor officially under IAEA 
protections; second, a "binding de jure  commitment" from India, in addition to its w ilful limitation, 
not to trade nuclear technology to different states; at last, a bargain to sign the CTBT or other 
believable measure for cessation of future nuclear testing. Contrary to the corrective methodology, 
Harrison contended that nuclear dealing would be both politically and economically gainful to the 
U.S. The nuclear energy industry of the U.S. would profit economically^®® and Washington would pick 
up political power into the hitherto isolated nuclear program of India. Such a methodology could 
enroll India's help and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the subcontinent. For 
instance in the case of North Korea, the Clinton administration, through the 1994 Agreed
Bouton, "South Asia's Concerns." 
Ibid.
Bernard E. Trainor, "U.S. Should not Deplore New Nuclear States: It Should Help Them Curb Risks," The Boston Globe, June 4 ,1998 , 
Selig s. Harrison, "India's Muscle Flexing is Over. Let the Bargaining Begin," The Washington Post, M ay 17,1998. Interestingly, the ll,S. 
India nuclear agreem ent of 2005 includes some of the suggestions made by Harrison.
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Framework, had consented to encourage the construction of two light water reactors as an 
exchange for the cessation of plutonium production at the Yongbyon research reactor/®®
Consequently, the U.S. could curtail North Korea's capability to get enough fissile material to 
assemble sizeable nuclear combs.®®® Richard Haass additionally supported engaging the nuclear 
India. He contended, "Not all proliferation is bad" and in this manner, the U.S. should treat 
antagonistic and friendly states in a different way. He reasoned that "discrimination is at the heart of 
the entire non-proliferation regime ... Double standards, and triple standards if need be, are what 
realistic and successful foreign policy is all a bout."®®  ^Thus, there was considerable backing for 
enrolling India's association with international nuclear and missile control regimes to contain the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.®®^
Third, the issue of nuclearisation in South Asia raised concerns about the Chinese association in the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the subcontinent. This, in turn, reflected a 
disappointment of the U.S. Trade Department to diminish missile technology proliferation in the 
attire of satellite exports to China. Gary Milhollin, chief of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms 
Control, expressed "We asked the Indians to show restraint in nuclear testing, but we were unwilling 
to put restraints on our own satellite companies by sanctioning China for missile proliferation."®®® 
Evidently, the prejudicial policy of the U.S. administration gives China access to sensitive missile 
technology and, on the other hand, "slaps India for trying to protect itself from the consequences of
Stephen M . W alt, "Two Cheers for Clinton's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 79, no. 2 (March-April 2000):72. Japan and South Korea also 
were involved in the Agreed Framework.
Ibid.300 I
Richard Haass, "The U.S. Role in India's Nuclear Tests," The Washington Times, M ay 1 4 ,1 99 8 .
Stephen P. Cohen, A New Beginning fo r  South Asia, Policy Brief no. 55, (The Brookings Institution, Washington D.C., January 2000): 3 -4 .
Director, Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Gary Milhollin, Testimony before the Com mittee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 
July 9 ,1 9 98 . Available at http ://w w w .fas.org /spp/starwars/congress/1998_h/980709gm .htm  (accessed January 10, 2012). M ilholli n 
Contended that American government's export arrangement on satellites empowered Chinese companies to offer missile parts to  Pakistan 
without dread of revenge. In fall o f 1992, China traded complete missiles to  Pakistan, yet now, China is exporting missiles in 'piecemeal'.
He condemned Clinton organization for exchanging the subject of offer of satellites and related advances to  the Commerce Departm ent. 
This he contended protected offer of satellites from missile related agreements. Under the regulations of the Commerce D epartm ent a 
item loses its identity as a missile item if it is incorporated into a commercial satellite. The export o f satellites would not be obstructed by 
the Commerce Departm ent despite the fact that the satellites held things that might be utilized within the missiles. Hence, the  missile 
related approvals are effortlessly dodged; Also see, Shirley A. Kan, China: Possible Missile Technology Transfers From U.S. Satellite Export 
Policy: Background and Chronology, CRS Report for Congress no. 98-485F, Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated  
August 13 ,1998 .
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this improved technology."®®^ The exchange of American missile technology to China was 
unfavourable. It helped China, the purported "world's worst proliferator"®®® in promoting Pakistan's 
improvement of WMD. China was additionally utilizing American technology to make more deadly 
missiles with multiple warheads.®®®
At last, it was understood that, contrasted with China, India was a "benign" proliferator; India had 
crossed the nuclear threshold and manufactured its own particular nuclear program however it had 
never proliferated technologies to others. Stanley A. Weiss brought up that India was not just the 
first nation to call for global nuclear disarmament, additionally it had never multiplied nuclear or 
missile technologies. He expressed: "From 1974, when it [India] first exploded an atomic device to 
last May, when it came out of the closet with five underground explosions, it watched China conduct 
more than 40 nuclear tests. [Moreover] India has not broken any international treaties. It never 
signed the 1970 non-proliferation treaty or the 1996 test ban treaty."®®^
Newt Gingrich, then speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, thrashed the Clinton 
administration's policy of accommodation towards China. He contended, the U.S. quietly 
acknowledged the conduct of 45 nuclear tests by China, yet, "roared with outrage when a 
democratic Indian government chose to test its capability."®®® Despite the rehashed violation of its 
non-proliferation obligations, China still recieved"virtually unrestricted" dual-use American high- 
technology exports, and India, a benign proliferator, was being denied technological access.®®®
Newt Gingrich, "Letter on the Indian Nuclear Tests," Office of the Speaker, The House o f Representatives, Washington D.C., 14 May, 
1998. Available at www.indianembassy.org/pic/Congress/newt_gingrich.htm (accessed January 10 ,2 01 2  )
Stanley A. Weiss, "India should be at the Top of Washington's Contact List," The international Herald Tribune, November 1 6 ,1 99 8 . 
Gingrich, "Letter"; Regarding Washington's concerns on China's role in proliferation of nuclear and missile related technologies, also 
see. Proliferation: Chinese Case Studies, U.S. Congressional Hearings, Special Weapons, Subcommittee on Internationai Security, 
Proliferation and Federal Services, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, April 10 ,1997 ; Shirley A. Kan, China's Proliferation o f  
Weapons o f Mass Destruction: Current Policy Issues, CRS Issue Brief for Congress, Congressional Research Service, M ay 16, 2001; For 
details on China-lran nuclear and missile technology related transfers, see, John W . Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post- 
Imperial World (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006)
Weiss, "Top of Washington's Contact List."; M oreover, the U.S. had significant concerns regarding Chinese transferring nuclear and 
missile technologies to  Iran. In October 1991, Richard Solomon, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, stated that China 
had sold nuclear related technologies to  Iran despite assurances to  address U.S. concerns. "Report Says Iran Seeks Atomic Arms," New  
York Times, October 3 1 ,1 99 1 .
Gingrich, "Letter on the Indian Nuclear Tests"; Also see, Harrison, "India's Muscle Flexing."
Weiss, "Top of Washington's Contact List."
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Subsequently, there was growing adoption of a nuclear bartering approach to captivate India in the 
more extensive non-proliferation regime.
This chapter examined that the Clinton administration endeavoured considerable efforts to "cap, 
rollback, and eliminate" the nuclear weapon capability of India, yet it neglected to keep India from 
crossing over the nuclear edge. The fortification of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, through the 
indefinite extension of the NPT and, especially, through formulation of the CTBT, additionally an 
instrument of specific non-proliferation, persuaded India to weaponise its nuclear capability. In 
1998, India conducted five nuclear test explosions in Pokhran, thus breaking the nuclear impasse 
between the U.S. and India. Pokhran II was seen as a disappointment of U.S. nuclear strategy 
uniquely focused around its punitive measures towards India. The Pokhran II nuclear explosions 
upset the U.S.- India nuclear stalemate and catalyzed a rushed search in Washington for options to 
manage the challenged postured by India to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
The qualitative changeover of the U.S.-lndia relationship is generally followed to the Clinton period. 
It is commonly seen that the Clinton administration contributed colossally to change in "structure 
and substance" of the bilateral relationship; yet, Clinton's predisposition to reinforcing global 
nuclear non-proliferation blocked any concessions in its non-proliferation goals.®^ ® On the other 
hand, Clinton's successor. President George W. Bush, is considered responsible for changing the U.S. 
nuclear approach to India and, in this way, of bargaining Washington's non-proliferation interests. 
This I contend is hazardous and requires re-evaluation of the developments throughout the Clinton 
administration in the post-Pokhran II period.
Consistent with his highly acclaimed responsibility to non-proliferation. President Clinton placed 
sanctions on India after the Pokhran II nuclear tests. Yet, the accompanying questions need to be
Christine Fair, "India and the U.S.: Embracing a New Paradigm", in Indian Foreign Policy in a Unipolar World, ed.. Harsh Pant (London, 
New York, Delhi: Routledge, 2009), 132.
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investigated: Was U.S. consistent in its approach to India? Were the sanctions kept up with the same 
force as they were imposed? Did the administration stick to its oft broadcasted objectives of "cap, 
rollback, and eliminate"? What were the non-proliferation benchmarks that the Clinton 
administration secured in its dialogue with India? And, did the administration attain them? The 
explanations for these questions will help us dissect whether President Clinton likewise contributed 
to changing the nuclear stance towards India.
I contend that President Clinton changed the "structure and substance" of the relationship with 
India, yet the whole time he moved the nuclear goalposts with respect to India. To begin with, the 
administration demonstrated an intense absence of generous post-proliferation strategy to manage 
nuclear India. The measures at first taken by the U.S., forcing sanctions and the nuclear trading, 
turned out to be ad-hoc and reactionary. There was considerable absence of strategic vision and 
innovation to captivate nuclear India inside the non-proliferation regime. Second, after the May 
1998 Pokhran II tests, U.S. non-proliferation objectives in the Indian subcontinent experienced a 
different shift from the prior "cap, rollback, and eliminate "with stance to essentially upkeep of 
"nuclear restraint." This inferred an unsaid acknowledgement of India's (and Pakistan's) nuclear 
weapons. Third, in the post-Pokhran II environment, the U.S. approach to nuclear India changed 
from coercive to conciliatory. The exceptional dialogue that resulted between the U.S. and India 
prompted harmonization of the bilateral relationship, however failed to gather any considerable 
commitment from nuclear India. The above perspectives, as it were, cleared the mulling nuclear 
debris between Washington and New Delhi and made space for the succeeding administration to 
bridge the nuclear divide with India.
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Chapter VI
Remodelling of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 
and Bush's Nuclear Prism
In the aftermath of the Pokhran II nuclear tests, the U.S. overhauled its punitive approach towards 
de facto nuclear weapon state India, and launched nuclear trade. Yet, it neglected to scaffold the 
nuclear divide with India. President Clinton failed to offer the key vision and in addition the 
determination to solve the nuclear issues with India. His methodology, implanted in Cold War 
thinking, turned out to be specially ad-hoc and reactionary. The Bush administration came to power 
in the year 2001 with the vision of reinforcing relations with India and picked up the hitherto 
unresolved nuclear agenda. The nuclear pact with India is considered an extension of the qualitative 
transformation of U.S.-lndia relations throughout the Bush period. It is by and large respected that 
President Bush proposed to create a U.S.-lndia strategic partnership against China, and subsequently 
signed the civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with India. This intimates that the Bush 
administration traded off non-proliferation objectives to attain foreign policy objectives. I contend 
that such explanations are tricky and require investigation. In this part I examine the approach of the 
Bush administration towards nuclear India and how it made space for nuclear cooperation with 
India. What did the strategic partnership with India involve? What was the methodology of the Bush 
administration at the nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPR) and how it contributed to the 
reimaging of India? What was President Bush's strategy to nuclear energy with regards to India? 
What was the essentialness of the strategic trade measures—High Technology Cooperation Group 
(HTCG) and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)?
This chapter is partitioned into five sections. The primary section is an endeavour to understand the 
strategic partnership with India. The second section analyses Bush's nuclear prism and the 
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reorientation of the nuclear regime. It additionally concentrates on the reconsidering of India as a 
potential accomplice in reducing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The third 
section highlights the restored attention on nuclear energy and recognition of India's unavoidable 
contention for nuclear energy. The fourth section concentrates on the U.S.-lndia strategic trade 
measures, the High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG), and the Next Steps in Strategic 
Partnership (NSSP) which made, until now truant, shared trust and confidence assembling in 
praiseworthy technology trades. I contend that the nuclear accord between the U.S. and India was a 
result of the reorientation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime which required as well as made 
space for India. The Bush administration understood the capability of India as a strong constrain in 
reinforcing the non-proliferation regime. Dissimilar to past administrations, the Bush administration 
confirmed India's genuine civilian nuclear energy necessities and was interested in investigating 
approaches to adjust U.S. non-proliferation objectives with the definitely developing energy needs 
of India. Through an arrangement of bilateral, high technology trade measures, in view of the 
creative methodology of complementary obligations, Washington convinced India to reinforce its 
domestic laws and in addition its export controls. In this way, the Bush administration could 
accomplish the until now apparently inconceivable assignment of adjusting its nuclear non­
proliferation objectives with India's journey for cutting edge dual-use technology. These measures 
induced confidence in Washington and empowered the U.S. government to make a further stride 
and uproot the technological barriers for India. Concomitantly, it could suit the ever elusive nuclear 
India, i.e., the anomaly within the nuclear regime.
Security Cooperation
Clinton had propelled the U.S.-lndia relationship into an upward trajectory and this pattern was 
conveyed further throughout the Bush time. Yet, as the Bush administration reoriented the bilateral 
relationship, it was not a consistent transition. India excessively compared its nonalignment policy
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and demonstrated considerable backing for its "natural ally"®^\ now also called a "civilisational 
ally."®""
Following the time when the Bush administration came to power it had been contemplating removal 
of the sanctions forced on India in 1998.®"® In June 2001, the U.S. representative assigned to India, 
Robert Blackwill contended that the U.S. method of forcing sanctions against India had not worked 
and recommended a brisk removal. He thought the most ideal approach to accomplish the U.S. non­
proliferation objectives was to assemble a "broad, comprehensive, and robust relationship with 
India."®"^ In August 2001, a senior administration authority demonstrated the "almost certain lifting 
of American economic and military sanctions imposed on India."®"® The decision to remove sanctions 
was deferred as the administration was contemplating "the question of how and whether to  also lift 
sanctions on Pakistan." Nonetheless, the launch of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 
terrorist assaults in the U.S. on September 11, 2001 (henceforth 9-11) expanded the geopolitical 
noteworthiness of Pakistan and "expedited" the decision to lift the sanctions against it.®"®
On September 22, 2001, President Bush issued an official order to lift all staying nuclear related 
sanctions against India and Pakistan.®"" Inviting removal of the sanctions, the Indian Finance
Also see, Robert D. Blackwill, "The India imperative," The National Interest no. 80 (Summer 2005):12; Also see, Malini Parthasarthy, 
"India, U.S. Natural Allies: Vajpayee," The Hindu, September 9, 2000; In 2000, Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, form er prime minister o f India, 
proclaimed the  U.S. and India as "natural allies." Since then, the term  "natural allies" has been often been employed by the leadership of 
the tw o countries.
Sandhya Singh, "US: A Civilisational Ally," The Pioneer, M ay 8 ,2 0 0 1 .
Alex Wagner, "Bush Waives Nuclear-Related Sanctions on india, Pakistan," Arms Control Today (October 2001). Available at 
http ://w ww.arm scontro l.org /act/2001_10/sanctionsoct01 (accessed April 29 ,2 01 1 ); Indeed inside the U.S. Congress help for the  
evacuation of sanctions was getting to  be solid. In a location to  the Brookings institution. Senator Sam Brownback, adm inistrator of the  
Near East and South Asia, subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Com mittee, urged the  Bush organization to  uproot the approvals 
forced in the outcome of the 1998 atomic tests. Brownback contended that the U.S. and India, other than the extending specialized 
collaboration, need to  build barrier and security participation as they confronted a typical threat from  China. Additionally, Senator Joe 
Biden kept in touch with the Bush administration communicating backing for the withdrawal of sanctions on India— in valuation for India's 
generally great conduct in practicing limitation on atomic related advances along these lines, setting an illustration for Pakistan.
Additional, Biden argued, "Economic sanctions on India serve to stigmatise rather than stabilise. If w e show our goodwill by removing this 
irritant, India will respond with reciprocal acts of goodwill in non-proliferation and other areas." Jane Parlez, "U.S. Ready to  End Sanctions 
on India to  Build Alliance," The N ew York Times, August 27, 2001; Aziz Haniffa, "Sanctions Against India, Pakistan M ay be Lifted 
Simultaneously," The Tribune (Chandigarh) September 8, 2001. Even, in 2001, reports w ere emanating of the Chinese assistance to  the  
Pakistani missile programme, see, "China helps P akto  M ake Missiles: CIA," The Tribune, S eptem bers, 2001.
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As quoted in. Parlez, "U.S. Ready to End Sanctions."
Wagner, "Nuclear-Related Sanctions"; R. Ramachandran, "Out of the Blacklist," Frontline 18, no.21 (October 13-26, 2001).
Ibid. Originally, 200 entities w ere sanctioned in the wake o f India's M ay 1998 nuclear tests. In October 2001, the  U.S. Departm ent of 
Commerce reduced the number of blacklisted Indian agencies to  16 that w ere prohibited from  doing business w ith their U.S. counterparts. 
It incorporated some huge elements like, the  Defense Research & Defense Organization (DRDO), the  Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), the  
Indian Space & Research Organization(isro), Bhabha Atomic Research Center (BARC), Sriharikota Space Center the  Vikram Sarabhai Space
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Minister, Yashwant Sinha, commented that it was a minor issue as the sanctions had effectively used 
themselves. He declared, "as far as the Indian economy was concerned, except for certain defence 
supplies, sanctions had no meaning."®"® Nonetheless, surely a positive step for closure of acrimony 
in the bilateral relationship. Besides, the repercussions of the 9-11 assaults India had instantly 
offered to help Washington in any conceivable way. India itself had been a victim of terror and the 
Global War on Terror (GWOT) vindicated its long standing claim that terrorist camps thrived in the 
Afghan-Pakistan area.®"® The 9-11 brought about the U.S. to rework its strategy in South Asia. In this 
context, Zafar Jaspal contends, that the U.S. was changing the way they looked at Pakistan, the way 
they percieved India. The US were searching for allies and partner wherever they could discover 
[them].""®"® At the summit gathering of President Bush and Prime Minister Vajpayee on 9 
November, 2001, the methodology of reorienting the bilateral relationship was unleashed. It built up 
and finally finished in a few way breaking measures that empowered the two nations to realign their 
divergent interests.
Strategic Partnership
"Strategic partnership" was a generally new term used by the Bush administration to highlight the 
relationship it imagined to create with India. With no fitting definition and absence of historical 
reference, the term was generally misconstrued. Viewed narrowly in the Cold War the term was 
mistaken as an alliance to maintain the Asian geopolitical balance of power, specifically directed 
against China. Rather, the Bush administration needed to win India's backing at a worldwide level for
Center amongst others. Authorizes that proceeded Pakistan included: M ilitary Coup Sanctions, Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961; and Missile Sanctions, Chapter 7 o f the Arms Export Control Act, needed by the  U.S. enrolm ent in the Missiie Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR), a deiiberate administration of 33 states that try  to  farthest point missile expansion. Regardiess, on Septem ber 28, 2001, 
President Bush in an aiternate determ ination (No. 2001-31) authorized a subsidizing of $50 miliion for Pakistan determ ining it to  be 
essential to America's security engages. This uncommon subsidizing, as Ramachandran comments, "appears to  invalidate all the  m ajority  
ruie government reiated assents forced after the October 1999 coup.
Yash\want Sinha, as quoted in, Rahul Bedi, "Lifting of Sanctions a 'Sweetner' for Siding with U.S.," The Telegraph, Septem ber 24, 2001. 
George Fernandes, the form er Indian defence minister, commented that the  withdrawai of sanctions is not significant unless it inciudes, 
"the restrictions imposed on items of dual-use technologies and the exchange of scientific know-how."
10 Initialiy, when the U.S. chose Pakistan as its "non-NATO aliy" in the GWOT, it created a certain pessimism in New Deihi regarding the  
impossibiiity of upward m omentum in the bilaterai reiationship with Washington. As C. Rajamohan states, "Nevertheless, w hile  India 
enthusiasticaily courted Washington after September 11, the United States chose reluctant Pakistan as its partner against Taliban." C. Raja 
Mohan, "The Paradigm Shift Toward South Asia," The Washington Quarterly  26, n o .l (W inter 2002-03): 144; also see, Bhabani Mishra, 
"india-US Reiations: A Paradigm Shift," Strategic Analysis 29, n o .l (January-March 2005).
Interview with Dr Zafar Jaspal, South Asian Nuclear Poiicy Analyst, February 2012.
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shaping the future world order. The U.S. strategic partnership with India was not proposed as an 
alliance against any single nation; its question was to improve jo int capacities to manage the 
countless and complex dangers of the post-9-11 world. Blackwill suggested that the U.S. and India 
are natural allies because of the long term comprehensive national interests and "not because of 
any current or future organisational connection." He further added, "There will be no formal alliance 
between the two countries." Yet, "this does not mean that Washington and New Deihi will always 
agree on specific policies or tactics. That w iil not happen."®"" This was plainly apparent in 2003 with 
the dispatch of the U.S. led war against Iraq. Regardless of the defence cooperation including jo int 
military activities, India declined to help its troops to the U.S. mission in light of the fact that the Iraq 
intrusion did not have a command from the United Nations. In spite of the fact that Washington 
wanted India to join, India's refusal to do so did not influence the respective relationship.
The Bush administration denoted a huge turn from the at one time held U.S. impression of India as 
"a persistent non-proliferation problem that required an American imposed solution."®""
Washington had generally seen India in the tight South Asian connection, it now saw India as a 
player in the Asian and global balance of power. The certain ascent of India as a global balance of 
power was underscored in the persuasive report of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, Mapping 
the Global Future. Highlighting the tectonic changes that were showing, it expressed, "The likely 
emergence of China and India ... as new major global players—similar to the advent of a united 
Germany in the 19th Century and a powerfui United States in the early 20th Century—will transform 
the geopolitical landscape."®"® This would, interalia, "have the potential to render obsolete the old 
categories of East and West, North and South, aiigned and nonaligned, developed and 
developing."®"'" Within a year Bush being in his office, there was a huge restoration of Indo-U.S.
®"" Blackwill, "India lmperative,"14.
®"" Ibid, 9.
National Intelligence Council, M apping the Global Future: Report o f the 202 0  Project, (Washington D .C .:, Director of National 
Intelligence, December 2004), 9.
Ibid. 9-10. The report highlights the ascent of these new powers is a 'virtual conviction', yet, there is instability over how these states 
would collaborate w hether agreeably or aggressively in the worldwide request. In any case, it suggests that the U.S. can assume a 
noteworthy part in affecting the future part o f these states.
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security collaboration. The establishments were laid under the initiative of Secretary of Defence 
Donald Rumsfeld, who saw incredible potential in defence cooperation with India. Not long after the 
sanctions were removed, in November 2001, Rumsfeld went to India to talk about with George 
Fernandes, his Indian partner, the until now precluded issues of arms deal and the revival of defence 
cooperation.®"®
From there on, U.S.-lndia security cooperation and double military interaction has been phenomenal 
in "scale, scope, range, and frequency of jo in t exercises."®"® La I it Mansingh, the then representative 
to the United States, guaranteed it was the "most visible manifestation of our new [strategic] 
relationship."®"" Subsequently, in December 2001 the outdated Defence Policy Group (DPG) was 
resuscitated. In a jo in t proclamation of the Defence Policy Group, the two sides confirmed the 
importance of the defence relationship to "assist both countries to counter threats such as the 
spread of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and [sea] 
piracy."®"® The DPG had been made in 1995 amid the Clinton period with an extension restricted to 
the promotion of shared understanding through jo int activities and high-level visits.®"® Until 1997, 
the two nations had embraced only five jo in t activities of the military; yet, since the recovery of the 
gathering the military have held "mutually beneficial combined exercises"®®® each and every year. 
The reason behind these activities has been to fabricate U.S.-lndia military synergy through 
interoperability in troublesome territories and ungracious climes and to upgrade communication 
and coordination.®®" Within the more extensive parameters of the DPG, in 2002, a Security
See, Wade Boese, "US-lndia Discussing Arms Deals, M ilitary Ties," Arms Control Today (Decem ber 2001). Available at 
http://w ww.arm scontro l.org /act/2001_12/indarm sdec01 (accessed May 2 6 ,2 01 0 ).
Ashok Sharma, Indo-US Strategic Convergence: An Overview o f Defence and  M ilitary  Cooperation, CLAWS Papers, (New Delhi: Centre for 
Land W arfare Studies, November 2, 2008), 17.
Ambassador La I it Mansingh, "Accomplishments and Challenges in the New Era of Cooperation," Keynote address at the  Sigur C entre  for 
Asian Studies, The Elliot School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington D.C., April 1 ,2 0 04 .
Joint Statement, Third M eeting o f the U.S.-lndia Defence Policy Group, December 3 -4 ,2 00 1 . Available at 
http ://avalon.law .yale .edu /sep tll/jo int_010.asp (accessed April 1 5 ,2011 ). (Hereafter: DPG Joint Statem ent, 2001).
Sharma, "Indo-U.S. Strategic Cooperation," 13.
Indian Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2002-03, Governm ent of India, New Delhi, 2003, 9. (hereafter. Annual Report 2002 -03  )For 
instance, "Balance Iroquois” and "Cope India" are series of the U.S.-lndia jo int military exercises which w ere held for several years.
DPG Joint Statement, 2001, defined the plan of holding military activities including: preparing for joined humanitarian airlift; combined 
special operations training; small unit ground/air exercises; naval jo int personnel exchange and familiarization; combined naval training  
exercises between the U.S. marines and corresponding Indian forces; Accordingly, jo int military activities were held at all levels— ground, 
ocean, and air— in difficult situations, also, jo int exercises in the huge straits of Malacca to  Arabian. Also see, Mansingh, "New Era of 
Cooperation." He notes, the armed forces of the U.S. and India "have carried out operations in the tropical heat in M ay 2002, in the
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Cooperation Group (SCG) and a Joint Technical Group (JTG) were made to arrange the huge issue of 
military arms exchange, jo in t innovative work (R&D), and the production of defence technology/®" 
Anupam Srivastava watched that, in an arrangement of appraisals since 2002, the Pentagon has 
understood that if the firewalls with respect to double utilize technologies were uprooted, the jo int 
U.S.-lndia coproduction of defence weapons frameworks could profit both nations.®®® Focusing on 
the importance of the offer of military transfers to India, Blackwill commented.
Of course we should sell advanced weaponry to India. The million-man army actually 
fights, unlike the post-modern militaries o f many o f our European allies. Given the 
strategic challenges ahead, the United States should want the Indian armed forces 
to be equipped with the best weapons systems, and that often means buying 
American.^^^
Altogether, the 2001 DPG gathering perceived that since both India and the U.S. have been targets 
of terrorism, defence cooperation for counterterrorism is essential. Thomas Pickering appropriately 
reflects the U.S. had no realization that India additionally "faced serious terrorist problems and had 
been facing them for many years whether they were insurgencies in Assam o r ... banditry in Andhra 
Pradesh or, in fact, a series of very devastating bomb explosions in Mumbai 1993."®®® This was only 
as a consequence of 9-11 that the U.S. got to be mindful of the terrorism in South Asia. Yet, he 
hastens to elucidate that it was only in the consequence of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks that
freezing climes of Alaska in Oct 2002, in dense jungles in Mizoram in February 2003 and in the Pacific Island of Guam in June 2003." In 
October 2003, the U.S. Special Forces along with India's mountain divisions exercised together in Ladakh— in the state of Jammu and 
Kashmir— at the heights of 18,000- 20,000 feet.
Annual Report 2 0 0 2 -2 0 0 3 ,9; Also see. Joint Statem ent on US -In d ia  Defence Policy Group M eeting, 2002, U.S. Departm ent of Defence, 
News Release, 2678-02, May 23, 2002. Available at h ttp ://w w w .defense link .m il/new s/M ay2002 /b05232002_bt267-02 .h tm l. (accessed 
March 15, 2012) (hereafter, DPG Joint Statement, 2002). The motivation behind the SCG was to develop a U.S.-lndia safeguard supply 
relationship by aiding in the  permitting and offers of the  weapon fram eworks and segments. The JTG, on other hand, was secured fo r the  
reasons o f jo int creation of defence technologies; Also see, Sharma, "Indo-U.S. strategic Convergence," 15. Following the tim e when  
Washington cut-off fuel supply for India's Tarapur atomic reactor. New Delhi respected the U.S. as an inconsistent supplier. This 
recognition was accentuated in the repercussions of the 1998 approvals as these influenced Light Combat Aircraft undertaking began amid  
the Reagan administration. Furthermore, India couldn't get the extra parts of specific transporters like Sea King helicopters and w arrior  
flying machines despite the fact that these were not of U.S.-origin.
Anupam Srivastava, "The Strategic Context of India's Economic Engagement w ith China," Indian Journal o f Economics and  Business, 
Special Issue on China and India (September 2006): 4 . In perspective of the  growing strategic interests, U.S and India consented to  a 
noteworthy safeguard arrangement in June 2005, that empowered, "Washington to  supply the state-of the  art combat systems, and 
engage in co-production and collaboration of sophisticated weapons systems w ith India."
Blackwill, "The India Imperative," 11.
Interview w ith  Ambassador Thomas Pickering through email questionnaire. M ay 2011.
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U.S.-lndia counterterrorism cooperation was considerably reinforced.®®® The Mumbai terrorist acts 
made the U.S. understand the enormity of the risk confronted by India, the lone stable democratic 
nation in the South Asian region.
Subsequently, the U.S.-lndia comprehensive security cooperation, termed a strategic partnership, 
was focused around the convergence of diversions. It incorporated the conduct of jo in t military 
excercises, counterterrorism cooperation, change of the defence-supply relationship, and defence 
coproduction. The DPG served as a noteworthy gathering for high-level policy dialog and formulation 
of activities to attain shared security interests.
Bush's Nuclear Prism
The Bush administration has been censured for its relative apathy to traditional measures of bilateral 
and multilateral key arms control and nuclear non-proliferation. Commentators contend that the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty was side-lined, "the CTBT [Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty] was 
left comatose. Strategic Arms Reduction (START-3) was allowed to lie, and the Nuclear Non­
proliferation Treaty (NPT) was largely ignored."®®" Yet, the critics have failed to comprehend that 
amid the Bush period the issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction had procured new 
dimensions that mandated a change in methodology to emerging threats.
Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union there were concerns in regards to the proliferation of 
nuclear technologies, weapons, and exchange of nuclear ability into wrong hands expectation on 
blasting "dirty bombs."®®® The potential nexus between maverick states and terrorist gatherings 
made additional apprehensions. In the post-9-11 period, the risk of nuclear trafficking and terrorism 
gained certain desperation. This does not imply that the proliferation dangers have essentially 
moved from state proliterators to non-state performers. Rather, the dangers connected with the 
proliferation of nuclear materials have gotten to be multidimensional in nature. As Lewis Dunn
“ “ Ibid.
337 M anpreet Sethi, "NPT RevCon 2010: An Oppurtunity to  Refocus Priorities," Strategic Analysis 34, no.2 (March 2010): 2 4 6 . 
The term  "dirty bombs" refers to  the crude nuclear bombs
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comments, "The nations of the world confront today multiple proliferation challenges. Indeed, these 
challenges may well be more severe than at any time since the dawn of the nuclear age in 1945."®®® 
In January 2001, the Baker-Cutler Task Force Report highlighted the risk of nuclear terrorism. As 
indicated by this report, “ the most urgent unmet threat" to the United States' national security is the 
“danger that the weapons o f mass destruction or weapons-useable material in Russia could be stolen 
and sold to terrorists or hostile nation-states and used against American troops abroad or citizens at 
home"^^° (emphasis in original). In addition, there were reports that al-Qaeda leaders responsible for 
the 9-11 assaults were heartily looking for nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to use in 
assaults in the United States and different spots. After the launch of the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) and the stationing of troops in Afghanistan, there was confirmation of the arrangements for 
advancement of "rudimentary nuclear weapons ... in an al-Qaeda safe house in Kabul."®^" Thus, it 
was appearing that terrorist groups intent to intensify the jihad (a holy war pursued by Muslims 
against infidels) to the following level (identified with the 9-11 attack on the U.S) by depending on 
explosions of crude bombs. The Bush administration was fast to comprehend that the danger of 
nuclear proliferation was "diverse, unpredictable, dangerous, and increasingly difficult to 
counter."®"""
A while ago, state-sponsored weapons projects were the essential proliferation concerns, yet now, 
"the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors and terrorist groups" was "an 
equally significant threat." Due to the expanding unpredictability of W M D, President Bush 
highlighted the vulnerability of the U.S., he expressed:
Lewis Dunn, "Today's Global Proliferation Challenges: Some Thoughts on Potential Indo-U.S. Cooperation," India-U.S. Relations: 
Addressing the Challenges o f the 21st Century, ed., N.S Sisodia, Peter R. Lavoy, Cherian Samuel and Robin Walker (New Delhi: Magnum  
Books, September 2008), 71. Dunn in his book tries to list the current global nuclear proliferation challenges and: Counteracting spread of 
atomic weapons in Northeast Asia and the M iddle East; restricting access to  W M D  advances by the terrorist groups; upgrading the  
authenticity and viability of global nuclear non-proliferation institutions; dealing w ith the multiplication dangers emerging from  the  spread 
of nuclear power; reviving global nuclear disarmament plan; and evading the following use of atomic weapons (72).
Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler, A Report Cordon the Departm ent o f Energy's Non-proliferation Programs with Russia (Washington D.C.: 
Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, U.S. Departm ent of Energy, January 10, 2001). Available at 
http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf (accessed February 12 ,2 01 1 )
Kenneth Juster, Undersecretary of Commerce, "September 11 and U.S. Non-proliferation Policy," speech at the Ninth Asian Export 
Control Seminar, Tokyo, Japan, 26 February, 2002. Available at www.bxa.doc.gov/PRESS/2002/JusterJapanSpeech02_2602.html (accessed 
March 25, 2011)
Ibid.
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The greatest threat before humanity today is the possibility of secret and 
sudden attack with chemical or biological or radiological or nuclear weapons.
In the past, enemies o f America required massed armies and great navies, 
powerfui air forces to put our nation, our people, our friends and allies at 
risk.^^^ (emphasis added)
Bush acknowledged that the danger from WMD existed amid the Cold War also in any case, prior; 
the antagonistic states could be countered through deterrence. The possession of a deterrent 
guaranteed the foe would depend on nuclear weapons as "weapons of last resort."®"""" In the 
contemporary time, for the fanatics and terrorists these are the weapons of "first resort—the 
preferred means to further their ideology of suicide and random murder." Chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons are simpler "to acquire, build, hide, and transport" than 
conventional weapons. Bush rightly underlined that this required a "change in thinking and 
strategy".®""® Nuciear weapons, once esteemed as weapons of deterrence, are considerabiy 
insufficient against the contemporary Hydra (numerous headed) type of terrorism and the threat 
from dirty bombs. In addition, the NPT-driven regime is centred on shortening the proliferation of 
nuclear technology to states and accordingly there is a lack of measures to manage the rising 
difficulties of the "second nuclear age."
Revelation of the "nuclear Wal-Mart" that had prospered since 1987 and was occupied with dark 
promoting of touchy double utilize technologies confirmed the reasons for aiarm in regards to illegal 
nuclear trafficking. This nuclear racket was led by A. Q. Khan, the father of Pakistan's nuclear 
weapons program, who additionally functioned as "the director of the network, its leading scientific 
mind, as weil as its primary salesman."®""®
The W hite House, Office of the Press Secretary, Fact Sheet, President Announces N ew Measures to Counter the Threat o f W M D , George 
W . Bush, Speech at National Defense University, Fort McNair, 11 February, 2004. (hereafter. President Bush, February 1 1 ,2 00 4 ). Available 
at ww w.w hitehouse.gO v/new s/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.htm l (accessed March 2 6 ,2 01 1 ).
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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It took a few years for the American and British intelligence services to infiltrate this system and an 
essential processing plant in Maiaysia was discovered to be occupied with building parts of a nuclear 
centrifuge and supplying it around the world.®""" This guided attention to two interrelated issues that 
abetted unlawful nuclear trafficking: The first was "onward proliferation" whereby "one proliferator 
supplies an alternate," accordingly shaping a chain of proliferators; the second was the 
"subcontract" or outsourcing of the production of nuclear related technologies.®""® Because of the 
lack of export laws in Malaysia, nuclear centrifuge reactors were being engineered in its domains 
and along these lines dispatched to a few places around the globe en route to Libya ®""® This 
highlighted the insufficiency of traditional measures to arrangement viably with the changing nature 
of proliferation threats.
The Bush administration, conscious of the vitiated nuclear situation, understood the urgent need to 
supplement the NPT-driven regime with inventive measures to upgrade interdiction and 
implementation abilities to control more up to date dangers of illegal WMD proliferation. The 
expanded attention on seeking after a proactive methodology to reducing the spread of WMD 
technologies was reflected in The National Security Strategy to Combat Weapons o f Mass 
Destruction (2002). It expressed that the Bush administration would look to "enhance the 
capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to prevent the 
movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and terrorist 
organisations."®®® This denoted a different shift to NPT-in addition to the measures.
Ibid. The illicit nuclear material was discovered when "a shipment of cutting edge rotator parts made at the Malaysia office" was 
recognized and followed. In Dubai, the shipment transferred to  BBC China, a German-owned ship. After the boat crossed the Suez Canal, it 
was blocked by the German and Italian forces; For more subtle elements o f the Khan nuclear network, see, Sara Kutchesfahani, "Case 
Study: The Khan Network," in Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Non-proliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, ed., 
James Doyle (Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinmann Homeland Security Series, July 2008); Christopher Clary, "A.Q. Khan and the Limits 
of the  Non-proliferation," Disarm ament Forum, no.4 (2004).
^"*Todd E. Perry, "The Growing Role o f Customs Organisations in International Strategic Trade Controls," Nuclear Safeguards, Security and  
Non-proliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, ed., James Doyle, (Burlington, MA: Butterworth-Heinm ann Homeland 
Security Series, July 2008), 550.
Ibid.
National Strategy to Combat Weapons o f Mass Destruction (W M D ), Homeland Security Presidential Directive 4 (Washington D.C.: The 
W hite House, December 2002), 2.
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In 2004 in an important speech at the National Defence University, Washington, DC, President Bush 
expounded his multipronged procedure to manage an extensive variety of WMD proliferation 
dangers. He stressed "active non-proliferation, counter-proliferation, and missile defences" s 
measures important to supplement the traditional non-proliferation routines.®®" Active non­
proliferation might be seen as measures for securing delicate materials inside the borders of genuine 
beneficiaries or supplier states. In this context. President Bush illustrated the accompanying 
convention: initially, the supply of civilian nuclear technologies will be limited to states that sign the 
IAEA Additional Protocol; second, an exceptional advisory group will be made from IAEA sheets to 
center seriously on verification and protections; third, IAEA board positions will be denied to states 
under scrutiny for unlawful nuclear exercises, for example, Iran; fourth, domestic and international 
laws will be fortified to institute strict fare controls to contain the proliferation of dual use 
technologies; at last, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) provision will be changed to incorporate the 
adoption of full scope safeguards by the beneficiary before the offer of uranium enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies. ®®" Through these measures President Bush planned to fortify the non­
proliferation regime by presenting inside changes in the IAEA and fare controls. Conforming to the 
dynamic non-proliferation measures, the Bush administration captivated India in high-tech business 
(2002-2005) and created a critical change in the last's domestic and international technology 
restrictions (examined later in this section). Thus, through the July 2005 agreement, the U.S. could 
convince India to receive IAEA safeguards for civilian facilities.
Counter-proliferation developed as a focal component of the Bush nuclear plan to control WMD 
proliferation. Counter-proliferation measures had long ago been received yet they had low necessity 
in the U.S. strategy The Clinton administration characterized counter-proliferation as the "full range 
of military preparations and activities under the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce threats
President Bush, February 1 1 ,2004 . 
Ibid.
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from [nuclear] delivery systems."®®® Departing from nuclear universality, in a sui generis approach, 
the Bush administration initiated a few measures to controi the risk of non-state actors smuggling 
weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. These included projects, for example, the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)®®"", the Container Security Initiative (CSI), and the Megaports 
Initiative®®® pushed by U.S. security and enforcement agencies through cooperation with well- 
disposed states. The CSI was propelled in 2002 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection, under the 
aegis of the Department of Homeland Security to recognize and screen containers for suspicious 
materials. These containers are recognized and investigated at foreign ports before they are stacked 
on board vessels destined for the United States.®®® In a comparable manner, the PSI was a U.S.­
headed multilateral activity to prohibit and "search planes and ships carrying suspect cargo and to 
seize illegal weapons or missile technologies Subsequently, President Bush called for growing the 
extent of the PSI, that is, moving beyond basically interdiction of shipments and exchanges to take 
law enforcements actions, for example, "to shut down the [illegal] labs, seize their materials, [and] 
freeze their assets."®®"
In April 2004 the Bush administration led endeavours for a unanimous adoption of U.N. Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540. Under Chapter VII of the U.N. sanction, UNSCR 1540 makes it 
mandatory for states to criminalize the proliferation of WMD and related technologies, to establish 
domestic measures to reinforce their export controls, and to protect sensitive stuff. The resolution
Zachary s. Davis and Mitchell Reiss, U.S. Counterproliferation Doctrine: Issues fo r  Congress, 94-734 ENR (Washington D.C.: Congressional 
Research Service, September 2 1 ,1994 ), 8.
®®"" The W hite House, Proliferation Security initiative: Statem ent o f  Interdiction Principles, Fact Sheet (Washington D.C.: Office of the Press 
Secretary, September 4, 2003). Available at http://w w w .state .gO v/t/isn /c27726.htm  (accessed April 0 5 ,2 01 1 ). The Statem ent of 
Interdiction Principles (SOP) September 4 ,2 0 0 3 , identifies specific steps for effectively interdicting proliferation-related shipments; Also 
see, Factsheet: Proliferation Security Initiative Support Cell, United States Strategic Command, Available at
http://www.stratcom.mil/fProliferation_Security_lnitiative_Support_Cell (accessed April 0 5 ,2 01 1 ). The Factsheet notes, "The PSI is not 
led or 'chaired' by a single country, rather, it's united by a common purpose and designed to  support flexible, fast action and coordination 
among partner nations to counter W M D  proliferation." For details on PSI, see, M ark Shulman, The Proliferation Security Initiative as a  N ew  
Paradigm fo r  Peace and Security, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army W ar College, April 2006)
The Mega ports Initiative, attem pted by the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) was propelled in 2003, and goes for 
participating w ith different nations to  screen cargo at seaports. The activity gives radiation recognition supplies and trains staff to  check 
for atomic or other radioactive materials.
U.S. Customs and Border security is an imperative part of the Departm ent of Homeland Security concerned with the trade and travel to  
the United States. For more information check its webpage, h ttp ://w w w .cbp.gov/xp/cgov/about/.
President Bush, February 11,2004 .
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does not particularly mention PSI or CSI activities, however by implication underpins these 
measures. Section 3 of UNSCR 1540 obliges states "to enforce effective measures to establish 
domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their 
means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over related materials."®®®
As per the provisions of UNSCR 1540, India in mid-2005 received domestic legislation to further 
fortify its export controls in regards to sensitive items.®®® In conjunction with the PSI and the CSI, 
this resolution demonstrated a change in the U.S. approach in swaying agreeable actions to upset 
nuclear trafficking and nuclear terrorism. Amid the Cold War, bilateral arms control was a high 
necessity for the U.S. as it looked to shorten the offensive arms race with its arch nuclear opponent 
the Soviet Union. The ABM treaty, signed and entered into force in 1972, restricted both the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union from "deploying nationwide defences against strategic ballistic missiles."®®® 
With the downfall of the Soviet Union there was a steady decrease in arms control measures. In 
spite of the fact that the Bush administration unequivocally communicated lack of engagement in 
arms control measures this lower necessity can really be followed to the Clinton administration. In 
this context, Saunders remarks, "Despite greater potential for arms control to produce substantive 
accomplishments in the post-Cold War period ... the Clinton administration did not initiate a single 
successful arms control treaty."®®"
Consequently, in May 2001, President Bush unequivocally proclaimed the 1972 ABM treaty was no 
longer significant to the changing nuclear non-proliferation situation, and it was the ideal time for
Text o f the UN Resolution 1540, S/RES/1540, Adopted by the Security Council at its 4956th meeting, 28 April 2 0 0 4 ,3 . Available at 
http://daccessdds.un.Org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdfPOpenElem ent ( accessed April 1 6 ,2011 )
Kumar, "India's New Imperatives," 26-28
The Anti- Ballistic Missile Treaty at a Glance, Available at ww w.arm scontrol.org/factsheets/abm treaty; (accessed January 9, 2012); Text 
of the  Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty available at w w w .state.gov/w w w /global/arm s/treaties/abm /abm 2.htm l (accessed January 9, 2012).
Philip C. Saunders, "New Approaches to Non-proliferation: Supplementing or Supplanting the Regime," The Non-proliferation Review 
(Fall-Winter 2001):124.
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the U.S. "to move beyond the constraints of the 30 year old treaty."®®" The rationale offered by the 
Bush administration was that Russia was no longer a transcendent threat; however the U.S. needed 
to shield itself from potential missile attacks from rogue states or non-state actors. In this way, the 
administration bolstered building a missile defence framework to secure itself against "missiles in 
the hands of these states, states for which terror and blackmail are a way of life."®®® The President 
Bush got considerable feedback for withdrawing from the ABM treaty and launching the NMD 
program, yet this pattern to NMD had been developing in U.S. even during previous 
administration.In the first place, after the downfall of the Soviet Union, as per the Law of State 
Succession, the destiny of the ABM treaty got to be indistinct®®"". Yet, the Clinton administration 
accentuated that the treaty was in force and in 1997 marked a Memorandum of Understanding with 
the Russian Federation, Belarus Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. At the same time this memorandum was 
not submitted to the Senate for regard. Second, inside the U.S. there was expanding enthusiasm 
toward constrained National Missile Defence (NMD) and Congress backed the proposal. The Clinton 
administration gave conditional regard to NMD focused around the considerations of innovative 
technologies, evaluation of rogue states missile threats, related expenses, and arms control 
factors.®®®
India: "Responsible" Partner
With the expanding dialogue and comprehensive cooperation, Washington started to understand 
that India, notwithstanding being outside the regime, had kept up a high standard of non­
proliferation. This perception was fortified by the knowledge that unlawful proliferation exercises
The W hite House, Office of the Press Secretary, "Remarks of the President to Students and Faculty at National Defence University." M ay  
2 1 ,2 00 1 . (hereafter. President Bush, M ay 2 1 ,2 00 1 ). Available at w w w .w hitehouse.gO v/new s/releases/2001/05/20010501-10.htm l 
(accessed March 15,2011 )
Ibid.
®®"" Douglas J. Feith and George Miron, Memorandum  o f Law: Did the ABM  Treaty o f 1972 Remain in Force A fter the USSR Ceased to Exist 
in December 1991 and Did it Become a Treaty Between the U.S. and the Russia Federation, w ritten  Testimony subm itted to  the Hearing by 
the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 106th Congress, 1st Session, 106-339, M ay 25 ,1 99 9 ; Also see, as G. M iron, "M em orandum  
of Law: Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 Remain in Force A fter the  USSR Ceased to Exist in December 1991 and Did it Become a Treaty  
Between the U.S. and the  Russia Federation?" American University International Law Review 17, no.2 (2002): 337. Feith and Miron argue 
that the ABM treaty had lapsed with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Craig Cernielio, "N M D  Bill Clears Congress as Senate Re-examines ABM Treaty," Arms Control Today, A pril/M ay 1999. Available at 
h ttp ://w w w .arm scontro l.o rg /act/1999_04-05/nm dam 99 (accessed December 26, 2012).
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had been happening in the South Asian region since the mid-1980s. Actually, as a senior official at 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission stated, "India has been miscast as a proliferator. India may have 
made a project for itself yet there is almost no proof that India has ever done anything to proliferate 
outside its borders" Thus, India securely fits with the western picture of a "non-proliferator."®®®
Pakistan was "caught red-handed" with the A. Q. Khan network that was not just occupied with 
bringing technology for Pakistan, it was additionally passing nuclear technology far and wide. Also, 
North Korean nuclear technology wound up in the Middle East on the grounds that the North 
Koreans were in desperate need of money.®®" A few high-positioning authorities in the Bush 
administration imparted the perception that India, regardless of being nonparticipant in the NPT 
regime, had held fast to non-proliferation norms®®® Nicholas Burns explains, "The non-proliferation 
system was very weak; a large country, India, was outside whereas there were others inside the 
system that were cheating—like North Korea and Iran."®®® Jaspal likewise commented that India 
"was not an outlaw. It had not broken any treaty [NPT] because it had not signed any treaty."®"®
Besides, as the Bush administration was occupied with eliminating WMD proliferation by organizing 
NPT-plus measures, for example, NMD, the PSI, and the CSI, the administration looked for India's 
cooperation. In the post-9-11 time, the Bush administration perceived that India, because of its 
developing innovative ability, topographical location, and economy, could assume a noteworthy part
®®® Interview with a senior official at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), secrecy asked for, March 2012. In spite of the  fact tha t it  
can't be overlooked that India has assembled the atomic weapons program for itself, yet, as the NRC authority contends, India has reliably 
insisted that "when the atomic weapon states satisfy their guarantee under the NPT; it would be euphoric to  go under t he NPT fold. This is 
notan  irrational thing to  ask. Because, a fundamental bargain underlying the NPT is: we nuclear powers will disarm and you the 
nonnuclear states w ill not arm ."
®^"lbid.
In 2003-4 a few  claims had surfaced that the Indian atomic researcher Dr. Y.s. R. Prasad, who resigned as the Chairman of India's 
Nuclear Power Corporation in the year 2000, was later, used by the Iranian Government. Prasad professedly w ent to  Iran on a few  events 
without acquiring clearances from  the Indian government. Later, the Iranian government sent the  subtle elements on the livelihood of Dr. 
Prasad to  the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) then, the IAEA asked for the Indian governm ent to  question Dr. Prasad. The 
Indian government contended that Dr. Prasad, a resigned atomic researcher, a master in nuclear power building, worked just on Iran's 
Bushehr nuclear project which is under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. For details, see "The Indian Scientist also Involved 
in Nuclear Proliferation to Iran," Frontier Star (NWPP, Pakistan) February 8, 2004; M anoj Jos hi, "Indo-lran Ties M ay Hurt Good Friend, U.S." 
Times o f India (New Delhi), February 22 ,2 00 4 .
Zafar Jaspal Interview
Zafar Jaspal Interview
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in the new security building design. President Bush underlined the need to supplant arms control 
treaties that had lost their importance. India, provided for its abhor for the NPT and CTBT, was 
energetic for Bush's creative skeleton for another post-Cold war nuclear building to supplant past 
prejudicial treaties with an agreeable security regime, in view of missile defence and counter­
proliferation. Fundamentally, adoption of the new measures by the Bush administration made space 
to captivate India as an accomplice in non-proliferation.
The decision of the Bush administration to withdraw from the ABM treaty and construct a missile 
defence system drew strong global reactions.®"" Richard Armitage, the deputy secretary of state 
(2001-2005) attempted the mission to clarify the new key system including non-proliferation, 
counter-proliferation, missile defence, and reduction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal —to friendly and 
cordial nations. In this context he went to India. Despite the fact that India exhorted the U.S. not to 
singularly abandon the 1972 treaty, it respected the reduction of the U.S. armory and also the 
movement to a more helpful defence schema.®"" Emulating a gathering with Armitage, Jaswant Singh 
avowed, "What we are attempting to work out together is a completely new security regime for the 
whole globe."®"® India was exceptionally satisfied that the U.S. considered it indispensable enough to 
send its undersecretary for defence, Richard Armitage, to examine the issue.
Amidst the overall wariness of Bush's nuclear methodology, "India's quick and enthusiastic 
support"®""" was an astounding advancement. A conspicuous difference to the profoundly installed 
hostile to Americanism, this was an extraordinary position taken by India on the issue of missile 
defence. The backing reached out by the Vajpayee government to Washington's arrangement of 
NMD made some introductory dismay in India; then again, after a countrywide civil argument on the 
issue a strong consensus developed. The thought of missile defence engaged India for a few reasons.
The W hite House, Office of the Press Secretary, A BM  Treaty Fact Sheet, press release, 13, Dec 2001. Available at 
www.state.gov /t/a c /r ls /fs /2 0 0 1 /6 8 48 .htm (accessed December 6, 2012).
The Visit o f  the U.S. Deputy Secretary o f  State Richard Arm itage to New Delhi, press release issued by Ministry of External Affairs, 
Government o f India, May 11, 2011. Available at h ttp ://w w w .indianem bassy.org /press_release/2001/m ay/m ay_ll.h tm  (accessed M arch
1 5,2011 ).
As quoted in Satindra Bindra, "India Backs Missile Shield," M ay 11, 2001. Available at 
http://archives.cnn.eom /2001/W O RLD/asiapcf/south /05/ll/ind ia.arm itage.pakistan.zhu.01/index.htm l
C. Raja Mohan, "A Paradigm Shift Towards South Asia?" The Washington Quarterly  (W inter 2002-03):144.
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Initially, as Sandhya Singh comments, "A defensive umbrella in which a tracking satellite can find and 
neutralize enemy missiles in mid-air is no small protection for a country [India] physically surrounded 
by civilizational hostile forces."^^^ Second, India saw NMD as a supplement to its nuclear regulation 
of "no first use," as a missile defence shield would check any temptation of dangerous powers to 
strike first/^^ At long last, NMD was consistent with India's decades-old mission for technological 
headway. As C. Raja Mohan affirms, "the development of the missile defence appears an inevitable 
technological trend and a country like India has to invest in it."^^^
Subsequently, Washington acknowledged India could be "truly useful" in the foundation of new 
security building design.^^^ In 2002, a jo int explanation of the Defence Policy Group gathering 
reflected the willingness of both the nations to team up on NMD. Both sides "reaffirmed the 
contribution that missile defences can make to enhance cooperative security and stability 
Subsequently, bilateral senior level talks were held and missile defence was fused in the Next Steps 
in Strategic Partnership as a priceless component of the "quartet" of issues on which the two nations 
looked to cooperate.
India, PS! and the CSI
other than being a non-proliferator, India had particular abilities that made it appealing as a critical 
accomplice for controlling the risk of weapons of mass destruction. To start with, because of its 
innovative ability, India could significantly participate in the jo in t improvement of "new systems of 
tagging, tracking, and surveillance." Second, India's prime location in the Indian Ocean region and its 
blue water maritime abilities were considered gainful, particularly "in the vital task of safeguarding 
the seas from nuclear trafficking."^^® Recognizing Indian maritime ability, Nicholas Burns
Singh, "A Civilisational Ally."
C. Rajamohan, "Vajpayee, Bush Explore Tie-up In Missile Defence," The Hindu (Chennai), September 23, 2003.
Ibid.
Interview w ith Gen Talat Masood, Specialist on South Asia, February, 2013.
Joint Statem ent on US -in d ia  Defence Policy Group M eeting, M ay 23, 2002. US Departm ent of Defence, New Release, 2678-02. 
Available at www.fas,org/terrorlsm /at/docs/2002/USIndlaDefensePollcyGroup.htm  (accessed April 21 ,2 01 1 ).
Samantha F. Ravlch, "Nuclear Non-proliferation and the Cases o f Russia, China and India." In The Challenge o f Proliferation: A Report o f  
the Aspen Strategy Group, ed., Kurt Campbell (Washington D.C.: The Aspen Institute, February 2005), 108.
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commented, "India's robust navy travels the sea-lanes linking the Middle East and Africa with East 
Asia and we are working with it to expand the surveillance of suspect cargo vessels and real-time 
communication."^^^ Due to India's power in the Indian Ocean region, the compelling functioning of 
the PSI w ithout Indian inclusion was "unthinkable."^^^ On a few occasions U.S. authorities 
communicated enthusiasm toward the participation of New Delhi in the U.S.-headed Proliferation 
Security Initiative (PSI) in its mission to forbid nuclear trafficking on the high seas. Colin Powell 
expressed, "We would like to see India participate in the PSI... we are going to increase the dialogue 
with respect to possible Indian participation."^^^
At first, India had specific apprehensions about the implications of joining the Proliferation Security 
Initiative. To start with, the PSI was a U.S.-headed exertion without United Nations or any 
international legal sanction.^®'  ^Second, the PSI obliged parts to permit o ff the cuff checks of their 
own ships and aircrafts. Third, there were apprehensions in regards to the considerable strain and 
"material degradation" of the key holdings of the Indian military amid interdiction operations. 
Fourth, India as of now had politically delicate relations with its neighbours, hence, this activity 
included a considerable political hazard that a debate may escalate into a military conflict.^®^ For 
example, one of the reasons that prompted the 1962 Chinese attack on India was the way that India 
offered haven to Tibetan exiles including the Dalai Lama—who were escaping persecution by 
Chinese powers. At last, India considered the retention of specific states as "core members" in the 
PSI as oppressive. The function of the core group was to characterize the essential standards of 
interdiction for the PSI and to expand its enrolment. Fundamentally, in 2005, the U.S. disbanded the
Nicholas Burns, "America's Strategic Opportunity with India," Foreign Affairs  86, no.6, (N ovem ber/ December 2007);141.
Amit Kumar, India and the U.S.-led W M D Non-Proliferation Initiatives, Pugwash India Research Articles, 29 March 2008. Available at 
www.indianpugwashsoclety.org/artlcle_detail.asp?aid=62 (accessed on December 6 ,2 0 11 ).
Siddarth Varadarajan, "U.S. for Indian Hand in Proliferation Initiative," Times o f India, 1 8 , March 2005.
Moreover, as Sharon SquassonI states, PSI has no "international secretariat, no offices in federal agencies established to  support it, no 
database, no reports o f successes or failures, and no established funding." Sharon Squassoni, Proliferation Security Initiative, CRS Report 
for Congress, (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated September 1 4 ,2006 ), CRS-3.
Deepa Ollapally, “U.S.-india: Ties that Bind," The Sigur Centre Asia Papers, The (Washington D.C: Elliott School of International Affairs, 
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PSI core group in order to mollify India's concerns/^® Therefore, India consented to  engage with U.S. 
in discussions in regards to approaches to participate in the PSI.
The Bush administration was additionally quick to look for India's cooperation in the CSI. As 
highlighted by Nicholas Burns, "We also urge India to participate in the Container Security Initiative 
and to unleash its proven expertise in information technology to meet a new generation of threats in 
cyberspace."^®^ In May 2005, after talks in regards to cooperation on the issue, India consented to 
join the CSI.^ ^^  It offered to make its biggest port, Jawaharlal Nehru Port, otherwise called Nhava- 
Sheva and run by the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT), agreeable to the CSI. As India is an export 
driven economy, it was in India's economic investment to guarantee the security of maritime trade 
infrastructure and in addition merchandise. W ithout CSI agreeable screening procedures in India, the 
freight starting from India en route to the U.S. would need to be dispatched to other CSI compliant 
ports, for example, Colombo, Dubai, or Singapore. This would make an interpretation of not just into 
a build in costs for merchandise of Indian origin, additionally into a misfortune in income because of 
diversion of foreign products to different ports. It was not a simple decision for India as it had 
reservations with respect to the posting of the U.S. Traditions and Border Patrol in its p o r t s . T h e  
Container Security Initiative stipulates that the entire transportation load destined for the U.S. is to 
be checked by U.S. custom officials at the port of inception. In addition, India saw that, in order to be 
successful, the CSI ought not to be U.S.-particular; rather, it ought to be a global activity to ensure 
the global stream of products. As terrorists undermine global maritime trade, and container cargo 
might be utilized to transport conceivably unsafe merchandise, India coherently fe lt it was key to 
guarantee the security of containers beginning from any port and destined for destination anywhere
Squassoni, "Proliferation Security Initiative," CRS-2.
Nicholas Burns, "Strategic Opportunity," 141.
Vijay Sakhuja, "Container Security Initiative: Is India Serious About its M aritim e Trade," no. 1748 (N ew  Delhi: Institute of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, 19 M ay 2005). Available at http://www.ipcs.org/artlcle_details.php?artlcleNo=1748 (accessed March 25, 2011) The four 
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screening holders before they touch base at U.S. ports; utilizing engineering to pre-screen high-hazard compartments; and, creating and 
utilizing secure holders. Previously, India, as well, has been a casualty of the  vehicle o f conceivably hazardous products to  its ports. In 
October 2004, ten persons in Delhi were executed in an impact brought on by live shells in metal scrap in delivery holders transported in 
from w ar plagued zones In W est Asia. See, Gurpreet S. Khurana, "India and the Container Security Initiative," IDSA Strategic Comments 
(July 17 ,2007 ). Available at http ://w w w.idsa.in /publicatlons/stratcom m ents/GurpreetKhuranal70707.htm  (accessed March 26, 2011 ). 
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around the globe. Sureesh Mehta, a chief naval officer in the Indian Navy, commented that 
safeguarding cargo headed only for the U.S. did not constitute "a foolproof system." Emphasizing the 
need to return to maritime security, he commented, the "CSI should be an integral part of a 
country's security system and not be U.S.-specific. Whenever a container leaves a port, each country 
concerned should certify it as safe."^ ®® The assaults in Mumbai (India) in November 2008 further 
strengthened the threats from the seas and the need to reinforce maritime security around the 
world. Hence, the criticalness to manage the threats of nuclear terrorism and trafficking prompted 
reorientation of the nuclear regime. India—hitherto a nuclear outcast and a focus of the non­
proliferation regime—was no longer considered a "country of proliferation concern" to 
Washington.^®^
Nuclear Safety Cooperation
In 2003, the Bush administration not just resuscitated the until now suspended nuclear safety 
cooperation with India, but additionally expanded it to the greatest degree conceivable inside the 
circle of U.S. domestic laws and international commitments towards non-proliferation. As a feature 
of this dialogue, the U.S. National Regulatory Commission (NRG) was locked in with its Indian partner 
the Atomic Energy Regulation Board (AERB) to guarantee the regulation and security of nuclear 
reactors in India.
Interestingly, the U.S.-lndia nuclear security dialog had started amid the Clinton administration in 
1994. At the same time it was uncertainly suspended in the fallout of the 1998 Indian nuclear tests.
A senior official at the NRC, affirms, "In many ways my agency has been at the forefront in this 
paradigm shift [U.S.-lndia nuclear cooperation] going back to the mid-90s."®®^ The NRC started taking 
enthusiasm toward Indian nuclear safety standards after a blaze at the Narora Atomic Power Station 
(NAPS) placed close to the capital city, Delhi. On March 31,1993, a fire broke out at the turbine
"N-Weapons Could Be Brought Through Sea: Navy," Indian Express (New Delhi), February 18, 2009.
M ark J. Valencia, The Proliferation Security Initiative: M aking Waves in Asia, Adelphi Paper no. 376 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 2005), 65. 
Senior NRC official, interview.
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generator of the 235 MW reactors at NAPS and boiled and raged for 12 hours. There was no harm to 
the reactor building and all the safety systems functioned normally.®®® The then executive director of 
the AERB, S. V. Kumar, certified that "no plant workers [were] killed or injured and there was no 
radiation hazard either to the staff or the public." Fortunately, when the flame handicapped the 
reactor's essential and secondary cooling systems the backup cooling systems kept a complete 
meltdown of the reactor.®®  ^Reviewing the episode, a NRC authority expressed, despite the fact that 
"the fire was quite dangerous, the operators at the site were extremely capable, knowledgeable, 
and nothing worse happened as they were able to contain it®®®." Nonetheless, it made concerns 
inside the NRC on the grounds that, in March 1975, the United States had a significant fire in its 
Brown's Ferry nuclear plant in Tennessee. This episode stressed the need to reinforce the safety 
regulations at nuclear power plants, to counteract future blaze mischances and to guarantee public 
health and safety. Consequently, after the NAPS episode, the NRC felt a pressing need to captivate 
India in discussions in regards to the security of its nuclear system. The way that India had created its 
nuclear program in isolation strengthened the need to guarantee its arrangement with international 
security standards. The NRC took the position that "nuclear safety issues should be cast out from 
other non-proliferation concerns, as an accident can be problematic for public health and safety."®®® 
Due to President Clinton's strong commitment to the non-proliferation targets, the NRC officials' 
review, "The dialogue with the executive was not easy. It was a bumpy road." Finally, the NRC was 
permitted to start a restricted dialogue with India on the issues of nuclear security. In the fall of 1994 
a delegation of Indian regulators went to the U.S. and discussions started on a few paramount 
general themes of nuclear safety. The NRC additionally swayed India to join the International 
Convention on Nuclear Safety, which it did in 1994.®®^  Despite the fact that the conversation had 
started, because of the inborn doubt in the bilateral relationship "it took several years for the
The Departm ent of Atomic Energy, Annuo/ Report 1993-94, (New Delhi: Government of India, 1994), 9; Also see, "Turbine in Nuclear 
Power Station Catches Fire," Associated Press, March 3 1 ,1 99 3 .
"Fire Damage W ill Take Months to Fix," Nucleonics Week, April 8 ,1993 ; Also see, Brahma Chellaney, "Backup Cooling System Averted  
Indian Reactor Meltdown," United Press International, April 4 ,1 9 9 3 .
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dialogue to really get going."®®® The Indians saw that the NRC expected to highlight the shortcomings 
of their nuclear project. At the point when India conducted nuclear tests in 1998 the interaction on 
nuclear security issues was indefinitely suspended.®®® Charles Ferguson, worked in the Office of 
Nuclear Safety, Bureau of Non-proliferation, U.S. Bureau of State (2000-2002), uncovers that in the 
outcome of Pokhran II, "the non-proliferation bureau was 'adamantly opposed' to  any nuclear 
related work with India even in the area of civilian nuclear safety.""^®® Also, the Indian nuclear 
researchers were denied visas to the United States till the sanctions were placed.^®^
At the time of suspension, there were three primary ongoing tasks. The principal was identified with 
the Tarapur nuclear reactor focused around U.S. outline technology. There were a few breaks in the 
shrout of the nuclear reactor centre. In this way, the Indian masters obliged U.S. aid to create 
Polaroids, to research conceivable harm to the reactor, and to guarantee that the reactor was 
protected. The second extend expected to guarantee that fire codes in Indian nuclear plants met 
international standards so a flame occurrence would not "thump out the entire reactor, the 
wellbeing framework, or the electrical link line." The keep going task was on crisis working methods.
In November 2001, amid the Indian leader's visit to Washington, these nuclear safety tasks were 
restored and both sides expressed their desire to engage in the circle of civilian nuclear cooperation. 
Nuclear cooperation turned into an important component of the "trin ity of issues" of the High 
Technology Cooperation Group which will be talked about later in this chapter.
In February 2003, a 15 part American delegation headed by the Chairman of the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Dr. Richard A. Meserve, went to India. Other than continuing cooperation in
Senior NRC official, interview.
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nuclear security issues, the motivation behind the visit was to distinguish particular territories for 
collaboration in peaceful applications of nuclear energy and space research/®^ The NRC was focused 
on the stance that a "dialogue with India is more important than banning India from the dialogue, at 
least on the very minimal on the nuclear safety front."'^®® This position was regarded well and was 
enhanced during the Bush administration. Consequently, the bilateral nuclear security dialog 
between the NRC and the AERB was expanded beyond the past issues of fire safety, emergency 
operating systems, and design issues, to incorporate two different territories: risk reformed 
regulation and license renewal for nuclear reactors.^®"  ^In this manner, the dialog between the NRC 
and the Indian partner, the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board, was continued with the object of 
controlling a safe nuclear program in India. Additionally, since 9-11 the risk of terrorist assaults on 
nuclear installations had turned into a concern, thusly, the physical wellbeing of nuclear reactors 
was incorporated in the U.S.-lndia discussions. Measures to improve "the security of nuclear force 
plants and the security of nuclear materials which may be being used in horticulture, therapeutic 
uses, or oil well logging" were acquainted with evade their abuse or their falling into the wrong 
hands.^ ®® In March 2002 India agreed to the Convention on the Physical Protection o f Nuclear 
Material.
U.S. Nuclear Regulator Impressed with Indian Safety Standards," National News, March 03, 2003. Available at 
http://news.indiamart.com /news-analysls/us-nuclear-regulator- 2134.html (accessed March 25, 2011) ; Also see, Beth Duff-Brown, 
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Commission, Richard Meserve, admired india for the safety measures at the nuclear power plants.
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Accordingly, amid the Bush administration, the U.S.-lndia nuclear safety dialogue was resuscitated 
as well as was fundamentally expanded focused around (i) increased dependence on nuclear power 
for both nations, (ii) guaranteeing the security of nuclear reactors in India, and (iii) protection against 
the danger of terrorist acts.
Recognition of India's Nuclear Energy Needs
The restoration of the nuclear safety cooperation with India served as a noteworthy confidence- 
building measure and guaranteed both the nations that they had a shared enthusiasm toward giving 
safe and reliable nuclear energy. Bit by bit, notwithstanding their contradictory methodologies to 
nuclear weapons, this nuclear safety dialogue prompted discovering a common ground.
The Bush administration got to be mindful of the need to move beyond present security and 
administrative issues; in light of the fact that India's economic development was making a "voracious 
appetite for electricity.""^®® In a report by the Aspen Strategy Group it was highlighted, "A broader 
U.S.-lndian energy dialogue can be an important tool in strengthening the overall relationship.""^®^ 
Moreover, it was accepted that if India's nuclear industry stayed disconnected it may be a problem 
for it to attain feasible energy. David Victor expressed, "As long as India's nuclear industry remains 
isolated, it is hard to see that India will build more than the occasional reactor as the cost basis for 
nuclear equipment will be too high and fuel needed fo r such reactors will not be available.""^®®
Indian authorities and researchers voiced similar energy concerns at few international fora. Within 
India, there were high level discussions about whether the Indian nuclear project would have the 
capacity to reach its anticipated energy prerequisites. The director of India's Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEG), Anil Kakodkar, underlining India's dedication to non-proliferation, made a 
supplication for the evacuation of technological embargoes. He expressed, "We have a commitment
407
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and an interest in contributing as a partner against proliferation ... we must shed the baggage 
inherited from the past which restricts the flow of equipment and technologies related to the 
peaceful uses of nuclear energy.""^®®
Essentially, in July 2005, a simple couple of weeks before the booked visit of Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh to the U.S., the executive of the AERB, A. Gopalkrishnan, shockingly attracted 
public attention to the deficiency of fuel for the Indian nuclear reactors. Calling for international 
cooperation in the supply of nuclear fuel, A. Gopalakrishnan condemned the silence kept up by the 
Indian government and additionally the Indian Department of Atomic Energy (DAE). He noted, "it 
has been a major problem for the officials of NPCIL [Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited] and 
the Nuclear Fuel Complex (NFC) for some time.""^^® Contrary to the common perception, he 
underlined that the critical requirement for India, was not nuclear reactors, yet fuel for the nuclear 
reactors officially functioning or to be constructed."*^^ Cognisant of U.S. domestic laws and 
international commitments that disallowed nuclear trade with India, Gopalkrishnan recommended 
that Washington backing could at any rate help the evacuation of NSG objections to empower India 
to import the basically required uranium, i.e., nuclear fuel, from different nations.
Interestingly, India's developing nuclear energy needs were being perceived at the international 
level, as well. A few nations, particularly France and Russia, were anticipating nuclear cooperation 
with India and desired a modification of the NSG Guidelines—prohibited member states from 
supplying nuclear aid and materials to any nation that has not acknowledged full-scope safeguards, 
e.g., India. Russia had raised the issue of moving NSG restrictions at the gathering in Pusan, Korea, 
from May 19-23, 2003. In this manner, an open explanation was issued by Russia. It expressed, "We 
believe that the activities of the NSG should not of course create obstacles fo r international
"Barriers to Safe N-Energy Must Go," The Hindu, 18 September 2003.
A. Gopalkrishnan, "Indo-U.S. Cooperation: A Non-Starter," Economic and Poiitical Weekly, July 2, 2005. He also said, "The DAE may 
argue that depleted uranium available from  the spent-fuel reprocessing plants will supplement our limited natural uranium stocks, but in 
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cooperation in this field of peaceful purposes of atomic energy and take into account new realities in 
this field in an adequate and timely manner.""*^^
Strategic Trade: Confidence Building
Regardless of the opening up of the bilateral relationship since the Clinton administration, the issue 
of technology transfer stayed perplexing and touchy. To review, the peaceful nuclear test explosion 
by India in 1974 had produced a ton of concerns in regards to the potential military employments of 
civilian nuclear technology transferred to developing nations. It had additionally prompted a crack in 
the middle of India and the U.S. (and Canada) with respect to the utilization of the CANDU nuclear 
reactor and the U.S.-source fuel for the nuclear explosion which were proposed for India's civilian 
programme."*^® From there on, the U.S. had founded technological controls to lim it dual use 
technologies to India; consequently, both nations experienced many years of doubt and disparate 
objectives. The U.S., because of India's refusal to acquiesce to the NPT-driven regime, was 
concerned about the end-utilization of Indian technology and in addition its export to outsiders. 
India, on the other hand, saw the U.S. in colonial terms as an untrustworthy supplier and responsible 
for setting up a "technological apartheid regime". For three long decades, US-lndia was not able to 
scaffold their dissimilar goals.
Amid the Bush period, Indian authorities were avid for the manoeuvring of U.S. restrictions so that 
India would have more noteworthy access to sensitive technology, and on a few occasions they 
communicated their craving for the lifting of the technological embargoes forced since 1974. The
Amit Baruah, "Iraq Dominates PM's Talks w ith Leaders," The Hindu, June 1, 2003; "France, Russia Seek Cooperation in 'Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Energy,"' The Hindustan Times, June 1 ,2003 .
Kenneth Juster, "Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India," speech at the 28th Annual M eeting o f the  US-lndia Business 
Council, New York, June 2, 2003.
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Indian government was "focussing narrowing" on the liberalization of U.S. restrictions on the export 
of nuclear and missile related technology."*^"*
For instance, Brajesh Mishra, in his speech at the Council of Foreign Relations, underlined India's 
non-proliferation restrictions toward oneself and his expectation for a deeper engagement in the 
enclosure of cutting edge technology. He expressed "I have been saying very candidly that a trin ity 
of issues—high technology commerce, civilian nuclear energy cooperation, and collaboration in 
space can take the Indo-U.S. relationship to a qualitatively new level of partnership. India has 
consistently followed responsible policies on non-proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies 
and has strict export control regimes for dual-use technologies"."*^®
President Bush agreed authenticity to India's mission for the technological progression required by 
its thriving economy. The Bush administration likewise understood that a "deeper cooperation" in 
the trin ity of issues could be the "leading edge" of the bilateral relationship."*^® Bush investigated 
courses in which Washington could take part in high technology trade consistent with it non­
proliferation targets. At a memorable summit meeting in November 2001, President Bush and Prime 
Minister Singh highlighted their dedication to stimulate high technology commerce. They consented 
to start a dialog to assess forms by which exchange of dual use and military items could be 
attempted inside a skeleton of "greater transparency and efficiency.""*^^ This was an unequivocal 
expression of passion on both sides to participate in strategic trade and investigate approaches to 
continue to find ways of the more extensive interest of both nations. In this way, the coming of the
Jaspal Interview
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Bush administration and its sympathy with India's technological aspirations reoriented the "context 
of the bilateral nuclear dialogue.""*^®
Nonetheless, Colin Powell, the then secretary of state, in a meeting with the Washington Post, 
highlighted that in spite of the fact that the U.S. respected India's demands for cutting edge 
technology and planned to do whatever it could to fulfil them; there were sure red lines in regards 
to non-proliferation that Washington couldn't cross. The U.S. imagined "glide path"—a three stage 
plan whereupon India would embrace measures to control non-proliferation and would reinforce 
domestic export control laws and the U.S. would respond by lifting technological restrictions."*^® 
Along these lines, Washington started to characterize the criteria and "structure a process" for 
improving a synergic trade relationship in dual use technologies, to guarantee the proper use of the 
sensitive items. Juster comments, it encompassed "developing 'habits of cooperation' on issues of 
mutual concern and, even more important, developing mechanisms for institutionalizing that 
cooperation." "*®° Meanwhile, the Indian government likewise submitted a few informal papers with 
thoughts on how to understand the objectives set in the November 2001 jo int articulation.
In light of the Bush-Vajpayee responsibility to take part in high-tech trade and commerce, 
Condoleezza Rice and Brajesh Mishra held talks and distributed the results as the Rice-Mishra Paper. 
It envisaged "set of clearly defined objectives to be negotiated by the two bureaucracies in a 
reasonable time frame.""*^^ The Rice-Mishra Paper underlined the need to investigate approaches to 
address American national security premiums in regards to non-proliferation and India's yearning for 
cutting edge technologies. This gave the foundation to the High Technology Cooperation Group to
C. Raja Mohan, "Lowering the Barriers?" The Hindu, November 2 0 ,2 00 3 .
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address the bilateral difficulties in high technology trade and commerce/®^ In November 2002, 
Kenneth Juster, the U.S. undersecretary for industry and security in the Department of Commerce 
went to India and held talks with Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal in regards to the foundation 
of a High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG). The Juster-Sibal talks spoke to a "determined 
political effort" to handle Indo-U.S. divergence over non-proliferation and propelled technology 
tansfers issues that had been waiting for a few decades."*®"* The proposal was reviewed by the Indian 
government and a jo in t press release was issued on 13 November, 2002, for creation of a HTCG 
involving senior representatives of the applicable bureaus of both the governments.
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February 5, 2003, the HTCG congregated and signed the Statement of Principles which encompassed 
reciprocal obligations of the two countries."*®® The Statement of Principles accentuated the 
dedication of both nations to forestall proliferation of sensitive technologies and the "shared 
objective" of reinforcing export control frameworks through laws, regulations, and requirements. In 
order to get approved transfer of dual use items and technologies, India needed to satisfy certain 
obligations. It needed to espouse a "mutually satisfactory system of assurances regarding end-use, 
diversions, transfers, and retransfers within and outside India, re-export, and, where necessary, 
physical protection from and access to controlled items by third parties.""*®® The motivation behind 
these measures was to "increase transparency and responsibility" to guarantee legitimate end-usage 
of technology of U.S. source, and to control proliferation of sensitive technologies."*®® The U.S. swore 
to respond by lifting restrictions in a staged way consistent with its national security and foreign
Ibid.
Kenneth Juster assumed a key part in empowering the key exchange. He headed the US Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) which was 
principally in charge of regulating compelling fare controls and their consistence w ith respect to  key exchange, a long these lines, 
propelling U.S. rem ote strategy, national security and economic investment. For details about Bureau of Industry and Security, see, 
http://w w w .bis.doc.gov/about/index.htm .
Mohan, "Lowering the Barriers."
Jaspal Interview
Statem ent o f Principles fo r  U.S.-lndia High Technology Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Departm ent o f Commerce, 
Washington D.C., February 5 ,2 0 0 3 . Available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/internationalprograms/statementprinciplesindia.htm  (accessed 
March 15, 2011).
M ohan, "Lowering the Barriers."
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policy objectives and international commitments. "*®® Essentially, the HTCG esteemed the part the 
private segment could play in empowering high tech trade. Likewise, in July 2003, the HTCG in 
conjunction with the Confederation of Indian Industry (CM), the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry (FICCI), the National Association of Software and Service Companies 
(NASSCOM), and the U.S.-lndia Business Council (USIBC) sponsored a public- private gathering on 
"Financing Innovation" in Washington. The discussion concentrated on further development of 
bilateral business cooperation in four rising regions of technology—information technology, life 
sciences, defence technology, and nanotechnology."*®®
In this manner, through the HTCG, trade and commerce in dual use goods was completed as a part 
of a structure that secured the national security and foreign policy diversions of the U.S. while 
satisfying India's technological demands. Remarking on the accomplishment of the U.S.-lndia staged 
technology transfers. Raja Mohan affirms, "More progress on the subject [technology transfers] has 
taken place over the last couple of years than in the previous three decades.""*®® It additionally ended 
up being a confidence-building activity to investigate courses in which bilateral high tech trade could 
be expanded further. That is, the HTCG was not seen as the endpoint, rather, as the start of strategic 
trade with India."*®^  In the expressions of Kenneth Juster, for Washington "it was a critical confidence 
building measure" and an unexpected advancement in the U.S.-lndia relationship."*®® The U.S.-lndia 
phased technology transfers permitted the U.S. and India, surprisingly, to take part in key trade 
without trepidations and animosity.
"statem ent of Principles."
Kenneth Juster, "U.S.-lndia Relations and High-Technology Trade," speech at luncheon hosted by the Federation of Indian Chambers of 
Commerce and Industry, New Delhi, November 20, 2003. Available at www.bis.doc.gov/new s/2003/kennewdelhinov03.htm  
M ohan, "Lowering the Barriers."
Kenneth Juster, "Stimulating High-Technology Cooperation with India," speech at the 28th Annual Meeting o f the  US-lndia Business
Council June 2, 2003, New York. 
Jaspal Interview
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Next Steps in Strategic Partnership
The HTCG not just made considerable advancement in starting strategic trade additionally organized 
a procedure focused around "corresponding obligations." This, thus, made a remarkable and 
creative pathway for technology transfers to India. Nonetheless, it strengthened the requirement for 
further measures—both within the U.S. to facilitate and ease the restrictions and in India to fortify 
technology controls—to upgrade the trade in sensitive zones identified with nuclear and missile 
technology. Consequently, as Jaspal states, "that is when U.S government created the Next Steps in 
Strategic Partnership (NSSP) skeleton." "*®®
In September 2003, Steve Hadley, the appointee secretary of state, joined by Juster, went by India 
to present NSSP recommendations to the Indian government in gatherings with Brajesh Mishra, the 
Indian national security advisor."*®"* The gatherings represented a critical endeavour by Washington 
to "logically eliminate the punitive sanctions" in order to encourage trade in strategic technologies 
with India while respecting its own international responsibilities and domestic obligations with 
regards to non-proliferation. "*®®
After an arrangement negotiation the NSSP was affirmed in January 2004. It launched a three stage 
process of proportional measures to build confidence and to empower U.S. exports of "progressively 
sensitive items" to India. The NSSP made some anxiety within India as it was seen as the 
arrangement of Indian export controls as indicated by U.S. interests. In this context, Jaspal, relates 
that the achievement was conceivable when "U.S. could overcome a considerable lot of India's 
technical concerns." "*®® Furthermore, alleviating India's concerns, he elucidated that the intention
Ibid.
'’ '^‘jaspai, interview. He informed that the desire was to  get an earlier approbation of the NSSP by the  Indian government in order to  have 
the NSSP embraced by President Bush and Prime M inister Manm ohan Singh at the UN General Assembly meeting in m id-Septem ber 2003. 
"Be that as it may Indian government was not ready to  do that yet and needed to  give more thought to this proposal. So the U.S kept on 
negotiating and deal w ith such a report. The Government of India sent an appointm ent to  Washington DC a couple of weeks after the fact 
for further examinations."
Mohan, "Impossible Allies," 28.
Jaspal Interview
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behind swaying India to strengthen controls was not proposed as a zero-sum game to extract 
concessions—rather, it was focused around correspondence. The requisite measures attempted by 
India would upgrade the confidence of the United States to expand the level and extent of 
technology exported to India. The NSSP started cooperation in the "quartet" of issues—civilian 
nuclear exercises, peaceful space projects, proper environments for high technology trade, and 
missile defence. On the other hand, it is critical to note that, even at the phase of NSSP, civilian 
nuclear exercises were limited to nuclear administrative and safety issues."*®® Like the HTCG, the 
NSSP reinforced the realization that the U.S. and India, interalia, have a common enthusiasm toward 
keeping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and, subsequently, India would not divert 
the technologies to military utilization nor proliferate to third parties. Therefore, Washington could 
securely encourage high-technology trade and commerce with India. The NSSP transformed these 
diversions into concrete actions to be embraced by both nations "consistent with each country's 
laws and international obligations.""*®® At the completion of stage I of the NSSP, in response to India's 
measures in regards to upgraded export controls, the U.S. moved restrictions considerably on the 
export of dual use items to India. The accompanying items were tended to: (i) The Indian Space 
Research Organization (ISRO)—India's head scientific institution—was expelled from the Department 
of Commerce Entity List. This measure removed a real aggravation in the expansion of Indo-U.S. key 
ties and was a long-pending Indian demand, as it was influencing India's space program. This 
measure encouraged a few dual use items to be exported to the ISRO without a permit and served 
as a positive sign to energize American speculation in the Indian civilian space sector; (ii) Licensing 
prerequisites were reduced for low-level dual use items (known as EAR99 and XX999 things) sent out 
to ISRO subordinate entities that were still on the Entity List. This change in authorizing policy 
empowered a reduction of approximately 80% in the applications for dual use exports to ISRO 
subordinate entities, (iii) A presumption of support policy was built for all dual use items of U.S.
"United States and India Successfully Complete Next Steps in Strategic Partnership," Factsheet, Departm ent of State, W ashington DC, 
July 18, 2005.
M atthew  S. Borman, "NSSP: U.S., India Interests in Action," The Hindu, October 0 2 ,2 00 4 .
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inception, aside from those controlled by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to the "balance of plant" 
portion of nuclear plants under IAEA safeguards; this empowered the expansion of civilian nuclear 
cooperation between the U.S. and India."*®®
After the effective conclusion of stage I of the NSSP, in mid-September 2004, President Bush and 
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh consented to launch the next phase of the NSSP. 
Consequently, the second stage was launched in October 2004. As per Juster, US then began to 
make genuine advancement in Phase II of the NSSP and they had the transition to  the second term 
of the Bush administration." "*"*° Jaspal accepted, "The NSSP was a discriminating venture in the 
transformation of the relationship" and guaranteed it to be a "milestone" in the U.S. - India key 
relationship which further cleared path for "considerably more prominent engagement in various 
key regions in which cooperation has a while ago been restricted or was non-existent.""*"*^ Thus, 
these measures were considered a discretionary triumph that prompted an expanded stream of dual 
use items into Indian civilian space and nuclear activities; yet the NSSP was likewise a critical 
confidence building measure that attested that the U.S. and India could connect their until now 
disparate diversions in a commonly beneficial manner. Fundamentally, the NSSP encouraged the 
U.S. to make further moves to upgrade strategic trade with India. On the other hand, it got to be 
clear that there was still a long way to go to comprehend the full potential of the relationship. 
Markey comments, the NSSP was "extremely ambitious however was additionally constrained." "*"*®
This chapter reviews the huge reorientation of the nuclear regime amid the Bush administration. The 
NPT, focusing on primarily state-actors, was not outfitted to manage the contemporary dangers of
See, the update on the completion of the NSSP phase I, Bureau of Industry and Security, Departm ent of Commerce. Avaiiable at 
http://www.bis.doc.gOv/news/2004/us-indianextstep.htm  (accessed April 26 ,2 01 1 )
Jaspal Interview
Factsheet, "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership."
General Talat Interview
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nuclear trafficking and terrorism. There was a detectable need to supplement the nuclear non­
proliferation regime with measures to cater to the post 9-11 global nuclear order. Contrary, to 
general perception, the Bush administration expanded the functional extent of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime through acceptance of interdiction measures, for example, PSI and CSI to 
manage dangers of nuclear trafficking and terrorism. The Bush administration vivaciously backed 
IAEA safeguards and the strengthening of international export controls to overcome provisos in the 
treaty that had been laid down five decades back. Cognisant of the vitiated nuclear order, 
Washington understood that India was a benign proliferator as well as serve as an accomplice in 
trying to diminish the complex threats of the post 9-11 global nuclear order. Moreover, the 
arrangement of strategic trade measures, mostly proposed by the U.S.—the High Technology 
Cooperation Group and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership—empowered the U.S. to strike a 
harmony between New Delhi's desire for cutting edge technology and Washington's concerns with 
respect to legitimate nuclear uses in a controlled environment and the likelihood of a technology 
spill over in India's military segment or across India's borders. These measures empowered the two 
nations to establish a strong framework of common trust and confidence building before taking the 
jump to a nuclear agreement.
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CHAPTER VII
The process of Negotiation of the Nuclear Deal/123 Agreement 
Accommodating the Anomaly
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George Bush marked what is known as a memorable 
Nuclear Pact on 2 March 2006 in New Delhi. The U.S and India touched base at a commonly 
acceptable understanding concerning carrying forward the process. For more than three decades, 
the U.S. distanced India and organized export controls to deny India access to cutting edge 
technology. The intention was to end the progression of India's nuclear capability, both civilian and 
military. This process neglected to contain India's innovative development. India, excluded from the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime (NPR), not just created and propelled its civilian nuclear program 
additionally crossed the nuclear weapons threshold. Regardless of a qualitative change in the 
relationship with India, the Bush administration confronted a critical quandary: how could India's 
irregular relationship with the global non-proliferation regime be determined? This was not just a 
waiting issue it was additionally ended up being progressively disadvantageous to leave nuclear India 
any longer in isolation. Resolution of this situation advanced through a reorientation of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime in response to the developing risk of nuclear terrorism and nuclear 
trafficking. The main section of this chapter concentrates on the policy decision to continue nuclear 
trade with India and the terms of the agreement. The second section examines the focal mainstays 
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The third section highlights that peaceful nuclear 
cooperation agreements are a vital piece of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation policy through which the 
U.S. can confine the nuclear conduct of recipient states. The last section depicts how the terms of 
the agreement and related U.S. domestic legislation, particularly the Henry Hyde Act, bring India 
inside the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. This part demonstrates that the U.s-lndia nuclear
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arrangement was an endeavour to oblige India within the regime and accordingly bring New Delhi 
under global nuclear influence.
The Policy Decision
In April-May 2005, intensified discussions were held within the U.S. State Department on the issue 
of allowing India access to civilian nuclear technology."*"*® The decision to continue nuclear trade and 
commerce with India was a top-down decision. Understandably, it was not a decision that "can be 
made in public""*"*"*, as it was identified with a highly delicate nuclear issue and, contrary to the 
common perception; it was only at a later stage that the Indian government was educated. Zelikow 
comments, "I do not think they [the Indian government] first understood the gravity of what we 
were proposing, when it fully dawned upon them ... their reaction was pleased astonishment.""*"*® In 
this context, C. Raja Mohan confirms that India had small suspicion of Washington's arrangements, 
with the exception of the likelihood of a significant activity on nuclear energy cooperation amid 
Manmohan Singh's visit in July, 2005. Because of the many years of technological embargoes headed 
by the U.S., there was hesitance to see a remarkable opening in nuclear energy relations with 
Washington.
On 18 July, 2005, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George Bush issued a 
jo in t declaration on civil nuclear cooperation. Fundamentally, the U.S. proclaimed India as "o 
responsible state with advanced nuclear technology" that deserves to "acquire the same benefits 
and advantages as other such [nuclear weapon] stotes" "*"*®(emphasis added). The declaration 
included path breaking promises on both the sides. The U.S. conferred; inter alia, (i) to offer civilian
A few  little, yet, very small confidential meetings were held inside the State Departm ent. There were divisions inside the State 
departm ent on this issue. The Departm ent of Defense at the most highest levels, especially Donald Rumsfeld and Douglas Feith, backed 
this thought they were, apparently, supporting India because of the  blossoming defence cooperation. National Security Advisor Steve 
Hadley and his agent J.d. Squat were uncomfortable about the move because of non-proliferation concerns.
Interview w ith a prominent U.S.-lndia relations scholar, anonymity requested 
Interview w ith Philip Zelikow, March 20, 2009; By a prominent US India relations analyst
On 19th July, 2005, during a press briefing, Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, clarified the position that U.S. was in no 
way acknowledging Indian nuclear weapons arsenal. He stated, "Nuclear weapons were not the subject o f this agreem ent...W eare  simply 
opening up a channel in order to  cooperate on a commercial basis and a technological basis on nuclear power itself and that's a very  
im portant distinction." Available at h ttp ://w w w .sta te .gO v/p /us/rm /2005/49831.h tm  (accessed M ay 7 ,2 0 1 1 ).
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nuclear technologies to assuage Indian concerns in regards to energy security; (ii) to look to conform 
U.S. laws and arrangements in order to understand the objectives of nuclear cooperation; and (iii) to 
sway its [supplier] companions to modify existing international regimes in order to empower civil 
nuclear cooperation with India. In reciprocation, India focused on (i) isolate its civilian and military 
facilities and place its civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards; (ii) honour the voluntary monotorium 
on nuclear testing; (iii) sign and stick to an IAEA Additional Protocol concerning civilian nuciear 
faciiities; (iv) cease from exchange of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to states that don't 
have them and backing international deliberations to lim it their spread; and (v) reinforce its export 
controls through comprehensive national legislation to check proliferation of sensitive technologies 
and harmonize them as per MTCR (Missile technology control regime) and NSG guidelines The U.S. 
likewise offered support to India's entry in the high-profile nuclear fusion project, the International 
Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). This further confirmed that the Bush administration 
was resolved to opening the conduits of cutting edge technoiogy to India."*"*®
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On the premise of the July 2005 jo int declaration, amid President Bush's March 2006 visit to India, 
the two sides concluded an arrangement for the separation of Indian civilian and military facilities 
They likewise commonly consented to "cut o ff the spread of enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies" and "backing the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty." "*"*® Subsequently, on 
18 December, 2006, President Bush, in a critical advancement, signed into law the Henry Hyde 
United States-lndia Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act (hereafter, Henry Hyde Act)."*®® 
Interestingly, it was passed with strong bipartisan backing in the U.S. Congress. The Henry Hyde Act
See, U.S. Supports Indian Involvement in International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) Project. Available at 
http://www.indianem bassy.Org/press_release/2005/Dec/5.htm  . (accessed M ay 7 ,2 0 11 ); The other partners are United States, the  
European Union, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Japan, China and India, also, see, India Joins Nuclear Fusion Club, BBC News 6 December 
2005. Available at h ttp ://new s.bbc.co.Uk/2/h i/sclence/nature/4504668.stm  (accessed M ay 1 6 ,2011 ).
See, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister's Suo M oto Statem ent on Discussions on Civil Nuciear Energy Cooperation with the U.S.: 
Implications o f India's Separation Plan, Office of the Prime Minister, Government of India, March 7 ,2 0 0 6 .
Factsheet: United States and India-Strategic Partnership, Office o f the Press Secretary, The W hite  House, Washington DC. Available at 
ww w.w hitehouse.gOv/news/releases/2006/03/20060302-13.htm l (accessed M ay 16, 2011)
The full text o f the Act is avaiiable at www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=hl09-5682.
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was portrayed as an "empowering legislation" as it made legitimate space, hitherto obstructed by 
the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA), for continuing nuclear trade with India—a non­
signatory of the NPT and an accepted nuclear weapon state. Nonetheless, Congress connected 
certain provisions to underline the non-proliferation measures, for example, the president should 
yearly guarantee that India is sticking to the terms of the agreement; India must consent to a 
safeguards arrangement with the IAEA and obtain authorization from the NSG; and, most 
fundamentally, the arrangement will slip by if India conducts further nuclear tests. "*®®
On the premise of the prior agreements (July 2005 and March 2006) and the Henry Hyde legislation, 
a different specialized agreement, prominently called the Indo-U.S. 123 Agreement, was marked by 
the two nations."*®® It determined definite responsibilities and conditions for the two nations. There 
were sure necessities India required to satisfy before the agreement could be operationalized—a 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA must be marked and an endorsement from the NSG must be 
acquired. In March 2008, India entered into negotiations with the IAEA to create a schema for 
safeguards. Emulating this, India approached the 45 nation Nuclear Supplier's Group (NSG) for 
support; after chaotic strategic negotiations headed by the U.S., the NSG conceded an India-specific 
waiver. Other noticeable members other than the U.S—including France, Russia, Britain, and 
Canada—had as of now indicated enthusiasm toward nuclear cooperation with India."*®"* On the 
satisfaction of the conditions—the safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the NSG exemption, the 
123 Agreement was presented in the U.S. Congress and it passed with a greater part in both the 
House of Representatives and the Senate. At long last, on December 2008, the U.S.-lndia Nuclear 
Cooperation Bill was signed into law by President.
R. Rajaraman, "The India-US Nuclear Deal: The Perspective of a Nongovernmental Nuclear Scientist," in Canadian Policy on Nuclear 
Cooperation with india: Confronting N ew Dilemmas, ed. Karthika Sasikumar and W ade L. Huntley (Vancouver: Simons Centre for 
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Research, 2007), 55.
Raj Chengappa and Saurabh Shukla, "Nuclear Showdown," India Today, March 7 ,2 0 0 8 .
It was called 123 accord , the reason for this is because it refers to  the section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act. The te x t o f this 
agreement is available at h ttp ://w w w .state .gO v/r/pa/prs /ps/2007/aug/90050.htm  .
W illiam  C. Potter and Jayantha Dhanapala, "The Perils o f Non-proliferation Amnesia," The Hindu, September 1 ,2007;W illiam  C. Potter, 
"India and the New Look of US Non-proliferation Policy," Non-proliferation Review  12, no.2 (July 2005).
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Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime: Fundamental Features
The nuclear non-proliferation regime initiated existence with the signing of the nuclear non­
proliferation treaty in 1968. Preceding the NPT, the Atoms for Peace project spoke to a simple 
endeavour to energize civilian nuclear cooperation between technologically propelled nations and 
developing nations. It prompted nuclear cooperation with a few nations including sales of research 
reactors and participation of foreign researchers in nuclear examination ventures. A real impairment 
of the nuclear cooperation under Atoms for Peace was that no nuclear non-proliferation 
affirmations were evoked from beneficiaries and the suppliers gave restricted technology. The 
Atoms for Peace program did not constitute a regime in light of the fact that it "had no injunctions, 
and injunctions are the 'essence' of regimes.""*®® Thus, "participating countries were free to pursue 
military programs in conjunction with externally assisted peaceful ones, as did France; there was no 
compulsory renunciation of a weapons option." "*®® The CIRUS agreement between the U.S., India, 
and Canada, marked in mid-1950s—is an excellent illustration of this venture. The CIRUS agreement, 
which contained no stringent nuclear non-proliferation provisions, turned harsh as it was asserted 
that India had gained the nuclear technology for the 1974 "peaceful" nuclear explosion. In this way, 
there was a developing mindfulness that the use and transfer of nuclear technology required to be 
regulated. Other than NPT, a few export control arrangements were set up with the intention "to 
overcome the deleterious effects of uncontrolled diffusion of nuclear technology but promote its 
organised use.""*®®
Critics contend there is considerable conceptual cover and down to earth trouble in perceiving 
generally verifiable principles and norms. Toll, Young, and Zurn note that standards "include goal 
orientations and causal beliefs at the level of the general policy arena," while, "norms describe
Roger K. Smith, "Explaining the  Non-proliferation Regime: Anomalies for Contemporary International Relations Theory," In ternational 
Organisation 41, no.2 (Spring 1987).p .266-7.
Ibid.
Trevor M cM orrisTate , "Regime-Building in the Non-proliferation System," Journal o f Peace Research 27, no.4 (1990):410.
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general rights and obligations mainly at the level of issue areas.""*®® That is, principles could be 
viewed as the essential set of assumptions and goals underlying a regime in a specific issue range 
and the norms characterize and control the conduct of participant state actors. Rules are viewed as 
the most concrete and express components of a regime and are normally enshrined in multilateral 
or bilateral agreements."*®®
In light of Krasner's definition, T.V. Paul characterizes the nuclear non-proliferation regime as "a set 
of norms, principles, treaties and procedures through which countries pledge not to acquire nuclear 
weapons or help in their acquisition by other states." "*®° The nuclear non-proliferation regime 
confronts the conceivably unsafe horizontal spread of nuclear technology. The spread of nuclear 
weapons might be lethal; however the spread of nuclear energy and its promotion for peaceful use 
is valuable for humanity. In this manner, the guiding principle of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime is: controlled access to nuclear technology and regulation o f the behaviour o f recipients and 
s u p p l ie r s Hasenclever et ai, discerns that norms "serve to guide the behaviour of regime 
members in such a way as to produce collective outcomes which are in harmony with the goals and 
shared convictions that are specified in the regime principles.""*®® Thus, the non-acquisition of 
nuclear weapons by additional states (nonnuclear weapon states) and non-exchange of nuclear 
technology without verification by both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and nonnuclear weapon 
states (NNWS) might be perceived as the principle norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime."*®®
Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young and Michael Zurn, "The Study o f International Regimes," European Journal o f In ternational Relations 1, 
no.3 (1995):273.
Please refer to  discussion in the  Theoretical Framework section. Chapter 2 
'*®°T.V. Paul, "Systemic Conditions and Security Cooperation: Explaining the Persistence of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime," 
Cambridge Review o f International Affairs 16, n o .l (2003): 137.
M cTate, 'Regime-Building,"403.
Andreas Hasenclever, Peter M ayer and Volker Rittberger, Theories o f Internationai Regimes (Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2002): 10-11.
Kari M ottola, "W hither the Non-Proliferation Regime?" Current Research on Peace and Violence 4, no.4 (1981): 236; Also see.
Hasenclever, et al, "Theories of International Regimes," 9 -10.
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Taking into account these directing principles and norms, a complex web of colossal regulations and 
decision-making techniques enshrined in a few multilateral and bilateral agreements serve as 
prescriptions for the conduct of member states. The NPT structures the core of the non-proliferation 
regime and characterizes the global nuclear order focused around a categorisation of states as 
nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. The nuclear deal underlying the non­
proliferation regime is institutionalized through the treaty. NWS are committed not to transfer 
nuclear weapons to NNWS, and not to trade nuclear materials w ithout international safeguards. The 
NNWS are obliged to repudiate their entitlement to manufacture nuclear weapons, yet are 
guaranteed fullest conceivable nuclear cooperation— including technology, supplies, materials, and 
knowledge—inside a domain of international safeguards."*®"* It is vital to note that there is critical 
accentuation on "horizontal" non-proliferation, i.e. prevention of new nuclear states, which India 
and other non-adjusted states had stood up to. The NPT additionally incorporates a jo in t obligation, 
yet feebly worded, for both classifications of states to progress in the direction of nuclear 
disarmament.
The NPT expresses intrusive requirement and verification measures as nuclear safeguards. The 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty fails to offer a characteristic monitoring agency, hence, appoints 
the IAEA, made in 1957, to guarantee the peaceful uses of energy in nonnuclear weapon states. The 
IAEA, through an arrangement of nuclear safeguards, guarantees that peaceful nuclear materials are 
not redirected towards military purposes. The IAEA likewise gives verification backing to a few other 
nuclear agreements, other than NPT, and hence assumes essential part in global nuclear influence. 
Trevor Findlay comments, the IAEA is "the principal organisation embodiment of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime"*®®." Furthermore, "the international system of safeguards governing nuclear 
energy cooperation is critical to the continued efficacy of the non-proliferation regime.""*®®
Smith, "Explaining the Non-proliferation Regime,"257-l 
Findlay, "Nuclear Energy and Global Governance,"143. 
M cTate, 'Regime-Building,"403.
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As per Article III of the NPT, every NNWS is obliged to acknowledge comprehensive (orfull-degree) 
safeguards at its nuclear facilities. In this admiration, NNWS consent to individual arrangements with 
the IAEA and proclaim their nuclear facilities and inventories of nuclear materials'*^^. In the late 
1990s, in view of lessons gained from the revelations of clandestine nuclear exercises in North Korea 
and Iran, the IAEA embraced reinforced safeguards and composed an Additional Protocol to be 
acknowledged by the states. To guarantee a more extensive evaluation of states' nuclear exercises, 
the Additional Protocol obliges "states to report nuclear-related equipment production, imports and 
exports, fuel-cycle-related research and development, and plans for newfacilities."^®^ In an 
endeavour to guarantee comprehensive scope of states' nuclear exercises, the reinforced safeguards 
have moved from a quantitative to a qualitative methodology including remote monitoring, 
environmental testing, and information from open sources—to evaluate states' intentions.
Normally, a specific treaty or agreement comes to be viewed as the sole normative wellspring of the 
particular regime. Be that as it may this is a thin and deceiving point of view and it is paramount to 
view the regime as a "functional whole, which may be composed of a rather heterogeneous set of 
(formal and informal) agreements, practices, and institutions."^^” An essential point is that, in spite 
of the fact that the NPT constitutes the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it is not 
synonymous with the regime.^^^ In this context, Lloyd Axworthy commented:
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on, and anchored in, 
international law and norms, as well as incorporated into 
international mechanisms. The NPT is fundamental, but the broader
Kenneth Boutin, "93+10: Strengthened Nuclear Safeguards a Decade On," Vertic Brief no. 2 (April 2004):2; Also see, "Integrated  
Safeguards In the Non-Nuclear W eapon States of the European Union," Technical Sheets, ESARDA Bulletin, no. 41  (June 2009):83.
Trevor Findlay, Nuclear Energy and Global Governance: Ensuring Safety, Security and Non-proliferation, (Routledge: New York, 2011), 
146.
Oliver M eier, Fulfilling the NPT: Strengthened Nuclear Safeguards, VERTIC Briefing Paper, 0 0 /2 , (April 2000): 9.
Hasenclever, e t al, "Theories o f International Regimes," 10:2f.
Karl M ottola, "W hither the Non-proliferation Regime?" Current Research on Peace and Violence 4 , no.4 (1981):235; Also see, 
Hasenclever, et al, "Theories of International Reglmes,"10
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regime is a complex system of multilateral and bilateral 
agreements, arrangements, and mechanism intended to promote 
and achieve a world without nuclear weapons, sooner rather than 
later. ... the regime is intended to provide a framework to enable 
the world to make effective use of nuclear capability for peaceful 
purposes^^^^
That is, other than the NPT, there are swarms of different agreements— multilateral and bilateral— 
those contain injunctions for members and along these lines constitute the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The cases incorporate however are not constrained to: the Statute of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency; the Additional Protocol (IAEA); the TIatelolco and Rarotonga nuclear 
weapons free zone treaties of Latin America and the South Pacific, separately; the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty. Late additions to the nuclear non-proliferation regime include: the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT); UNSCR 1540 resolution; the Proliferation Security Initiative; the Container Security 
Initiative, and the Global Initiative to counter terrorism. In this context, the Fissile Material Cut-Off 
treaty is even now being arranged in the Conference on Disarmament. Once it is detailed and 
marked it will put restrictions on the measure of nuclear fissile material gathered by nuclear weapon 
states and accepted nuclear weapon states.
Export control courses of action structure an alternate vital constituent of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime. As examined long ago, in the result of India's purported peaceful nuclear 
explosion, there was a spurt of innovative control group, for example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
(NSG) and the Zangger Committee. From that point forward, export controls have turned into a 
paramount constituent of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. These export control plans not just 
guarantee supplier limitations, including situation of meddling IAEA safeguards on the transfer of 
nuclear technology to non-weapon states, additionally "establish guidelines for nuclear commerce
Lloyd Axworthy, as quoted in Tariq Rauf, "Toward Nuclear Disarmament," Disarm ament Forum, (2000):41.
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that would keep commercial competition from undercutting safeguard obligations Nuclear non­
proliferation regime researchers respect the one-sided approaches of key suppliers (e.g., U.S.,
Britain, and Canada) that characterize the principles of nuclear trade as a critical component of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime."^^  ^Roger K. Smith contends that "Less prompt, yet no less basic, 
guidelines and décision-production systems might be found in each nation's laws—particularly the 
nuclear suppliers." In this context, since the mid-1970s, the U.S. has energetically fortified its 
domestic legislations to impede the proliferation of nuclear technologies. The most imperative 
being: (i) the Arms Export Control Act of 1976; and (ii) the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act of 
1978(NNPA).
Civilian Nuclear Cooperation—An Instrument of U.S. Non-proliferation Policy
Since the start of the nuclear period, peaceful nuclear cooperation, that is, "exchange of nuclear 
technology, materials, and knowledge" between states has been generally common.^^'^ Actually, 
Eisenhower's "Molecules of Peace" discourse lighted a general enthusiasm toward tackling nuclear 
energy for sustainable development and encouraged nuclear nations to participate in civilian nuclear 
cooperation with developing nations. Yet, cognisant of the dual capability of "atoms of peace" 
Eisenhower proposed a few measures to disallow militarisation of nuclear technology. 
Correspondingly, the NPT perceives the natural right o f nonnuclear weapon states to civilian nuclear 
energy and vows nuclear aid; however it doesn't concede unconditional access. Article III of the 
treaty recommends acknowledgement of full-degree IAEA safeguards as the condition for peaceful 
nuclear aid to nonnuclear weapon states. Comprehensive safeguards permit verification measures 
on all nuclear facilities to discount diversion of nuclear material from civilian to military purposes. 
Along these lines, as William Foster, calls attention to:
McTate, 'Regime-Building,"403.
M atthew  Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation: Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreements," In ternational Security 34,
n o .l (Summer 2009):7.
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Neither uranium enrichment nor the stockpiling of fissionable material in 
connection with a peaceful program would violate Article II so long as these 
activities were safeguarded under Article III. Also, clearly permitted would be the 
development under safeguards of plutonium fuelled power reactors, including 
research on the properties of metallic plutonium, nor would Article II interfere 
with the development or use of fast breeder reactors under safeguards^^^.
In the last a few decades, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has advanced through a few export 
control measures, treaties, and agreements. Yet, this has not hampered substantial scale nuclear 
energy programs nor has it stalled peaceful nuclear cooperation—there are more than 2,000 
bilateral nuclear agreements among the s t a t e s . A  few nonnuclear weapon states—Canada, 
Australia, and Japan—that acknowledged comprehensive safeguards as per Article III created 
advanced nuclear energy programs as well as rose as critical suppliers in the international nuclear 
order. Case in point, "Canada has 27 nuclear cooperation agreements in force, covering 44 states, 
parties to the Non-proliferation Treaty, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for 
the fullest possible exchange of nuclear, and other material, equipment, and technology.""^^^ Even 
the U.S., in spite of the thorough measures and safeguards contained in the Nuclear Non­
proliferation Act of 1978, has engaged in civilian nuclear cooperation with roughly 22 nations going 
from cutting edge industrialized nations to developing nations in the Middle East, South America, 
and Asia, including some that have yet not launched civil nuclear power projects, for example, 
Bangladesh, Columbia, Egypt, Morocco, Peru, Thailand, and T u r k e y . W i t h  expanding realization of
William Foster, form er Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, during Senate hearings on ratification of the NPT, 1968, 
as quoted in Fred McGoldrick, The U.S.-UAE Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: A Gold Standard or Fool's Gold? Proliferation  
Prevention Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C.: CSIS, November 3 0 ,2 01 0 ), 5.
Fuhrmann, "Spreading Temptation,"?.
Report submitted by Canada, implementation o f the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons, 2010 Review Conference of 
the Parties to the  Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2010/9, (March 1 8 ,2010),4. Available at http://daccess- 
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/G EN/N10/279/58/PDF/N1027958.pdf?OpenElem ent (accessed March 10, 2012.)
McGoldrick, "A Gold Standard or Fool's Gold?" 7.; Also see, Fred McGoldrick, N ew U.S.-ROK Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation Agreem ent: A 
Precedent fo r  a  New Global Nuclear Architecture, Centre for U.S.-Korea Policy, Asia Foundation (Novem ber 2009).1
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the profits of nuclear energy to battle environmental change coupled with a scarcity of energy 
assets, the demand for nuclear energy is climbing. Consequently, the arrangement of beneficiaries of 
nuclear technology is expanding at a fast pace, even among littler states, for example, Jordan, 
Vietnam, Qatar, and Algeria. As indicated by Matthew Fuhrman, "The global nuclear marketplace is 
more active today than it has been in at least 20 years. Countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, 
the Middle East, and Africa have expressed a desire to begin or revive civilian nuclear programs."'^^”
Researchers avow that nuclear trade has been a critical component of U.S. nuclear non-proliferation 
po l i cyWash i ng t on  has regularly utilized the motivating force of nuclear cooperation to inspire 
non-proliferation duties from beneficiary nations. Case in point, in 2009, the U.S. consented to a 
nuclear cooperation arrangement with the United Arab Emirates as an exchange for a long term 
duty to get nuclear fuel and inspired the recent's renunciation of improvement of enrichment and 
reprocessing capabilities. Jennifer Weeks contends, "This linkage [between nuclear trade and non­
proliferation objectives] was reasonably effective through the mid-1970s, while the United States 
dominated the international nuclear market." Due to the motivating force of nuclear trade with the 
U.S., a few nations marked the NPT with full or halfway safeguards on their nuclear projects.
The U.S. agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with different states require strict 
non-proliferation controls that go beyond those of different suppliers, for example, consent rights on 
reprocessing, enrichment, and storage.^^^ In the mid-1990s the United States additionally utilized 
this methodology to manage North Korea's noncompliance with the treaty's provisions. North Korea 
consented to the NPT in 1985 yet arrived at safeguards agreement with the IAEA only in 1992. With 
the start of IAEA inspections in June 1992, it was discovered that Pyongyang's declarations of nuclear 
facilities and weapons-usable plutonium were deficient and dishonest. This made created a crisis
Fuhrmann, "SpreadingTemptation," 40.
McGoldrick, "A Gold Standard or Fool's Gold?"; Jennifer Weeks, Iran and North Korea: Two Tests fo r  U.S. Nuclear Non-proliferation  
Policy, Report for American Nuclear Society (La Grange Park, II, 30 August -2  September, 1999). Available at 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/2015/iran_and_north_korea.htm l (accessed March 12, 2012).
Weeks, "Iran and North Korea."
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between the U.S. and North Korea and stoked reasons for alarm of war.'^^^ In the midst of the crisis, 
the Clinton administration captivated North Korea in an Agreed Framework. Washington offered two 
light water reactors (LWRs) through a multilateral consortium to help as an exchange for the recent's 
dedication to end operations and in the long run destroy its reactor and reprocessing Yongbon plant, 
solidify construction of two nuclear reactors, and hold fast to the IAEA safeguards.^^^ This nuclear 
agreement "managed to contain Pyongyang's plutonium program for nearly a decade."'^®'  ^Fred 
Mcgoldrick highlights the essentialness of civilian nuclear cooperation in U.S. nuclear non­
proliferation policy. He comments:
The U.S. agreements for cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy with 
other states require strict non-proliferation controls that go beyond those 
of other suppliers, such as consent rights on reprocessing, enrichment, 
and storage of weapons-usable materials subject to our agreements. They 
also provide a framework for establishing invaluable person-to-person 
and institution-to-institution contacts and collaboration that can help 
advance our non-proliferation objectives.'^^^
Accommodating India within the Nuclear Regime
Taking into account the analysis in the above sections, it is clear: (i) injunctions are the quintessence 
of regimes; (ii) the nuclear non-proliferation regime is not limited to the NPT, rather it is embodied a 
network of institutions and agreements; and (iii) the U.S. has used the civil nuclear cooperation 
agreements to advertise non-proliferation targets. In this context, the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement
Steven E. M iller, Wael Al-Assad, J ayant ha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan and Ta Minh Tuan, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform and the  
Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime, (Massachusetts: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, April 2012),10-11.
Henry Sokolski, "Implementing the DPRK Nuclear Deal: W hat U.S. Law Requires," The Non-proliferation Review  (Fall-W inter 2000):146. 
M iller et al, "Nuclear Collisions,"!!. M iller states, "The agreement, however, broke down in 2002, a fter the revelation that North Korea 
had been pursuing a secret and illicit uranium enrichment program. In the crisis, that erupted anew, in late 2002, Pyongyang threw  out the  
IAEA, w ithdrew  from  the NPT in January 2003, reopened its nuclear facilities, resumed its active pursuit o f nuclear weapons, and in 
October 2006 conducted a nuclear weapons test." (p.11)
McGoldrick, "A Gold Standard for Fool's Gold?" 9.
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"subjects India to political and normative weights" to acknowledge a few non-proliferation
486obligations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Right from the earliest starting point India had a bizarre relationship with the NPT, which kept India's 
outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In spite of many years of technological embargoes, 
India created nuclear weapons riling the challenge for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. For 
three decades, India had declined to agree to the NPT and along these lines, stayed outside the 
whole circle of the nuclear regime. Since the signing of the NPT in 1970, many years of legal and 
regulatory relationships had developed around the non-proliferation framework. And India was 
outside all of them. Surveying the implications for India, a de facto nuclear weapons state, outside 
the non-proliferation regime. This is exemplified in India's civilian and military nuclear system, along 
with indigenous state-of-the-craft space and missile programs, built regardless of long standing 
technological embargoes. Along these lines, existing outside the nuclear regime, India could 
construct up and coming generation of nuclear weapons, consequently, creating a South Asian 
nuclear weapons contest. Accordingly, India's mentality as a "resentful outsider" was not valuable to 
the non-proliferation framework, and bringing India into the nuclear non-proliferation regime was 
considered to be significant.
In 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in an unclassified report to the U.S. Congress, 
highlighted the dangers of leaving the de-facto nuclear weapon states outside the non-proliferation 
regime. It stressed reinforcing of national export control laws in de facto nuclear weapon states to 
lessen a considerable proliferation hazard. The report expressed that, with the progression in their 
domestic capacities, "traditional beneficiaries of WMD and missile technology could rise as new 
suppliers of technology and skills. A large number of these nations, for example, India, Iran, and 
Pakistan—are not parts of supplier groups, for example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia 
Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime and [therefore] don't stick to their export
Findlay, "Nuclear Energy and Global Governance," 151.
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constraints." Also, privately owned businesses, researchers, and designers in these nations could 
take playing point "of frail or unenforceable national export controls and the growing accessibility of 
technology." Thus, the CIA report underlined the need to captivate de-facto nuclear weapon states, 
as abandoning them in isolation would only debilitate the non-proliferation framework.^^^ This 
added criticalness to the decades old difficulty confronted by the U.S. to incorporate India inside the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. It was a foregone conclusion that India would neither rollback its 
nuclear weapons program, nor sign the NPT. Thus, the decision was constrained: either leave India 
outside the nuclear regime—that is w ithout any restrictions on its civilian or nuclear weapons 
program—or suit the way that India has created the nuclear weapons, in order to manage India's 
nuclear conduct and avoid further headway of its nuclear weapons program. The Bush 
administration picked the last option.
In perspective of India's refusal to agree to the NPT, the Bush administration in a key move enlisted 
India in a particular nuclear cooperation arrangement to cultivate its adherence to similarly critical 
non-NPT regulations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime—in this way, counteract further harm 
to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The accompanying itemized discussion of the terms of the 
U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement uncovers how the U.S. has enrolled India as per the huge injunctions 
and institutions of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Freeze on nuclear testing
In return for accepting nuclear technology, India has resolved to keep up a ban on nuclear testing. 
The Henry Hyde Act obviously details that the nuclear cooperation bargain with India will be ended 
in the occasion of a nuclear test conducted by India."^^  ^Not just the U.S., even the parts of the
Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition o f  Technology Relating to Weapons o f  Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
M unitions, 1 July through 31 December 2000 (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, 2000), 1.
^  A. Gopalakrishnan, "Assured Fuel Supply is a Mirage," Deccan Chronicle, August 5 ,2 0 0 7 ; P. K. Iyengar, "123 Agreem ent is a Gilded 
Cage," The Aslan Age, August 16, 2007
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Nuclear Suppliers Group could withdraw their waiver prompting a "cut o ff nuclear supplies."^^” The 
likelihood that any further nuclear testing could prompt termination of the nuclear arrangement 
with the U.S. will go about as a strong deterrent for India."*”” A. Gopalakrishnan says, "No future 
Indian government will dare to test a nuclear weapon in the face of this potential loss of investment, 
whatever the deteriorated and outdated status of our nuclear deterrent." Although, India was 
hesitant to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), this adherence to the ban on 
nuclear testing will reinforce the nuclear non-proliferation regime and will cap India's nuclear 
capabilities. W ithout this ban, any further nuclear testing by India would encroach on the 
accomplishment of CTBT as well as plunge South Asia in a nuclear weapons contest and further 
destabilize the region. Indian tests would "give political cover to Pakistan and China" to conduct 
nuclear tests."*”^
The dedication to shun nuclear testing will keep India from creating state of the craft nuclear 
weapons. Dinshaw Mistry views it as a "significant concession [made by India] because most of 
India's nuclear weapons are believed to be first-generation fission weapons, and India's 1998 
thermonuclear test was at best a partial success." Several researchers accept that India needs 
further testing to create thermonuclear weapons, or else its nuclear abilities will be antiquated. 
Bharat Karnad opines, "This arrangement adds up to death by stagnation for the Indian nuclear 
weapons program." He accentuated that for India to be dealt with as "a nation of consequence," it is 
imperative to have a thermonuclear obstruction "the prime cash of force in the new thousand 
years." Thus, India's renunciation of nuclear testing is dangerous. Dissimilar to the U.S., New
Paul K. Kerr, U.S. Nuclear Cooperation with India: Issue fo r  Congress, CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700, RL-33016, (Washington D.C.; 
Congressional Research Service, December 15, 2011), 14.
A. Vinod Kumar, "A Doctrine at Work; Obama's Evolving Nuclear Policy and W hat it Bodes for India," Strategic Analysis 35, no.2 (March  
2011):217.
Gopalakrishnan, "Assured Fuel Supply." He gauges that, "If later on, India imports an aggregate of 30,000 M w e of nuclear reactors, our 
[Indian] capital financing in this alone will be at least about Rs 300,000 crores. W e must add to it new extra capital investments of about Rs 
1,200,000 crores in power devouring commercial enterprises and business elements that would come up, depending exclusively on this 
nuclear power. This aggregate financing of Rs. 1,500,000 crores of our own will lie unmoving if the fuel supplies to  these reactors are  
upset.
Michael A. Levi and Charles D. Ferguson, US-lndIa Nuclear Cooperation: A Strategy fo r  Moving Forward, CSR16, (Washington D.C.: 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 2006), 3-4.
Mistry, "Diplomacy, Domestic Politics," 683.
Bharat Karnad, "Nuclear Test is a Must," The Aslan Age, 22  February 2008.
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Delhi has not the information or the technology to conduct the recreated nuclear tests needed to 
create a thermonuclear hindrance. The U.S. has tested this information from something like 1,054 
nuclear tests along with "a computing ability of 100 teraflops and a gigantic ICF facility to obtain 
miniature thermonuclear explosions.""*”” Arun Shourie, after intensive examination of the terms of 
the U.S. - India agreement and related U.S. legislation, concluded that, Washington wanted that 
"India [be] drained of its strategic nuclear programme, and thus [become] a dependent India.""*”” He 
cautioned that the U.S "rollback and eventually eliminate the nuclear weapons capability of 
India.""*”'
Controlled nuclear fuel supply
The nuclear agreement needs lifetime surety of nuclear fuel supplies for the U.S. gave nuclear 
reactors. A. Gopalkrishnan, previous Chairman of the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board of the 
Government of India, underscores that "iron-clad confirmations" for nuclear fuel supplies are basic 
to guarantee that all foreign reactors would "run for their lifetime at high limit." Earlier on account 
of Tarapur nuclear reactor, India needed to endure in view of the suspension of nuclear fuel by 
Washington. Moreover, the Henry Hyde Act limits India from stockpiling more than 2-3 years of 
nuclear fuel supplies; it additionally stipulates that the U.S. President will give yearly certification 
that the nuclear fuel supply supplied to India is not in overabundance of India's civilian prerequisites 
and does not contribute to its military system."*”” This gives enough degree to political manoeuvrings 
and arm curving by Washington, if India does its manages on non-proliferation issues, for example, 
the Fissile Material Cut-Off treaty, negotiations. Proliferation Security Initiative or even Iran's nuclear 
issue. In this way, there is critical apprehension in India, that a "nuclear weapon test is not the only 
event which can lead to a temporary or long-term disruption of supplies through termination or
Ibid.
Arun Shourie, “ Parity', Did You Say?" The Indian Express, August 24, 2006. 
ArunShourie, "This is About Energy, Did You Say?" The Indian Express, August 23, 2006  
^®*Gopaiakrishnan, "Assured Fuel Supply."
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suspension of the deal." That is, if India does not conduct an alternate nuclear test bringing about 
the termination of the arrangement, the unlucky deficiency of iron-clad certifications of lifetime fuel 
supplies for the nuclear reactors could bring about makeshift or long-term suspensions of nuclear 
fuel. This could decipher into noteworthy economic misfortune for India”””, as India has consented 
to arrangements with a few nations in addition to the U.S., making an immense economic financing. 
Likewise, P.k. Iyengar, bemoans, "The much-hyped promise of nuclear technology doesn't translate 
to much in real terms." Instead, "Through the 123 Agreement the U.S. has presented us with a gilded 
cage. By signing the Agreement we would voluntarily walk into the cage."””^
Consolidation of India's nuclear export controls
As a nuclear outlier and part of the nonaligned development, India saw the multilateral export 
control regimes as a type of technological apartheid. For the last a few decades India has declined to 
stick to the regulations of these multinational cartels. Through a few laws passed since 1962, India 
organized a "unilateral set of controls" to control its nuclear export.””'  Anyway, in the contemporary 
nuclear period, there were developing concerns that these were not expansive and stringent enough 
to avert spillage of sensitive nuclear materials and technologies. In this context, Randail Woods calls 
attention to, "While India's export-control system is fairly well developed by international standards, 
a case in 2003 in which a private engineering company exported some dual-use items and precursors 
to Iraq via Shell companies in Jordan and Dubai showed that the legal framework and enforcement 
system contain some serious gaps. While recent initiatives [HTCG and NSSP] have promoted 
streamlining the export process to stimulate trade, India will have to find a balance that prevents 
proliferation of dangerous equipment."””” This reflects desperation to synchronize India's nuclear
Ibid.
Ibid.
P. K. Iyengar, "123 Agreement is a Gilded Cage," The Asian Age, August 16, 2007.
Richard Bruneau, "Engaging a Nuclear India: Punishment, Reward and the Politics of Non-proliferation," Journal o f Public and  
International Affairs 17, (Spring 2006), 33.
Randall S. W ood, Non-proliferation Strategies fo r  India and Pakistan In the Afterm ath o f the M ay 1998  Tests,(Decemher 2004),18. 
Available at http://therandym on.com /papers/non-proliferation.pdf (accessed March 18, 2012)
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export regulations with current international standards to forestall unintentional proliferation of 
India's nuclear materials and expertise.
In the post-9-11 period, expanding threats from nuclear terrorism and illegal trafficking pose grave 
dangers to international security. This has increased concerns about the vulnerability of nuclear 
materials and technologies and has expanded the stress on fortifying global export controls. Levi and 
Ferguson remark, "India affects this challenge directly as a potential exporter of nuclear 
technologies, a [potential] source of nuclear weapons or materials, and a partner in interdicting 
dangerous nuclear traffic."””"* The changed global nuclear situation requires that all states having 
sensitive nuclear materials, particularly de-facto nuclear weapon states like India and Pakistan, be 
"brought into consistence" with international export controls.””” Accordingly, a few non-proliferation 
researchers suggest that "India and Pakistan ... immediately and unconditionally bring their export 
control laws and practices up to the most stringent international standards by establishing databases 
and border controls to prevent scientists and engineers from proliferating nuclear know-how."”””
The U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement, comprehensive of measures to synchronize India's export 
controls, is a huge accomplishment for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The 2005 nuclear 
agreement denote a progression from the effective fortifying of India export controls in the FITCG 
and NSSP agreements. The arrangement mandates India to adjust its export regulations to those of 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Seeking after it 
further, the Henry Hyde Act requires a yearly presidential determination that India has embraced 
measures to secure sensitive materials and technology. Additionally, under U.S. assertion, India has
Levi and Ferguson, "US-lndia Nuclear Cooperation,"12-13.
George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Circincione, Rose Gottem oeller and Jon B. Wolfsthal, Universal Compliance: A Strategy  
fo r  Nuclear Security, (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007), 117.
Ibid.
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consented to harmonize its export control records with the Wassenaar Arrangement and the 
Australia Group.””'
In last few years, the U.S., in with other prominent states, has increased the extent of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime through a few activities went for reinforcing nuclear export regulations and 
guaranteeing their stringent requirement. These include: United Nations Security Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1540, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the Container Security Initiative, and the 
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).””” Washington has looked for India's 
participation in all these activities. India has actualized UNSCR 1540 and as needs be rolled out 
statutory and administrative improvements in its export regulations.””” in June 2005, utilizing UNSCR 
1540 rules, India embraced a comprehensive WMD legislation. The Weapons of Mass destruction 
and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities), to fortify its export controls and their 
authorization. The Henry Hyde Act stipulates that India must join the PSI, however as per Minister of 
State for Defense M. M. Pallam Raju, "The PSI is a very good initiative, but we do have other 
domestic political compulsions. There is some resistance. We are working on tha t."” ”^ Meanwhile, 
India has made a critical port CSI-compliant and a few others are at the present time accomplishing 
agreeability. Established in 2006, the goal of the GICNT is to "prevent the acquisition, transport, or 
use by terrorists of nuclear materials and radioactive substances or improvised explosive devices 
using such materials, as well as hostile actions against nuclear facilities."”^^  India has joined the 
GICNT and is eagerly taking an interest in its "working groups on nuclear detection, nuclear
Rice, "The Indian Separation Plan."
Rajiv Nayan, "Integrating India with the Global Export Controls System: Challenges Ahead," Strategic Analysis 35, no.3 (M ay 2011):447  
Ibid.
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forensics, and response and m itigation/'”^' Thus; the July 2005 nuclear agreement and related U.S. 
legislation are bit by bit incorporating India into the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Implementation of IAEA nuclear safeguards
By staying outside the NPT, for 30 years, India dodged adoption of comprehensive IAEA nuclear 
safeguards—which India viewed as oppressive. India acknowledged only facilities specific safeguards 
on six of its nuclear reactors got through international cooperation.” ”^ In the late 1990s, India 
declined to sign the IAEA Additional Protocol, seeing it as an extension of the prejudicial NPT 
framework. In this manner, aside from the safeguards on the six nuclear reactors, India's nuclear 
system was protected from IAEA controllers and from the international group.
The July 2005 agreement conquered this deficiency, charging India to acknowledge IAEA safeguards 
on its civilian nuclear facilities and sign the Additional Protocol. The Henry Hyde Act, Section 104 (b) 
(3), preceding implementation of the agreement, required a presidential determination with respect 
to the generous advancement of India and the IAEA on the Additional Protocol as per the standards 
and approaches of IAEA particular to India's civil nuclear project.” "^* Consequently, as per its July 
2005 dedication and in addition the Henry Hyde Act, India differentiated its nuclear facilities into 
civilian and key units. In August 2008, India consented to an arrangement with the IAEA and, with 
support of the IAEA's Board of Governors; India acknowledged safeguards on its civilian facilities. The 
India-IAEA Agreement is an "umbrella agreement" that would serve as a model for India's future 
nuclear agreements with different nations.” ”^ In May 2009, India additionally marked the Additional 
Protocol with the IAEA. In satisfaction of its dedication, India announced the arrangement of its 
civilian nuclear facilities. The dominant part of India's nuclear reactors, 14 out of 22, including both 
existing and future nuclear force reactors, will be put under safeguards by 2014. Condoleezza Rice
Prime Minister's Office, Nuclear Security Summit National Progress Report: India, Press Information Bureau, Governm ent o f India, New  
Delhi, March 27, 2012. Available at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=81755 (accessed March 16 ,2 01 2 ).
Mistry, "Diplomacy, Domestic Politics,"685. These included, tw o Russian supplied reactors at Tarapur, tw o  Canadian supplied reactors, 
and tw o Russian built LWRs under construction.
Kerr, "Issues for Congress,"15.
Nayan, "Non-Proliferation Paradigm and India," 560.
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commented; "Under this initiative, 65% of India's thermal reactors will be brought under safeguards, 
a figure that the Indian government has said could rise as high as 90% as India procures more civil 
reactors in the next 15 years."” ”^ India consented to place all future nuclear reactors, whether 
breeder or thermal, under IAEA safeguards. These safeguards are lasting, that is, once a facility has 
been put under safeguards, it can't be withdrawn. At first, the issue of changeless safeguards was 
connected to an unhindered lifetime supply of nuclear fuel from the U.S. In spite of the fact that, 
India did not get ensured lifetime nuclear supplies, yet, it conceded to safeguards in interminability. 
India additionally recognized eight nuclear reactors as vital and along these lines, outside the nuclear 
safeguards. Dinshaw Mistry remarks, "India's nuclear separation plan struck a balance between 
Washington's position, which was influenced by U.S. domestic lobbies, that India place most of its 
nuclear facilities under safeguards, and India's position, influenced by its nuclear scientists, of 
keeping key facilities away from international inspections."”^'
Critics contend that India's acknowledgement of safeguards is simply typical, as India has not 
acknowledged full-extension safeguards like the NNWS. Moreover, India could pick which facilities to 
announce as civilian and place under IAEA safeguards. Likewise, it is contended that "India's 
Additional Protocol does not contain most of the Model Protocol's provisions, requiring only that 
India provide the IAEA with information about its nuclear exports."” ”^
As opposed to concentrating on what is truant in the U.S.-lndia nuclear arrangement, it is paramount 
to perceive the non-proliferation commitments obtained from India. To begin with, for three 
decades there was considerable equivocalness in regards to India's nuclear project, including civilian. 
Surprisingly India has acknowledged international inspections of its civilian nuclear facilities; this in 
itself is a critical accomplishment for the nuclear regime. Second, India has acknowledged safeguards 
in permanence, that is, regardless of the possibility that the nuclear agreement with the U.S. breaks
Rice, 'The Indian Separation Plan."
Mistry, "Dipiomacy, Domestic Politics,"685. 
Kerr, "Issues for Congress," 15.
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apart, India can't withdraw its facilities from IAEA safeguards.” ”^ Third, there are concerns that India 
has kept eight reactors, primarily its breeder reactors, outside of safeguards. These breeder reactors 
could be a hotspot for plutonium production.”' ” Contrasted with the prior situation where there was 
no distinction between India's civilian and military facilities, and India could have utilized all the 
nuclear reactors for key purposes, post-bargain at India has only eight key reactors. Condoleezza 
Rice suggested "imagine the alternative: imagine the alternative: W ithout this initiative, 81% of 
India's current power reactors—and its future power and breeder reactors—would continue to 
remain outside of IAEA safeguards. The Indian nuclear power program would remain opaque, a 
nuclear black box."”'^
In 2010, under U.S. Pressure, India close down the controversial CIRUS reactor. In this context, 
Brahma Chellaney comments this "will deprive the nuclear military program of almost one-third of 
its current supply of weapons-grade plutonium."”"  Moreover, India has consented to take an 
interest in the formulation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and to sign it. At the point when India 
signs the treaty, the production of weapons-usable materials will end, and India won't have the 
capacity to utilize the plutonium from the nuclear reactors distinguished for key purposes. 
Subsequently, in conjunction with India's preparation to acknowledge a fissile material cut off, the 
IAEA safeguards can restrain the development of India's nuclear project. The then IAEA chief general 
Elbaradei respected India's intention to distinguish and place all its civilian nuclear facilities under 
IAEA safeguards and sign and stick to an Additional Protocol concerning civilian nuclear offices. He 
considered it as "a step forward toward universalization of the international safeguards regime."”' ”
^^®Rice, "The Indian Separation Plan."
Dinshaw Mistry, "Diplomacy, Domestic Politics," 687  
Rice, "The Indian Separation Plan."
Brahma Chellaney, "India's U.S.-Influenced Decision to  Shut Down Cirus Research Reactor," June 22, 2006. Available at 
http://chellaney.net/2008/06/22/indias-u-s-influenced-decislon-to-shut-down-cirus-research-reactor/ (accessed April 1 2 ,2 01 2 ).
Remarks of M oham m ed El-Baradel, IAEA Director General Welcomes U.S. and India Nuclear Deal, March 2, 2006. IAEA Press R elease, 
Press Office, Division o f Public Information, International Atomic Energy Agency. Available at 
www.iaea.Org/newscenter/pressreleases/2006/prn200605.htm l (accessed March 18, 2012)
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Disavowal of enrichment and reprocessing technologies
Enrichment and reprocessing technologies (ENR) utilized for creating fuel for nuclear reactors can 
additionally be utilized to deliver weapons-usable materials— highly advanced uranium and 
plutonium—for immediate use in nuclear weapons. It is "troublesome and testing" for the IAEA to 
discover facilities that enhance uranium and plutonium. Moreover, the production of nuclear 
fissionable materials not just adds to the danger of state-level proliferation, it additionally expands 
the dangers of nuclear theft and unlawful trafficking.”'"* It is increasingly realised that "restraining 
the spread of reprocessing and enrichment capabilities must be a fundamental component of any 
nuclear non-proliferation policy."”' ”
The noncompliance issues of North Korea and Iran have brought attention to the proviso in the 
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. That is, non-nuclear weapon state signatories of the NPT can 
legitimately get enhancement and reprocessing technologies and hence lawfully withdraw from the 
treaty as per Article X. Jon Wolfsthal clarifies that this shortcoming of the NPT, "allows 
governments, in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, to produce and possess 
enriched uranium or separated plutonium, with few assurances that they will not at some point use 
the material for less-than-peaceful purposes."”' ” In 2004, highlighting the need to develop 
methodology for the spread of nuclear influence without the risk of proliferation. President Bush 
expressed: "I propose a way to close the loophole ... Enrichment and reprocessing are not necessary 
for nations seeking to harness nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 40 nations of the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group should refuse to sell enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to 
any state that does not already possess full-scale functioning enrichment and reprocessing
McGoldrick, "A Gold Standard or Fool's G old ,"l.
Ibid.
Jon Wolfsthal, "The Next Nuclear Wave," Foreign Affairs (January-February 2005). Available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com /articles/60452/jon-b-wolfsthal/the-next-nuclear-wave?page=show
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plants."”"  Although, at first, this proposal was rejected by the NSG, the notion to control the spread 
of ENR technologies picked up more extensive acknowledgement.”' ”
The U.S.-lndia nuclear settlement is truly noteworthy, if seen in this context. Initially, aware of 
India's ENR abilities and possession of related technologies, Washington evoked a discriminating 
non-proliferation responsibility from India. In the nuclear agreement. New Delhi has consented to 
not exchange sensitive technologies, especially enrichment and reprocessing technologies, to 
nations that don't have them; in addition, India has resolved to back international endeavours to 
check the spread of such technologies. Levi and Ferguson comment, this "reinforces an important 
but largely moribund Bush administration initiative aimed at closing a loophole in the NPT that 
allows states to acquire bomb-making technologies under civilian guise."”' ” Second, Washington 
permits India to reprocess the by-results of U.S.-given nuclear reactors that constitute "safeguarded 
nuclear materials" only in another facility particularly assembled for reprocessing and put under 
IAEA safeguards. The emphasis on new facility is to guarantee full agreeability with the IAEA 
safeguards as plans of older facilities might o ff and o n , not permit full application of cutting edge 
nuclear safeguards.
Third, and most importantly the U.S. has not offered to  sell enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies to India. In perspective of India's constrained domestic uranium supplies and far 
reaching thorium supplies, Homi Bhaba, the father of the Indian nuclear system, had envisioned a 
three-stage, closed fuel-cycle, civilian nuclear strategy for India. In the first stage, the point was to 
assemble a couple of uranium reactors; then, in the second stage, fast breeder reactors would be 
assembled that would utilize plutonium from the used fuel of the uranium reactors; at last, in the 
third stage, thorium based reactors would be manufactured to use the spent fuel from the fast 
breeder reactors. Hence, in every stage, reprocessing of the spent fuel is crucial for the Indian
President Bush, Remarks at the National Defence University, February 11, 2004
M iller et al, "Nuclear Collisions,"22-24; Also see, McGoldrick, "A Gold Standard or Fool's Gold," 2.
Levi and Ferguson, "US-lndia Nuclear Cooperation,"15; Also see, Rajiv Nayan, "Global Export Controls System," 449. In this context, 
India passed a notification to im plem ent the UNSCR 1737, of December 2006, which imposes sanctions on Iran and restricts sale of 
enrichment and reprocessing technologies to  India
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program. With the expansion of the Indian program, India would require a huge scale reprocessing 
technology. It is assessed that "India will need to put up eight to ten times the present reprocessing 
capacity in the coming years to handle the spent fuel from the increasing number of reactors."”””
The July 2005 agreement ambiguously sureties "full-scope nuclear cooperation" with New Delhi. This 
made expectations in India that the agreement incorporates enrichment and reprocessing 
technologies. Yet, this is not the situation. Michael Krepon in his article, "An alternate Contentious 
Issue" gives proof that ENR technologies are not piece of the arrangement. Robert Joseph, 
undersecretary of state, in response to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in November 2005, 
expressed: "We do not intend to provide enrichment and reprocessing technology to I n d i a . T h e  
Henry Hyde Act, Article 103 (5), outlines the U.S. policy on ENR technologies: "given the special 
sensitivity of equipment and technologies related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of 
spent nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, [we need to] work with the members of the 
NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the transfers of such equipment and 
technologies, including to India."””'  Similarly, at the April 5, 2006, Congressional hearings, 
Condoleezza Rice attested that "the proposed [123] agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation will 
not provide for exports of SNT [sensitive nuclear technologies]; the agreement would have to be 
amended (and the amendment submitted to Congress for review) to allow for such exports."”””
Along these lines, Washington has drawn a pledge from India, to not offer ENR technologies to 
nations that don't as of now have them; in the meantime, it has declined to offer ENR technologies 
to India. This is a critical venture to reinforcing the nuclear non-proliferation regime and would 
restrain the expansion of India's civilian and its nuclear weapons program. R. Ramachandran, 
deploring the effect of the arrangement remarks:
R. Ramachandran, "On Slippery Ground," Frontline 28, no.16, July 30-August 1 2 ,2011 . Available at 
http://w w w .frontlineonnet.eom /fl2816/stories /20110812281611900.htm  ( accessed March 18, 2012).
As quoted in Michael Krepon, "Another Contentious Nuclear Issue," The Hindu, July 12 ,2011 .
As cited, Ramachandran, "On Slippery Ground."
US-india Peaceful Atom ic Energy Cooperation and US Additional Protocol im plem entation Act, Report of the Com mittee on Foreign 
Relations, Senate, 1 0 9 -2 0 8 ,109th Congress, Second Session, July 20, 2006. Available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT- 
109srpt288/htm l/CRPT-109srpt288.htm  (accessed March 18,2012 ).
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Having made a huge mistake of entering into the India-U.S. nuclear 
deal, it would be prudent now to focus on scaling up indigenous 
reprocessing capacity as a priority. The new facility opened early 
this year at Tarapur is also of only 100 tonne capacity. What we 
need are plants with capacities of several hundred tonnes. Given 
that the gestation period of these new plants is six to seven years, 
there is adequate time for expanding reprocessing capacity. The flip 
side, of course, is that these new plants will have to be brought 
under IAEA safeguards.””"*
Assurance to fissile material cut-off
Prohibition on the production of fissile materials is amazingly basic in the current global situation. 
Stressing the significance of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), William Walker rightly 
comments, "Regulating fissile materials is the only plausible way to tackle simultaneously the 
troublesome [multifaceted] challenges of our era."””” It will (i) prevent the rise of additional nuclear 
weapon states; (ii)keep check on the likelihood of development of crude bombs by non-state actors; 
(iii) reduce the nuclear weapons contest at the global and also the regional level, particularly in 
South Asia—between India-Pakistan or India-China; and (iv) guarantee a proliferation hazard free 
environment for expansion of peaceful nuclear power.””” Many Non-proliferation researchers concur 
that eliminating of the fissile material production in India and Pakistan is "the absolute best route for 
Pakistan and India to point of confinement the nuclear weapons contest and to contain the pool of 
material that could conceivably be redirected to terrorists".””'
In the July 2005 agreement, India consented to definitely partake in the negotiations of a fissile 
material cut-off treaty. Contemplating, India's history of dismissing the non-proliferation treaties.
Ramachandran, "On Slippery Ground."
William Walker, "Cut off the Source," Bulletin o f Atomic Scientists, (M arch/April 2006):68. 
Ibid.
Perkovich, e t al, "Universal Compliance," 162.
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this is a huge duty to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Whether the FMCT forbids the future 
production of fissile material or influences the current stockpile, it would "successfully cap the 
development of India's nuclear arsenal." India would likewise be not able to utilize plutonium from 
any of its eight key nuclear reactors for weaponisation.”””
The above discussion proposes that the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement controls India's nuclear 
conduct as per the essential regulations and methodology of the nuclear non-proliferation regime— 
to cap India's nuclear weapons program and to anticipate horizontal proliferation of nuclear 
materials from India. Extensively talking, the measures included in the nuclear agreement: (i) ban on 
nuclear testing: restricts improvement of cutting edge nuclear weapons; (ii) reinforcing of export 
controls: to avoid voluntary and involuntary transfer of nuclear materials and technology; (iii) IAEA 
nuclear safeguards place India's civilian nuclear program under international scanner; (iv) 
constrained nuclear fuel supply: to confine accumulation of nuclear fuel; (v) disavowal of enrichment 
and reprocessing technologies: counteracts diversion of peaceful nuclear fuel for weaponisation 
purposes; and (v) fissile material cut-off: would lim it accumulation of weapons-usable fissile 
material, that is, breaking point the amount of India's nuclear weapons. Besides, before finalization 
of the agreement, Washington obliged India to look for approbation of the two unmistakable 
institutions of the nuclear non-proliferation regime—the IAEA, including its Board of Governors, and 
the 40 part Nuclear Suppliers Group. In this way, as opposed to a revolutionary change of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, it denotes a modification within the regime, to oblige India which 
for three decades opposed joining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In spite of the fact that, the 
nuclear agreement does exclude stringent measures, for example, India's signatures on the CTBT or 
acknowledgement of full-scope safeguards; yet, the hugeness of this landmark agreement can't be 
denied. It is guileless to feel that a nation that effectively restricted the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime for three decades could be incorporated in a solitary endeavour. Rather, given India's 
interesting position in the nuclear order and its history of alienation, India's integration in the
Mistry, "Diplomacy, Domestic Politics,"683-4.
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nuclear non-proliferation regime will be incremental. This nuclear arrangement is the initial phase in 
pleasing subtle India inside the regime, and is a landmark in the advancement to attaining the target 
of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The measures if seen independently may not appear 
stringent, however if viewed in conjunction with one another they can possibly curb India's nuclear 
capabilities.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
For more than 35 years, before the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement, India constantly abstained from 
joining the nuclear non-proliferation regime and subsisted as an inconsistency. Amid this period, the 
U.S. neglected to strategically manage the considerable challenge to the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime posed by India. Initially, India consistently declined to sign the NPT, calling it biased. Second, 
in 1974, India directed a peaceful nuclear explosion and contrary to the de jure categories of the 
nuclear weapon states (NWS) and nonnuclear weapon States (NNWS), set itself in a questionable 
position—the PNE showed its technological capacity to build nuclear weapons, yet, India did not 
obviously proclaim its nuclear intentions. Third, India declined to participate in the NPT review 
conference (1995) and apposed indefinite extension of the treaty. Fourth, India considered the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be biased and declined to sign it. Fifth, in 
disobedience of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, in 1998, India directed nuclear weapons 
explosion and pronounced itself a nuclear weapon state. Post-1998, there was a waiting challenge: 
how to engage nuclear India inside the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
In 2005, the Bush administration's choice to lift a three decade ban on civilian nuclear trade with 
India included altering U.S. domestic legislation and international export controls. It was generally 
respected that the Bush administration acted in contradiction of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, as India was a de facto nuclear weapon state and a non-signatory of the Nuclear Non­
proliferation Treaty (NPT). The motivation behind this study was to explore how the change in the 
U.S. nuclear non-proliferation approach happened and whether the U.S.-lndia nuclear understanding
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undermines the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The methodology for this study included: 
document exploration and semi-structured interviews. Documents for this research primary and 
secondary were collected during field research in the U.S and Qatar. For more noteworthy 
comprehension and clarity, semi-structured interviews were conducted with former high level policy 
American and South Asian researchers and Policy makers possessing expertise in nuclear non­
proliferation, nuclear energy, and related issues in South Asia and India. The research findings from 
the records and interviews were investigated within the context of regime theory.
Chapter III analyzed the shifted contentions in the literature in regards to the change in the U.S. non­
proliferation strategy to India that culminated in the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreement. The 
pact raised a storm of debate in regards to nuclear trade with India, a de facto nuclear weapons 
state and generated concerns in regards to repercussions of this U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement on the 
non-proliferation regime. Supporters of the agreements contended that the nuclear pact was a prize 
for India's model nuclear non-proliferation conduct and that it motivated other challenger states to 
adhere to the regime. Critics argue that the U.S.-lndia nuclear arrangement denoted a dismal move 
to counter-enlightenment that would inevitably unravel the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and 
that it made impetuses for nuclear suppliers and in addition non-weapon states to mock the 
standards of the regime. In any case, the debate was inconclusive. The nuclear cooperation 
agreement was viewed as a sudden development between the U.S., a leading promoter of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and India, a nuclear outlier, and brought up issues about the U.S. 
inversion of non-proliferation strategy. Many regarded the U.S. deal with India as an endeavour to 
create balance of power in Asia against China.
Chapter IV gives a historical insight into the U.S.-lndia alienation with respect to the establishment 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. It clarifies that the U.S. and India had dissimilar points of view of 
nuclear non-proliferation. The U.S., keen to prevent the emergence of new nuclear states, centred
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only on averting even proliferation of nuclear technology and materials. India, alongside other 
nonaligned states, earnestly engaged with worldwide negotiations to curb horizontal proliferation 
and forced the nuclear weapon states to disarm. The NPT was framed as an instrument to control 
horizontal proliferation, with a feebly worded commitment to disarmament. Puchala and Hopkins 
observed that a regime is formed by the interests of the actors and may not be illustrative of 
interests of all members.
Along these lines, America's mission to prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear technologies 
conflicted with India's journey and need for cutting edge technology. India was not prepared to 
revoke its entitlement to get to and create advanced technologies by consenting to the NPT-centric 
regime. Hence, from a supporter of the cause of nuclear disarmament, India turned into a peculiarity 
for the NPT-centric non-proliferation regime. With the peaceful nuclear explosion of 1974, it tested 
the NPT and ignited a spurt of technological embargoes launched by Western states. For the 
following several decades a stalemate followed as the international community unable to evaluate 
how to manage India.
Chapter V depicts that in the mid-1990s President Bill Clinton made significant efforts to  reinforce 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime, with an indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty and the marking of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Clinton embraced coercive measures 
to "cap, rollback, eliminate" India's nuclear capabilities however was not able to avert the 
nuclearisation of South Asia. The Pokhran II nuclear tests in 1998 spoke to India's rebellion of an 
inexorably disproportionate concentrate on horizontal proliferation with little advancement towards 
nuclear disarmament. Pokhran II lighted a serious review of the U.S. nuclear non-proliferation
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approach, until now, in light of dissent and isolation of India, and added critical urgency to manage 
this anomaly of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Chapter V further details elements that in the consequence of India's 1998 nuclear blasts; the 
Clinton administration imposed sanctions but additionally engaged India in the first ever supported 
nuclear dialogue. The sanctions were quickly uprooted and the Talbott-Singh dialog failed to gain 
non-proliferation commitment from India, regardless, there was considerable shift of the nuclear 
goalposts with regards to India. The post-Pokhran II stage denoted a unique movement in 
Washington's strategy from isolation to nuclear negotiating yet, the Clinton administration was not 
able to manage the challenger of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This chapter likewise 
highlights the absence of measures in the regime to manage post-proliferation circumstances a 
lacuna in the regime that needs to be altered.
Chapter VI demonstrates that during the Bush administration, there was critical rebuilding of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, which prompted reimaging of India, as well as made space to 
engage India within the regime as an accomplice to check the developing threats of nuclear 
trafficking and terrorism. Regardless of the upward swing of the bilateral relationship, the Bush 
administration understood that technological confinements, and the resultant common doubt, were 
making hindrances in building a far reaching association with India. In addition, he understood that 
in the changed global nuclear scenario India's continued existence as a de facto nuclear weapon 
state could have a negative effect on the nuclear non-proliferation regime. With India at the less 
than desirable end of technological embargoes, India couldn't be required to assume a significant 
part in dealing with the post-9-11 dangers radiating from the nexus of terrorism and WMD 
trafficking. Consequently, the Bush administration chose to lift the technological embargoes
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hallowed in its domestic legislation and in the Nuclear Supplier Group's (NSG) rules. Essentially, the 
High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), 
focused around the guideline of proportional obligations, made a pathway for transfer of sensitive 
technology to India and made nuciear coordinated effort between the two nations conceivable. The 
imperativeness of these key measures attempted by the two nations has gotten little consideration 
in the current literature.
Chapter VII detailed the "principles, norms, rules and regulations" of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime and examined the terms of the U.S.-lndia nuclear accord in this setting. It contends that the 
NPT structures the centre of the nuclear non-proliferation regime however it is not synonymous 
with the regime. The nuclear non-proliferation regime comprises of a heterogeneous blend of 
multilateral and bilateral agreements, treaties, and strategies that direct the conduct of state actors. 
It has likewise been contended that the U.S. uses nuclear cooperation agreement to push its non­
proliferation goals by managing the conduct of recipient states. Also, the Bush administration did 
not give unconditional technological access to nuclear India, however adhered to the principles and 
norms of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, wherein suppliers set the rules and recommend 
proper conduct to the recipients of nuclear technology.
India had consistently declined to agree to the NPT, and now in the wake of turning into a de facto 
nuclear weapons state, the likelihood of India joining the settlement were unimportant. 
Consequently, the Bush administration made India consent to non-NPT regulations and institutions 
of the non-proliferation regime, in a vital offer to engage the recalcitrant India within the global 
nuclear order. In return for cutting edge nuclear technology, the 2005 U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement 
made it compulsory for India to adjust trade controls to MTCR and NSG rules, to isolate its regular
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civilian and military facilities, and to place IAEA safeguards on its civilian nuclear facilities. What's 
more, India acknowledged a unilateral ban on further nuclear testing and signed an Additional 
Protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Accordingly, the change in the U.S. nuclear 
non-proliferation policy, manifest in the U.S.-lndia civil nuclear accord, does not check disentangling 
of the regime, rather it denote an accommodation within the regime to oblige the anomaly.
Subsequently, the change is dynamic as opposed to retrogressive for the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. Before commencing with the dialogue, I might want to offer several provisos. To begin with, 
the U.S.-lndia nuciear pact became controversial, not to discuss the multitude of perspectives on the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime itself. This leaves sufficient scope for disagreement. Second, this is 
a qualitative study; that is, w ithout rigid mathematical and scientific formulae, the argument is liable 
to diverse interpretations.
Remembering these perspectives, this thesis, with the assistance of regime theoretical analysis, 
which contends that the U.S.-lndia nuclear understanding characterizes a progressive change within 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Stephen Krasner has provided clear distinction between 
change within a regime and change of a regime. He suggests that changes in principles and norms 
lead to a complete change of the regime, while changes in rules and procedures imprint changes 
within the regime.^^® Puchala and Hopkins consider changes within the regime to be evolutionary 
changes of the regime.^^°
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is right now going up against noteworthy difficulties that place 
it under coercion: noncompliance issues, the presence of de facto nuclear weapon states, rise of non 
state actors, nuclear terrorism and trafficking, and a developing interest for nuclear energy around 
the globe.
Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables," International Organisation 36, 
no.2 (Spring 1982):185-188
Puchala and Hopkins, "Lessons from  Inductive Analysis," 249.
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Steven Miller contends:
This regime has an oddly schizophrenic history. On the one hand, it has 
attracted nearly universal membership, its critical importance is routinely 
acknowledged, and it has proven to be durable and resilient across four 
challenging decades ... On the other hand, it is chronically troubled, beset by 
crises and setbacks and possible defections, amidst fears for its future and 
doubts about its adequacy^*^.
Since the end of the Cold War the change of the NPT-centric regime has been underway, proven by 
the indefinite extension of the NPT and signing of the CTBT. This process picked up energy in the 
consequence of the 9-11 terrorist attacks. A critical number of multidimensional changes are 
continuously embraced to manage the contemporary issues facing the regime the tightening of 
export controls, fortifying of the IAEA, and broadening of IAEA safeguards, including the Additional 
Protocol. More up to date activities, for example, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and 
Counter Security Initiative (CSI) supplement the regime and authorize stringent avoidance systems 
to check trafficking in illegal materials. Recommendations have been progressed to create 
proliferation-resistant technologies that would permit nuclear energy projects to thrive w ithout the 
danger of proliferation. In this manner, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is developing and 
moving past the NPT. This does not mean the NPT is insignificant, or there is an evolutionary shift. 
The nuclear non-proliferation regime is NPT-centric yet it is not confined to the NPT alone, it is a 
heterogeneous blend of several different agreements, and measures that control the conduct of the 
members. The Bush administration went under substantial feedback for reducing the stress on the 
NPT and organizing new counter-proliferation (or ban) measures. At the same time this was 
essentially a reorientation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime to supplement the NPT to manage 
the extended range of nuclear threats from state and non-state actors.
Steven E. M iller, Wael Al-Assad, Jayantha Dhanapala, C. Raja Mohan and Ta Minh Tuan, Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform and  the  
Nuclear Non-proliferation Regime, (Massachusetts: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, April 2 0 1 2 ),! .
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The international community headed by the U.S. is focused on altering the anomalies, and the 
multidimensional changes imply reinforcing of the regime. At present managing the current 
difficulties, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is getting to be more far reaching, more implanted 
in supplier controls. For example, the international nuclear fuel bank proposed by President Obama 
will enlarge the supplier controls. There are worries that the proposed fuel banks would turn into 
"the energy equivalent of a nuclear umbrella with development rights being restricted to a 
privileged few, as in the case of nuclear weapons."^^^ Thus, the nuclear non-proliferation regime is 
developing through "reflexive adjustment." Andy Knight suggests that Reflexive adjustment could be 
portrayed as a generally oblivious reaction to exogenous or systemic forces. It permits an 
international organization to change structures and techniques as indicated by changing requests 
and does so in a noticeably ad hoc, creative yet to a great extent non purposive design.
On the off chance that the worldwide group is not able to resolve contemporary difficulties, or if 
these difficulties amplify, there is potential for a crunch of the regime. For example, in the wake of 
increased interest for nuclear energy, the regime may be not able to hold or deal with the 
proliferation of nuclear technology. Steven Miller remarks, "The expansion and spread of nuclear 
power could lead to dangers ahead if steps are not taken to ensure that the NPT regime is able to 
effectively regulate a more nuclearized world."^^^ Viewed in this setting, engaging the de facto 
nuclear weapons states, like India, denotes progression instead of a retrogression of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime. As Joseph F. Pilat stresses that the U.S.-lndia settlement was "an effort to 
address the current problems with the regime by bringing India into the fold to the extent 
possible."^'^^
For more than three decades India existed as an anomaly of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. It 
was normal that the estrangement of India would stall India's civil nuclear and military projects.
A. Vinod Kumar, "A Doctrine at Work: Obama's Evolving Nuclear Policy and W hat it Bodes for India," Strategic Analysis 35, no.2 (March  
2011): 213
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Palgrave, 2000),82.
M iller, "Nuclear Collisions,"3.
Joseph F. Pilat, "The End of the Regime?" International Affairs 83, no.3 (2007):475.
175 I P a g e
eventually compelling it to sign the NPT. Actually, India created a nuclear energy program as well as 
moved ahead to create nuclear weapons. In less than five years of the coming into force of the NPT, 
India conducted a "peaceful nuclear explosion," showed its nuclear weapons capacity yet kept up 
obscurity on weaponisation. Thus, in 1998, India ended the haziness in regards to its nuclear plans 
and exploded nuclear weapons. Actually, India turned into a nuclear weapon state however it was 
not concurred nuclear weapon status under the NPT. In any case, it marked a grim setback to 
Washington's strategy of estrangement.
Being a de facto nuclear state that had not signed the NPT or the CTBT, India was outside different 
types of rules and regulations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. India was likewise hesitant to 
take part in arrangements on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Besides, as India had not signed 
the NPT, it was outside the IAEA safeguards framework. Under the NPT, non-nuclear weapon states 
are obliged to acknowledge full-scope safeguards, however India for three decades had dodged IAEA 
reconnaissance. The Bush administration recognized that India's case, dissimilar to those of Iran,
Iraq, and North Korea, was not of rebelliousness with the NPT. Washington understood that keeping 
India outside the nuclear non-proliferation regime was not filling any need, and could be possibly 
precarious for the regime. Bringing India within the nuclear non-proliferation arrangement of action 
would reinforce the regime. The rigorous dialogues and diplomacy between the U.S. and India that 
has proceeded since 1998 made space for the bridging of the nuciear non-proliferation divide with 
India and achieved a reorientation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime amid the Bush 
administration.
Washington adjusted the fact that India is a non-signatory of the NPT and has nuclear weapons. The 
states of the nuclear agreement with India are as per the standards of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, in view o f supplier controls that would control India's nuclear conduct. India needed to 
seperate its civil and military facilities, accept safeguards on its civil nuclear facilities, consent to
participate in global arrangements for the detailing of the FMCT, acknowledge moratorium on 
nuclear testing, and embrace stricter export controls. For this agreement to be concluded, India had 
to look for the endorsement of the two essential associations of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Consequently, this 
understanding marked the start of the incremental mix of India into the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime, and guarantees adherence of India, non-signatory of the NPT, to the principles and norms of 
the regime. Bringing India, a challenger of the regime, into the regime through engaging India in the 
non-NPT measures, is helpful to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Truth be told, this makes a 
way to scaffold the gap with other nuclear outliers. Mohammed El-Baradei, the then IAEA executive 
general, respected the U.S.-lndia consent to embark on full nuclear energy cooperation and to work 
to upgrade nuclear non-proliferation and security. He remarked that out of the box thinking and 
dynamic participation by all members of the international community are significant if we are to 
develop nuclear arms control, non-proliferation, safety and security, and handle new threats, for 
example, illegal trafficking in sensitive nuclear technology and the risks of nuclear terrorism.^'^®
Obama Administration and U.S.-lndia nuclear Deal
The post-2008 U.S.-lndia nuclear argument gives prove that through the nuciear agreement 
Washington planned to align India to the nuclear non-proliferation regime and looked for its 
cooperation in reinforcing and strengthening the regime. Subsequently, it challenges the myth of an 
approaching U.S.-lndia strategic partnership directed against China.
According to Paul Lettow in the special council report, has observed that President Obama set out 
the contours of his disarmament and non-proliferation poiicy in addresses in Prague in April 2009 
and to the UN Security Council in September 2009. He expressed a pledge to seek after a world
Remarks of IAEA Director General, M oham m ed El-Baradei, "IAEA Director General Reacts to  U.S.-lndia Cooperation Agreem ent," IAEA 
Press Release, International Atomic Energy Agency, 20 July 2005. Available at
http ://w w w .laea.org /newscenter/pressreleases/2005/prn200504.htm l
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without nuclear weapons, with the provisos that the United States would keep up its nuclear 
stockpile as long as others did, and that nuclear abolition would not likely occur within his lifetime. 
He called for a take after on Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with Russia before the end of 
2009 and made clear that his administration would seek after Senate consent to the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and international negotiations for a Fissile Material Cut o ff Treaty (FMCT)^^^.
First and foremost. President Bush was censured for offering a nuclear agreement to India and 
considered in charge of the exceptional change in nuclear non-proliferation approach, which it was 
said could possibly disentangle the global export control regime. This research recommends, the 
nuclear arrangement was offered to bring India within the nuclear non-proliferation regime, and the 
methodology of the current Obama administration underpins this. Critics of the Bush administration 
contended that the U.S.-lndia nuclear agreement would go into disrepair amid the Obama 
administration because of its solid non-proliferation orientation. Despite the fact that the Obama 
administration's strategy to nuclear issues has been distinctive in several regards from that of the 
Bush, yet, the Obama administration has excitedly upheld the nuclear concurrence with India, and is 
seeking after an arrangement of improving India's joining in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
The Obama organization is additionally endeavouring to incorporate India into the current 
worldwide nuclear structural planning. The U.S. needs India apply for a membership in the NSG, 
MTCR, and other export control arrangements. As indicated by a White House fact sheet, dated 
November 8,2010, the United States. "Intends to support India's full membership" in the 
multilateral export control regimes.^^®
In a jo int statement of Manmohan Singh and Barack Obama in November 2010, Washington 
guaranteed India of its backing for India's entrance into four multilateral regimes the NSG, the 
Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In
Paul Lettow. "Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation regime" International Institutions and Global Governance Program, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 54, April 201 0 .1 7 -19
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addition, the Obama organization has stretched out backing to the Proliferation Security Initiative 
and the Container Security Initiative, broadly censured as unilateral imperialists measures of the 
Bush administration, and has looked for India's backing in these groups. In fact, Obama "seeks to 
enlarge their scope through cooperative enhancement and institutionalisation."^"^^
Second, with its anomalous relationship to the nuclear regime reset by the Bush administration, 
there has been a change in India's stance at the nuclear non-proliferation issues. Shyam Sa ran, 
especial envoy of the Prime Minister on nuclear issues, comments.
From being an outiier, India is now accepted as a partner in the global 
nuclear domain. The success of the civil nuclear initiative has 
engendered a sense of assurance and confidence which enables us to 
look, proactively and not defensively, at a new global agenda for nuclear 
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.^^®
India is energetically looking for more prominent support in the global nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. In a major foreign policy shift, India's foreign secretary, expressed: "the logical conclusion of 
partnership with India is its fuil membership in the four multilateral regimes."^^^ India is intrigued by 
joining the Nuclear Supplier Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Australia Group, and 
the Wassenaar Arrangement. Prior, for three decades India had vociferously contradicted these 
export control cartels as technology disavowal regimes; India is currently quick to join these groups.
A. Vinod Kumar, "Doctrine at Work," 212.
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This means a vital change in the nuclear argument. There is a change in India's position on the CTBT, 
additionally. Prior, India had declined to sign the CTBT, referring to it as prejudicial. Presently, the 
consideration is whether the CTBT can guarantee India's national security interests.^”  About 
whether, this may lessen the local resistance in India to repudiate nuclear testing and accordingly 
straightforwardness India's acknowledgement of the CTBT. Carl Paddock observes: "Globally, India is 
now perceived to be inside the tent, a part of the global solution to nuclear non-proliferation issues. 
So, while the NPT is a no-no for New Delhi, at least in present form, the CTBT can leave room for 
manoeuvre."^^^ Lauding the Obama administration moves to nuclear disarmament, Shyam Saran, 
states, "It is also our conviction that if the world moves categorically toward nuclear disarmament in 
a credible time-frame, then Indo-U.S. differences over the CTBT would probably recede into the 
background."^^"^ Furthermore, India is cooperating with the international community on a fissile 
material control treaty in the Conference on Disarm ,there is little advancement in the detailing of a 
FMCT as the dialogues in the Conference on Disarmament are not able to move ahead because of 
procedural and political troubles Pakistan has been stalling the negotiations for several years now. In 
any case, by making its dedication in the July 2005 accord, "India has shut its alternatives to oppose 
the arrangement regardless of concerns over its ramifications [due to  stopping fissile material 
production] for its key project. Subsequently, the terms of engagement and nuclear dialogue are 
changing between the U.S. and India.
The nuclear agreement, undoubtedly, has been a "game changer." Through the terms of nuclear 
arrangement, the U.S. has bound India to the nuclear non-proliferation regime, consequently, India 
can't escape it responsibilities. At the same time, the integration of India within the regime will be 
incremental and it will be guileless to expect complete integration overnight. Likewise, it w ill not 
automatic or smooth; there are still a few leaps that must be crossed. In 2012, all the export control 
associations NSG, MTCR, Australia Group, Wassenaar Arrangement—held plenary meetings to
Carl Paddock, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty: Where Does india Stand? (New Delhi: Epitome Books, 2010),54. 
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consider India's enrolment. The issue of non-membership of the NPT may haunt India in its 
endeavours to gain membership in the export control regimes. Sanndeep remarks, "The fact that the 
NSG Plenary will consider India's case does not mean membership will be granted automatically. A 
long road of persuading all the members lies ahead because decisions at NSG are taken 
unanimously," Regardless, referring to the case of China, Paddock accepts there is potential for 
full coordination of India within the nuclear non-proliferation regime. He further observes that, India 
could gain from China. For a considerable length of time China stayed away from the global nuclear 
regime, calling it an instrument of Western dominion, while it proliferated with exemption to 
Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran. Be that as it may in the wake of signing the NPT in 1992, as a 
nuclear weapon state, and eventually signed CTBT, FMCT [sic], MTCR, and so on.^^ ®
At long last, the "strategic partnership" seen in the restricted realist interpretation as an alliance, 
particularly vis-à-vis China, has died a natural death. As opposed to the hype made not long after the 
agreement, the U.S. also India has not signed any agreement against containing China or any other 
nation. Actually, India has declined to take after Washington's directs on the current U.S. nuclear 
standoff with Iran without influencing the U.S.-lndia relationship. Despite the fact that, India is 
agreeing to the United Nations sanctions against Iran, it has declined to be a part of the U.S. headed 
sanctions against Iran.^^^ Washington acknowledges India's position on Iran and would "not want to 
jeopardise India's energy security by asking it to reduce its dependence on Iranian oil."^^®
To date. President Obama's discourses and his administration's policy and actions have accentuated 
and been particular on arms control and disarmament approaches yet have been less explicit in 
putting forward important steps to reinforce the non-proliferation regime. The administration needs 
to shift focus and interests to tying measures to fortify the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
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Importance for Present-day Proliferation
Gaining from the experience with India, Washington needs to look for the current chances to engage 
with other nuclear states like North Korea, Iran and Pakistan. While the U.S. has more than once 
engaged North Korea. Recently the bilateral negotiations with Iran since the oust of the Shah of Iran 
and engaging in bilateral diplomacy have helped bring forth the recent nuclear deal with Iran. So to 
address the issue, that by what means can Washington hope to achieve its nuclear non-proliferation 
goals is still applicable and paramount? The U.S. can't afford to restrict Iran. A comprehensive 
engagement with Iran has helped the U.S. to accomplish several key goals running from nuclear 
issues to regional issues. This is so on the grounds that the dialogue methodology makes space for 
acknowledgment of common diversions and engagement. Minister James Dobbins avows,
... Engagement is a virtue in its own right. It may or may not lead to agreement but 
it will always lead to better information, and better information will lead to better 
policy. The more information a president and his administration have, the more 
soundly based their decisions are likely to be. And engagement always leads to 
information. It may not always lead to agreement.^^®
U.S. approach with respect to North Korea has been similar to a pendulum, swinging from one great 
disengagement, dangers, and assents to an alternate engagement. To be powerful, the dialog must 
be predictable and maintained. Alluding to the pact signed in 1994 between the U.S. what's more 
North Korea, Ambassador Ferial Ara Saeed suggests "North Korea's weapons program is much 
smaller today than it would have been without the 1994 deal. Pyongyang could have had an arsenal 
of a hundred or more nuclear weapons, instead of enough plutonium for four to eight weapons, 
w ithout the eight-year pause".^®°
Ambassador James Dobbins, Remarks at the ACA Press Briefing, "Iran's Nuclear Challenge: Where to go from  here?" Arms Control 
Association, Washington D.C., October 22, 2009.
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Besides, an alternate lesson that rises up out of India's case is that nuclear discretion ought not to be 
focused around elevated goals of prompt rollback and disposal, as sought after by the Clinton 
administration before the nuclear tests. Rather the introductory destination ought to  be what is 
conceivable and achievable. For example. Ambassador Saeed proposes that on account of Iran and 
North Korea, the U.S. should first demand a "nuclear stop," and after that, through managed dialog, 
extend to more extensive terms of engagement. Saeed comments, "securing nuclear materials and 
gaining access, oversight, monitoring, and transparency over facilities and programs [in Iran and 
North Korea], however imperfect, serves critical U.S. interests."^®^
With respect to the de facto nuclear weapon states, in the same way that the U.S. brought India 
inside the nuclear non-proliferation regime, Washington needs to captivate Pakistan and Israel "as 
partners in nuclear non-proliferation and arms co n t ro l . Pak i s t a n  is likewise intrigued by getting a 
nuclear agreement, including a NSG waiver, like that of India. El-Baradei comments that he would 
help a nuclear arrangement for Pakistan, on the o ff chance that it demonstrates responsible conduct 
with nuclear technology.
Imminent Paths for Future Research
This research focuses on the need to go past realist perceptions to focus the particular 
components that shape the interests of individual states in connection to international regimes; as 
such, why does a specific state decline to consent to a specific regime? Edward Luck calls attention 
to that, "The relative neglect of the factors that make individual states unique, in favour of an 
assumption of generic motivations, values, and responses, has had distorting consequences for both 
the theory and practice of global governance."^®^ Luck notes that significant exploration is needed 
to focus the interests and motivations of states sticking to or contradicting from international
Ibid. 7.
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agreements.
The empirical data and analysis provided in this study establish a framework for further research in 
several perspectives: First, the U.S.-lndia nuclear accord embodies bridging of the nuclear non­
proliferation divide, yet critical alterations remain. India will keep on pursuing its expansion of goals, 
objectives and endeavour to hold its strategic self-governance. There is a lot of scope for 
explorations on how India could be completely coordinated in, or at any rate extend its engagement 
with the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Second, the examination gives an understanding into the 
association of how Bush administration and high level officials made the extraordinary choice to lift 
the technological embargoes against India. Along these lines, the role of personality factors in 
foreign policy decision making and cognitive Psychology studies in this respect can be researched 
further.
Third, this thesis has been focused on the change in U.S. nuclear non-proliferation strategy in the 
connection of the U.S.-lndia accord and looked at the triad relationship of U.S., India and Nuclear 
non- Proliferation regime. It would be intriguing to investigate India's inspirations to participate in 
nuclear cooperation with the U.S. Did Indian policy makers apprehend that staying outside the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime was not serving Indian interests anymore? What elements 
propelled India to acknowledge the regulations of the nuclear non-proliferation regime held in the 
U.S.-lndia nuclear accord? What part in the future will India try to play in the nuclear non­
proliferation regime?
Fourth, this examination has used regime theory to examine the importance of the U.S.-lndia 
nuclear pact. It would be fascinating to investigate, whether this change in U.S. nuclear non­
proliferation policy be considered as a paradigmatic movement or not? In this schema, what can 
Kuhn's hypothesis of ideal model, and standard change, help our elucidation of this issue? Fifth, this
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examination reflects how the U.S. has headed in the station and upkeep of the nuclear non­
proliferation regime. The U.S. is not viewed as an economic hegemon anymore; however it is still a 
hegemon in the nuclear weapons coliseum. In what manners can the hegemonic hypothesis of 
stability help us comprehend U.S.-lndia nuclear cooperation?
Sixth, researchers can additionally consider the U.S.-lndia nuclear cooperation through a neo- 
Gramscian lens. In the wake of technological embargoes for several decades, the U.S. has 
endeavoured to engage India in nuclear cooperation. Can it be argued that in perspective of the 
global nuclear energy demand and the developing interest for more prominent access to nuclear 
technology, the U.S. has chosen India—a leading voice of counter-hegemonic thoughts?
Seventh, this thesis identifies a real loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. This 
examination concentrates on an absence of successful post-proliferation management of de facto 
nuclear states and underscores that there is a need to make rigid post-proliferation measures to rein 
in other de facto nuclear weapon states and additionally future nuclear crossovers. Likewise, this 
examination recommends that the reason of bringing India within nuclear non-proliferation regime 
can provide approach to deal with the other de facto nuclear states. Thus, further research needs to 
be done on how to deal with de facto nuclear states like Pakistan and Iran and Israel and how to 
bring these fragile states under the umbrella of the nuclear non-proliferation regime?
Eight, most important point that there needs to be more research done on direct diplomatic 
approach while dealing with de facto states like Pakistan, Iran and Israel and bring them into the fold 
of nuclear non-proliferation regime. Paul Lettow in a special council report on strengthening nuclear 
non -proliferation regime states that Forceful direct diplomatic approach makes the case fo r specific 
meaningful and binding non-proliferation measures underscoring the greatly antagonistic security 
and economic consequences of continued proliferation. There is a wide strategic communications 
and education role for the U.S government and the president specifically, to set out unmistakably
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the risk to all states from proliferation, and to help in initiatives to fortify the regime—and also to 
take part in immediate and direct, capital to  capital diplomacy on the subject^®" .^
Last but not the least, this research has underlined the development in the useful extent of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. Yet, there is considerable space for in depth analysis of the 
development of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly with respect to the unobtrusive 
parity of commitments enshrined in the NPT—Articles IV (nuclear energy) and VI (disarmament). 
What is the answer from the non-nuclear weapon states with respect to the fortifying of the supplier 
restrictions on the transfer of nuclear technology? How the nuclear non-proliferation regime could 
be further redesigned to bear the approaching challenges and difficulties of the nuclear renaissance?
Paul Lettow. "Strengthening the Nuclear Non-proliferation regim e" In ternational Institutions and Giobai Governance Program, Council 
on Foreign Relations, Council Special Report No. 54, April 2 01 0 .1 9
186 [ P a g e
Appendix A
Field research conducted at the following centres/ institutes:
Asia Society, New York 
Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C. 
Centre for Advanced Study of India, Philadelphia 
Council of Foreign Relations, New York and Washington D.C. 
The South Asia Centre, and Van Pelt Library, Philadelphia 
Royal United Services Institute (Doha) Qatar
• Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan
• American University of Sharjah, UAE
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Appendix B
List of Interviewees
1. General Talat Masood ( Nuclear Policy Analyst South Asia)
2. Dr Zafar Jaspal (Nuclear South Asia Expert, Islamabad, Pakistan)
3. Ambassador Thomas Pickering
4. Anonymous: Academic and specialist on U.S.-South Asia relations
5. Anonymous: non-proliferation scholar
6. Anonymous: Senior official at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC)
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